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Abstract
Secession has contributed to nearly 50 intra-state armed conflicts around the world, and
remains a complex issue in public international law. Over the past 72 years, several cases
stand out as providing evidence of state practice with regards to invoking a successful right
to unilateral secession: Bangladesh, Croatia, South Sudan, East Timor, Eritrea and Kosovo,
to name a few. However, apart from invoking a right to secession, these cases also share a
common factor that legitimized their independence: their Unilateral Non-Colonial (UNC)
secessions became legal as a result of two factors: (i) an invocation of a right to selfdetermination which was systematically denied and, (ii) the denial of self-determination was
followed by egregious abuses of human rights deemed as in extremis (ethnic cleansing,
genocide and mass killings). A priori, should a putative state have the right to unilaterally
secede based on human rights considerations alone? And if it secedes, should the use of force
by the putative state or a third-party state in its defense be considered a violation of the
prohibition on the use of force, if it is done in response to in extremis cases of human rights
abuses?
This thesis will defend the existence of three core suppositions of the principle of selfdetermination: (i) that the principle of self-determination exists as a legal right under
international law, (ii) that the principle of self-determination provides a qualified right of a
UNC secession, and lastly, (iii) that, in cases where the principle of self-determination is
systematically denied (combined with human rights abuses designated as in extremis), a legal
right may be invoked to a military intervention by a third-state. In turn, the preceding
suppositions will be examined in light of case studies that either justify or reject UNC
secessions on the basis of the previously outlined criteria; demonstrating a legal exception to
the use of force in humanitarian crises of a self-determination nature, as well as a framework
for the consideration of the legitimacy of newly formed states by way of UNC secessions.
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Secession
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Preface
Secession has contributed to over 50 intra-state armed conflicts around the world, and
remains a complex issue in public international law.1 Yet, apart from its devastating effects
on international affairs, why does it pose such a challenge to the international legal order?
The answer is layered and complex; however, one can start the enquiry by analyzing a
corollary concept of international law that secession purports to violate: the principle of
territorial inviolability.2 Consider this opinion by Brad Roth, which illustrates some of the
primary legal challenges with the concept of secession:
The Yugoslav and other cases [of secession] have inspired among many
advocates and scholars a disparagement of the traditional territorial integrity
norm for its insensitivity to claims based on considerations of democracy,
constitutionality, history, or ethno-national coherence... By taking [such]
considerations "off the table" in determinations of the admissibility of aid to
secession, traditional norms against cross-border projections of coercive power
transcend competing perspectives on the legitimacy and justness of internal
arrangements. To predicate the foundations of the peace and security order on
ideologically contested propositions would signal that an external use of
coercion or force to revise sovereign boundaries amounts to just another
political conflict, rather than an extraordinary breach requiring an emergent and
coordinated international response.3
Stated otherwise, the legal and political ramifications of secessions are a topic of an

In 2012, the number of conflicts was at 50. The number has likely risen since then. See Joel Day, “The
Remedial Right of Secession in International Law” (2012) 4:1 J Intl Pol’y Stud 19 at 19.
2 The principle of territorial inviolability (otherwise referred to as the principle of territorial sovereignty)
is a corollary principle of international law. See Samantha Besson, ed, “Sovereignty” in Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press) at online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com>
(“[t]he principle of sovereignty, ie of supreme authority within a territory, is a pivotal principle of
modern international law. What counts as sovereignty depends on the nature and structure of the
international legal order and vice-versa. Most of the other, if not all institutions and principles of
international law rely, directly or indirectly, on State sovereignty; it suffices to mention, for instance, the
relationship between the conditions and attributes of statehood or the principles of territorial or
personal jurisdiction, immunity, and non-intervention, on the one hand, and considerations of
sovereignty, on the other. The 1945 United Nations (UN) system itself is based, albeit not directly on the
principle of sovereignty itself, on a necessary corollary of that principle: the principle of sovereign
equality of its Member States as guaranteed in Art. 2 (1) UN Charter (States, Sovereign Equality).
Provided States have supreme authority within their territory, the plenitude of internal jurisdiction, their
immunity from other States’ own jurisdiction and their freedom from other States’ intervention on their
territory (Art. 2 (4) and (7) UN Charter), but also their equal rank to other sovereign States are
consequences of their sovereignty” at paras 1-2).
3 Brad R Roth, “The Virtues of Bright Lines: Self-Determination, Secession, and External
Intervention"(2015) 16:3 Ger L J 384 at 386.
1
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extensive debate in international law. As further explained by Glen Anderson, a scholar who
has written extensively on the subject, “[i]ndeed the word ‘secession,’ is conspicuously
absent from virtually all international legal instruments. This situation is explicable by the
fact that secession represents a challenge to perhaps the two most fundamental principles of
international law: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.”4 In short, the legal
parameters of secession outside of the colonial context 5 have not yet crystallized under
international law.6
Outside of the legal parameters of secession, putative or emerging states that have
thus far not succeeded in attaining statehood (such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), etc.)7 have further exacerbated how the concept is

Glen Anderson, “Secession in International Law and Relations: What Are We Talking About?” (2013)
35:3 Loy LA Intl & Comp L Rev 343 at 343 [Anderson, “Secession in International Law”].
5 See Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 (“[o]utside of the colonial context’ refers to
“…a territory [that] is ‘geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the
country administering it’ the territory concerned is, prima facie, of a colonial nature Once it has been
established that such a prima facie case of geographical and ethnical or cultural distinctiveness of a
territory exists, other elements may then be brought into consideration. These additional elements may
be, inter alia, of an administrative, political juridical, economic or historical nature. If they affect the
relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily
places the latter in a position or status of subordination, they support the presumption that there is an
obligation to transmit information under Article 73e of the UN Charter” at 375). See also Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res 1514 (XV), UNGAOR, 15th Sess, UN
Doc A/1541 (14 December 1960) [Declaration of the Granting of Independence].
6 For evidence of support that the legal parameters of secession outside of the colonial context have not
yet been clearly established in international law, see Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A
Legal Reappraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press,1995) at 72 [Cassese, “Self-Determination of
Peoples”]. See also Ved P Nanda, “Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede” (1981) 13 Case W Res J Int’l L 257 at 258 [Nanda, “Self-Determination in IL”].
7 South Ossetia and Abkhazia may eventually become successful secessions but have not as of the time of
writing achieved statehood. Their bids for statehood have exacerbated the need to define the legal status
of secession in international law. See Glen Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Criteria
for Statehood in International Law” (2015) 41:1 Brook J Intl L 1 at 4, nn 6–7 [Anderson, “Unilateral NonColonial Secession”]. Chapter 4 will provide evidence of their statehood bids as being illegal under
international law. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was deemed an “illegal secessionist
entity” by a court ruling and referred to as a “purported state” in several General Assembly Resolutions.
At time of writing, it has only been recognized by one state: Turkey. Additionally, with reunification talks
underway between the TRNC and Cyprus (infra note 42), it can be inferred that the TRNC’s status as an
entity, created through blatant violations of peremptory norms of international law, continues to impact
its statehood formation process, and hence has obligated it to recount its illegal creation through a
negotiated solution with the metropolitan state to which it belongs de jure. From this thesis’ standpoint,
this provides evidence of the fact that illegal UNC secessions cannot ‘survive’ as states ad infinitum, and
hence, will at some point (such as the case of TRNC), be forced to renegotiate their status under
international law (ibid at 69, nn 254–57).
4
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viewed in the contemporary world. In large part, a reliance on the strength of the territorial
inviolability principle has done little to deter state actors from seeking to secede from their
former metropolitan state.8 Given the lack of clarity in international law with respect to
secession, this thesis intends to answer the following question: should the use of force by a
third state acting in defense of a putative state or entity be considered a violation of
international law if it is done in response to cases of human rights abuses deemed as in
extremis?9
This thesis will argue that, through the principle of self-determination, unilateral noncolonial secessions (UNCs)10 have an established status under international law. It will do so
by focusing on the principle of self-determination as the crucial factor in allowing for an
entity to become a putative state in order to legally secede from an existing state under a
particular set of circumstances. Additionally, it will provide a framework through which a
third-state or collective of third-states could violate the prohibition on the use of force in
cases of UNC secessions that involve human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. Hence, this
thesis’ primary argument will be built on the existence of three core suppositions related to
the principle of self-determination: (i) that the principle of self-determination exists as a legal
right under international law, (ii) that the principle of self-determination provides a qualified
right of a UNC secession, and lastly, (iii) that, in cases where the principle of selfdetermination is systematically denied, combined with human rights abuses designated as in
extremis, a legal right may be invoked to a military intervention by a third state. In turn, the
preceding suppositions will be examined in light of case studies that either justify or reject
UNC secessions on the basis of the previously outlined criteria. Lastly, it is important to note

Catalonia’s bid to secede from Spain is a prime example of an ongoing dispute over the independence of
the autonomous province. For more on this situation, see “Catalan independence movement seeks boost
with mass protest”, The Guardian (10 September 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com>.
9 ‘In Extremis’ as defined by Glen Anderson refers to “…where a sub-state group, or people, has been
subject to deliberate and sustained human rights abuses (ethnic cleansing, mass killings and genocide) by
the existing state.” See Glen Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and The Use of Force: Effect on
Claims to Statehood in International Law” (2013) 28 Conn J Int’l L 197 [Anderson, “The Use of Force”].
at 197.
10 For the purposes of this thesis, a unilateral non-colonial secession can be defined as a unilateral
withdrawal of a non-colonial territory by an entity from an existing state. Upon withdrawal, the entity
declares itself a state. For more on this, see Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at
8.
8
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that this thesis will focus on the simultaneous examination of several, still-contested, areas of
international law – the law on territorial integrity, legal and illegal use of force by states, and
the right of peoples to self-determination – all of which will be considered collectively in
order to come to the aforementioned conclusion.
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Chapter 1
Chapter 1: An Introduction
1.0.

Background
Chapter 1 will be separated into three parts. First, a brief sub-section on the scope

and the objectives of this thesis will define the parameters of the subject being studied, as
well as the objectives that this study will aim to achieve. Subsequently, a contemporary
definition of the sources of international law will be presented in order to establish the
interpretations of international law as they pertain to this thesis. Lastly, a final subsection
will present a thesis roadmap in order to allow the reader to understand the methodology
used in support its primary elements.

1.1.

Objectives and Scope
The relationship between military interventions11 and secessions invoked through

the principle of self-determination has not been thoroughly defined under international
law. On one hand, self-determination as a principle of international law should be
respected given its status a peremptory norm12 of international law, on the other hand, a

It is important to specify that the terms military intervention and humanitarian intervention are
often conflated. Outside of the context of self-determination, military operations and interventions by
third-states have largely been termed ‘humanitarian interventions.’ For the purposes of this thesis,
the term ‘military intervention’ will be used as a primary term to define all military interventions
(regardless of whether the intervention has been claimed as being ‘humanitarian’ in nature, or not.)
A thorough study of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention will be presented in Chapter 3 which
will demonstrate the legally accepted definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’. Another reason for
using the term ‘military intervention’ is that it provides a neutral and objective context with which
the act of the intervention can be analyzed without prejudice.
12 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states that “…[A] peremptory
[jus cogens] norm of general international law is accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole, as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, CAN TS 1980 No 37 art 53
(entered into force 27 January 1980) [VCLT]. See also Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”,
supra note 7 (“[t]here are two overlapping schools of thought as to the content or scope of
peremptory norms. According to the "substantive" school, peremptory norms are substantive rules
11

2

self-determination claim that purports to advocate for a separation of territory clashes
with the principle of territorial inviolability, which is equally as corollary to the
international legal order of sovereign states. 13 Thus, the dilemma of whether a hierarchy
of principles can exist in the case of an external self-determination claim (such as a UNC
secession) requires meticulous examination.
The significance of studying the legality of military interventions in the context of
in extremis abuses of human rights was identified as early as the Roman era by Cicero,
and reaffirmed by classical international legal scholars such as Grotius and Kant.14 For
example, Grotius introduced the concept of societas humana (the universal community of
mankind) whereby a senseless attack by a “tyrant” on humanity would command a
‘humanitarian’ intervention.15 Nevertheless, apart from its normative and philosophical
meaning, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which purports to support the
obligatory concept of military intervention in all cases of systematic oppression of
civilians, has had a complicated relationship with both classical and contemporary
international law.16 As explained by Nardin, several issues can be clearly identified once
one faces the reality of providing a legal defense for the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention under international law:
[Humanitarian intervention] holds that armed intervention is morally
[legally] justified when people are violently mistreated by their rulers, and

of international law from which no derogation is permitted. According to this view, structural rules,
such as pacta sunt servanda and pacta tertiis, which operate in the context of treaty law, are excluded.
The "systemic" school, by contrast, defines peremptory norms as including substantive norms from
which no derogation is permitted and structural rules” at 62, n 230).
13 This thesis argues that the principle of self-determination should be respected on the basis of its
status as a peremptory norm in international law. For evidence of scholarly support of this position
see generally, David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2002) at 289; Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 140; Alexander
Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 51
[Orakhelashvili, “Peremptory Norms”]; Glen Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry into the United
Nations Law of Self-Determination: A Right to Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession?” (2016) 49:4
Vanderbilt J of Transnational L 1183 at 1185 [Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”].
14 Susan Breau, The Responsibility to Protect in International Law: An Emerging Paradigm Shift (New
York: Routledge Publishing, 2016) at 11.
15 James Brown Scott, ed, Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925),
Vol II at 584 [Scott ed, “Grotius, DJBP”].
16 For a more detailed description of this statement, see infra note 330.
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is reflected in the widely-held opinion that states, acting unilaterally or
collectively, are justified in enforcing respect for human rights. It is this
enduring tradition, not current international law, that best explains the moral
basis of humanitarian intervention. In twentieth-century international law,
a just war is above all a war of self-defense. But sixteenth- and seventeenthcentury European moralists justified war as a way to uphold law and protect
rights, of which self-defense was only one. Rulers, these moralists argued,
have a right and sometimes a duty to enforce certain laws beyond their
realms.17
As can be deduced from Nardin’s argument, the challenge with the European moralist
claim for humanitarian intervention is that any argument could be applied to justify a
humanitarian intervention if based on a temporal moral standard. As a result, the
contemporary justification for humanitarian intervention has reached a standstill,
supported by both justifiable and unjustifiable violations of international law that have
preceded and succeeded it. More precisely, recent military interventions in Iraq and Libya
for example, have demonstrated that “there is no denying that widespread and egregious
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law are no longer within the
‘exclusive’ domestic jurisdiction of States but constitute a matter of concern of the
international community as a whole.”18 All in all, the nature of military interventions as
being conducted by self-interested parties without recourse or interest for the
consequences of their interventions has led to a general wariness of accepting the legal
justifications behind the concept.19
With regards to the act of secession, a number of issues challenge its status in
international law as well. As mentioned earlier, one of its primary issues is that it posits
“a challenge to perhaps the two most fundamental principles of international law: the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.”20 With regards to the latter, as sovereignty

Terry Nardin, “The Moral Basis for Humanitarian Intervention” (2002) 16:2 Ethics & Intl Affairs J
55 at 55-6.
18 Vaughan Lowe & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, eds., “Humanitarian Intervention” in Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press) at para 41, online:
<www.opil.ouplaw.com>.
19 Luke Glanville, “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders” (2012) 12:1 Human Rights L Rev 1
at 32.
20 Ibid.
17
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is considered a corollary concept of statehood,21 it is important to briefly define its
relationship with self-determination and secession, as well as the challenges they pose to
the creation of states in international law.
The relationship between statehood and self-determination is an important topic
of inquiry. Crawford posits that “[external] self-determination, is at the most basic level,
a principle concerned with the right to be a State.”22 Although the process of state
creation can take many forms in international law,23 secession is by the far the most
complicated and underdefined form of state creation.24 This pertains in large part to the
debate over whether secession is a process and an outcome, or a process that leads to an
outcome.25 This thesis supports the argument that the latter is true, taking a different path
of interpretation than Crawford with respect to the act of secession. This claim is
supported by the fact that a process of a successful secession has an eventual outcome of
a new state being created; however, the process by which that state is created is not
uniform and can take on many forms that are “not always contingent on [territorial]
withdrawal.”26 Kohen expands on this claim by observing that “[s]ecession is not an
instant fact. It always implies a complex series of claims and decisions, negotiations
and/or struggle, which may – or may not – lead to the creation of a new state.”27 This is
important to note as the process by which statehood is achieved via secession can include
forms achieved by peaceful and non-peaceful means; a fact that distinguishes secession
as a process that leads to an outcome, rather than a process or an outcome on its own.

Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No7 art 2 (1) [UN Charter].
James R Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006) at
107 [Crawford, “The Creation of States”].
23 Some forms of state creation include: discovery, prescription, abandonment, cession, etc. For a full
list, see John H Currie et al, International Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2014) at 314-27 [Currie].
24 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 343-4.
25 Ibid at 349.
26 Ibid at 350.
27 Marcelo Kohen, ed, Secession: International Law Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006) at 14 as cited in Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 349.
21
22
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Several scholars have argued against the fact that secession is a process that leads
to an outcome. For example, according to Crawford, “secession is the creation of a State
by the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign…” 28 In other
words, Crawford sees secession as a process dependent on the use or threat of force. This
dependency creates a reliance on seeing secession as a singular and unilateral
predetermined act, rather than a process that can offer numerous options on what can be a
peaceful or nonpeaceful outcome. This view has certainly found support in the legal
academic community, with academics such as John Dugard and Alexis Heraclides
defending its existence.29 The difficulty with accepting Crawford’s view of secession as a
singular process is that it does not account for events that happen in the period between
the initiation of the secession, and the ultimate success or failure of that secession. For
example, Glen Anderson approaches Crawford’s definition somewhat differently by
describing secession as “the withdrawal of territory (colonial or non-colonial)30 from a
part of an existing state to create a new state.”31 Indeed, Anderson’s definition looks to
counter the attempts made by restrictive definitions (such as Crawford’s), as in general,
they narrow the scope of the definition of secession itself, while failing to provide
explanations for the ongoing series of events that shape the nature of the secession ex
post facto.32 In other words, this indicates that the process of secession is initiated once
the withdrawal of territory is invoked; however, it does not end until the entity in
question earns legal personality under international law, a process which can take place
over an extended period of time.33 Needless to say, although the reality of any withdrawal

Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 375.
See John Dugard, “A Legal Basis for Secession – Relevant Principles and Rules” in Julie Dahlitz, ed,
Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoidance – Regional Appraisals (Hague: TMC Asser Press,
2003) at 89 [Dugard, “A Legal Basis for Secession”]; Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of
Minorities in International Politics (New Jersey: F Cass Publishing, 1990) at 1 [Heraclides, “SelfDetermination of Minorities”] cited in Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at
350, n 32.
30 Anderson claims that “secession can be validly said to occur in a colonial context, as any new
assertion of sovereignty over a colonial territory involves a modification to the sovereignty of the
metropolitan power.” See Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 7.
31 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 344.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
28
29
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of territory relates to a consequential withdrawal of sovereignty as well, not all secessions
are enforced through the threat or use of force and can in fact be executed through
peaceful and legislated mechanisms. One such example is the secession of South Sudan
from the Republic of Sudan in 2011 by way of a referendum and a legally-negotiated
process.34 Therefore, “…once it is accepted that the specific process of withdrawal is
separate from the outcome, it emerges that there are two basic secession types:
consensual and unilateral.”35
A consensual secession refers to the act of secession executed with the existing
state’s consent, while a unilateral secession occurs without the state’s consent and may or
may not include the threat or the use of force.36 Consensual secessions can further be
broken down into constitutional and politically-negotiated secessions. With respect to
consensual secessions, a constitutional secession refers to the creation or the existence of
a provision within the constitution of an existing metropolitan state, which allows for an
act of secession to occur by virtue of a domestic legal mechanism. Examples of such
mechanisms include, for example, the 1921 Liechtenstein Constitution and the 2003
Constitutional Charter of the State of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro.37 Equally, the
Clarity Act 38 in Canada is an example of a statute created to provide clarification on the
procedural mechanism of secession in the Canadian Constitution. In essence, the Act
“[reaffirms] the constitutional process prescribed by the [Supreme] Court: a clear

Although South Sudan is an example of a consensual secession per se, it is important to note that
its secession was preceded by two bloody civil wars which had led to the deaths of nearly 3.5 million
people. Additionally, since the secession, a third civil war broke out in 2013 which caused another
300,000 deaths, as well as the displacement of nearly 3.5 million civilians. For the purposes of this
footnote, it is necessary to point out that the objective of this sentence is solely to establish an
example of a legally-negotiated secession via a referendum; however, the atrocities that preceded
and succeeded this secession cannot be disregarded as part of this example. For more on the civil
conflict in South Sudan, see generally Douglas H Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars
(Oxford: Indiana University Press, 2003); Mario Silvio, "After Partition: The Perils of South Sudan”
(2015) 3:1 U Balt J Intl L 63; Salman Salman, "South Sudan Road to Independence: Broken Promises
and Lost Opportunities" (2013) 26:2 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J 343.
35 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 350.
36 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 7.
37 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 352.
38 Clarity Act, SC 2000, c 26, s 3(1).
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referendum vote in favour of secession, followed by negotiated agreement between
Quebec and the rest of Canada, and finally the passage of a constitutional amendment
lawfully effecting Quebec’s secession.”39 Although this type of legislation does not
ensure a consensual separation,40 the mechanism allows for a legislated process to exist in
the case that separation becomes necessary.
On the other hand, politically-negotiated secessions are secessions that are
completed through a diplomatic negotiation. As described by Anderson:
It requires that the existing state and the secessionist entity be willing to
politically negotiate the resolution of a secessionist situation [and] is most
likely to occur when the existing state fails to provide any constitutional
avenue for secession for constituent national groups and when relations
between the existing sovereign and secessionist entity are amicable. 41
Examples of politically-negotiated secessions include such examples as the current
unification negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus and the de facto Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC),42 or the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993
through the peaceful secessions of the Czech and Slovak republics from the former
federalist state.43
Alternatively, unilateral secessions include the withdrawal of territory from a state
without its consent. As expanded on by Thürer and Burri, “…what was formerly a
constituent part of a State becomes independent—at least from a legal, though not
necessarily a factual perspective. Rather than create a new State, the separating part of a
State may choose to join an existing State.”44 As such, unilateral secessions can be further

Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 351.
Ibid at 344. It is impossible to claim that a legislated process for secession can ensure a consensual
separation as secession has been linked to anarchy, separation, civil conflict and instability.
41 Ibid at 352.
42 See Sara Stefanini, “Cyprus reunification talks to resume in Switzerland”, POLITICO (11 November
2016), online: <www.politico.eu>.
43 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 353.
44 Daniel Thürer & Thomas Burri, eds., “Self-Determination” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (Oxford University Press) at para 1, online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com> [Thürer &
Burri].
39
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broken down into colonial and non-colonial secessions.45 The former refers to a secession
that occurs as part of a ‘peoples’ 46 invoking their right to self-determination when their
putative state is considered a colony of a metropolitan state; the latter refers to “the
unilateral withdrawal of non-colonial territory from part of an existing state to create a
new state.”47
In addition to some of the major issues of the act of secession mentioned above, a
lack of opinio juris48 and state practice with regards to the legal process of UNC
secessions has also contributed to the gray area surrounding its legal status under
international law. As it stands, there are few guidelines and even fewer legal instruments
in international law to prevent a secession from turning into a militarized territorial armed
conflict.49 Moreover, with secessionist movements citing the Kosovo declaration of
independence50 in 2008 as justification for de jure recognitions of their respective

Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 353-4.
See Christopher J Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent? Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict
Resolution” (Paper, delivered at the EES Noon Discussion, 13 June 2008), (2008) 47 Int’l Leg
Materials 461, online: <www.wilsoncenter.org > [Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”] (“[a]t various
points in international legal history, the term “people” has been used to signify citizens of a nationstate, the inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a foreign power, or an ethnic group”
at 4). For more on the controversy surrounding the term ‘peoples’, see Chapter 2.
47 Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 3.
48 See Cornell Encyclopedia of Law, sub verbo “opinio juris”, online: <www.law.cornell.edu> ([i]n
customary international law, opinio juris is the second element (along with state practice) necessary
to establish a legally binding custom. Opinio juris denotes a subjective obligation, a sense on behalf of
a state that it is bound to the law in question”). See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26
June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 (in force 24 October 1945) art 38 (1)(b) [ICJ Statute] which affirms that
opinio juris is a general principle and source of customary international law.
49 The only legal guidelines that can prevent a secession from turning into an armed conflict (peaceful
settlement of disputes) are outlined in the United Nations Charter. See also UN Charter, supra note
21; “The Security Council & Mediation”, online: <www.peacemaker.un.org/peacemakingmandate/security-council>.
50 See Stefan Oeter, ed, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law by (Oxford University Press), online:<www.opil.ouplaw.com> [Oeter, “Dissolution of
Yugoslavia”] (“On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly declared the independence of the
Republic of Kosovo. The United States and a number of important Member States of the EU soon
recognized Kosovo as an independent and sovereign State. Even within the EU, however, there was
no consensus on the qualification of such a move, since some Member States had objections against
recognition. Most UN Member States were even more reserved, which found its expression with the
support for Serbia’s quest to ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on
whether the unilateral declaration of the independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international
law” at para 85).
45
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secessions,51 the question of whether a ‘remedial right’ to secession exists outside of the
colonial context continues to split the international legal community. 52
Overall, two theories exist that defend a right for remedial secession: the primary
right and the remedial right. The dichotomy between the two theories is summarized by
Thomas Simon in the following manner:
Under the remedial view, secession is justified only as a remedy of last
resort for persistent and serious injustices. Primary right theorists, in
contrast, argue that a right to secession does not depend upon a finding of
injustices. They claim either that a right to secede can be made on ascriptive
grounds, such as the nationality of the peoples claiming the right; on
democratic, plebiscitary bases that reflect the preferences of peoples living
within a territory; or on administrative grounds that simply assess the
capability to function as an independent state.53
As can be deduced from Simon’s summary, the ascriptive nature of a population is
difficult to define. In fact, it is one of the major challenges to accepting the primary right
theory. After all, how can ascriptive distinctions be made in a globalized, multi-cultural,
and multi-ethnic world? Alternatively, what is the threshold for the argument of the use
of force as the ‘last resort’? Does this theory defend a remedial right to secession only in
cases of egregious human rights abuses such as genocide or ethnic cleansing? What about
cases of human rights abuses that are considered as less egregious than the rest? Clearly,
many lacunae can be identified in the theoretical argument for the right of remedial
secession;54 however, this thesis intends to prove that a right to a UNC secession exists

See Steve Gutterman, “Russia Denounces Kosovo Declaration”, The Washington Post (17 February
2008), online: <www.washingtonpost.com> (direct quotes from press releases by de facto leaders of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia after Kosovo’s declaration of independence). For Transnistria, see
Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”, supra note 46.
52 Thomas W Simon, “Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, from Katanga to Kosovo”
(2011) 40:1 GA J Intl & Comp L 105 at 143.
53 Ibid.
54 One of the more important lacunae in the international law on secession is the question of whether
“remedial secession” is a legal concept as part of a crystallized norm in customary international law
or not. See Jure Vidmar, “Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice”
(2010) 6:1 St Antony’s Intl Rev 37 at 37 [Vidmar, “Remedial Secession”]. See also Lee C Buchheit,
Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New York: Yale University Press,1978)
(Contemporarily, a general ‘fear’ exists around the institutionalization of remedial secession. “…[t]his
fear is known under a number of names, including Pandora’s Box, balkanization, ethnic domino
theory, and indefinite divisibility…” at 28). Additionally, it should be noted that multiple scholars
51
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under international law insofar as the principle of self-determination is egregiously
violated and denied, which can also subsequently lead to a justification for a third-state
military intervention. 55
In sum, this thesis will use cases of third state military interventions in
Bangladesh, Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia to identify a legal exception for the
external use of force outside of the existing positive international law.56 More precisely,
this thesis will argue that a right of the use of force by a third state outside of the current
legal parameters57 exists only within the context of UNC secessions in which the peoples
involved are suffering human rights abuses designated as in extremis. Additionally, this
thesis will argue against the existence of an obligation of military intervention under
international law (as supported by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention), pointing to
a number of heterogeneous factors that support its rejection as a crystallized legal norm in

have attempted to argue, with varying degrees of success, that a remedial right to secession should
exist in international law. Unfortunately, their arguments largely approach the question of remedial
secession from a theoretical or sociological perspective, which at-times can be questionable on the
basis of its relevance with respect to codified international law. This thesis will not use a theoretical
analysis of the subject matter, rather, it will opt to a legal one on the basis of existing treaty and
customary international law. For examples of pro-remedial secession theorists, see generally, Harry
Beran, “A Liberal Theory of Secession” (1984) 32:1 Pol Stud 21; Christopher Wellman, “A Defense of
Secession and Self-Determination” (1995) 24 Phil & Public Aff 142; Robert W McGee, “The Theory of
Secession and Emerging Democracies” (1991) 28 Stan J Intl L 450 [McGee, “The Theory of
Secession”].
55 It is necessary to note that the idea of a third-state military intervention as being justified under
international law in cases of self-determination is not novel. Generally, this argument is made by
defending its legality under the auspices of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Several
scholars have pronounced on the idea as potentially existing or existing under a pretext of conditions.
that typically reaffirm the legality of the interventions’ humanitarian nature. This thesis intends to
expand on the existing scholarship with regards to the notion of third-state military interventions in
the context of UNC secessions, providing a conceptualized legal argument for the existence of a
developed right of military intervention in international law under the pretext of self-determination
in a very particular set of circumstances. For examples of authors who have proposed similar ideas,
see generally Thomas D Grant, “Armed Force in Aid of Secession” (2014) 53:1 Military Law and the
Law of War Rev 69 at 91; Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 240; Juan Carlos de las
Cuevas, “Exceptional Measures Call for Exceptional Times: The Permissibility under International
Law of Humanitarian Intervention to Protect a People’s Right to Self-Determination” (2015) 37:1
Hous J Intl L 49.
56 The existing international law on the use of force, as well as the current status of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 3.
57 It should be noted that international law prohibits the use of force by states except in cases of selfdefence or through authorization by the United Nations Security Council. General prohibitions for the
use of force can be found in UN Charter, supra note 21, arts 2(3)–(4), 39, 42,55.

11

international law.58

1.2.

Sources of International Law
This thesis will rely on the consideration that sources of international law are

considered binding without derogation. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) sets out the sources of international law:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.59
In order to better understand these sources in toto; a brief definition of each must be
presented.
The most commonly-known source of international law is known as a ‘treaty’,60 a
form of “international [“contract”] between states and /or certain international
organizations, [which sets] out rules that bind, as a matter of international law, the parties
to them in their relations with one another.”61 The second source of international law is
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,” 62 usually

The controversy relates to the legal status of humanitarian intervention in international law. An
exception permitting the use of force as part of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention does not
currently exist in international law, although some scholars have argued on its existence through the
R2P (Responsibility to Protect) principle. This debate will be expanded on in greater detail in
Chapter 3. For a description of the general controversy on the accept of a right to ‘humanitarian
intervention’, see Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 18 at para 1.
59 ICJ Statute, supra note 48, art 38 (1).
60 It is necessary to point out that not everyone agrees with this statement. For a general description
of this debate, see Currie, supra note 23 at 46.
61 Ibid at 48.
62 VCLT, supra note 12, art 38 (b).
58
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referred to as customary international law.63 Customary international law is composed of
two elements: opinio juris and the practice of states. Opinio juris “denotes a subjective
obligation, a sense on behalf of a state that it is bound to the law in question,”64 while
state practice refers to the practice of a particular custom by states. Customary
international law is unwritten and is considered universally binding on all states.65
Outside of the well-accepted notions mentioned above, this thesis will adopt a
more contemporary interpretation of two important factors within the ambit of customary
international law. First, the requirement of ‘state practice’ will be interpreted as evincing
general and not consistent practice to become law, and second, the effect of General
Assembly Resolutions will be interpreted as influencing the international law-making
process where the answer to a legal question cannot be found through existing
jurisprudence. With respect to the former, the traditional understanding of ‘practice’
requires state practice to be consistent, as set out the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) in the Lotus Case,66 and subsequently by the ICJ in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Case.67 On the contrary, this thesis will use an interpretation that
accepts claims by states68 as well as physical acts and omissions, to underline the

The author recognizes the existence of scholarship that questions, discounts or rejects the function
of custom as a general source of international law. Although these challenges to the contemporary
understanding of custom are important to point out, this thesis’ legal analysis will operate on the
well-established precedent of customary international law as a general source of law as supported by
the VCLT and the ICJ Statute. For examples of scholars questioning the normative function of custom
in international law, see Emmanuel Voyaikis, “Customary International Law and the Place of
Normative Considerations” (2010) 55:1 Am J Juris 164; Gerald J Postema, “Custom, Normative
Practice and the Law” (2012) 62 Duke LJ 707.
64 Supra note 48.
65 It should be noted that there are three exceptions to the universality of customary international
law. See Currie, supra note 23 at 116, 133. (“first…a treaty rule that is inconsistent with a rule of
customary international law will generally prevail, as between parties to that treaty; second, rules of
“regional” customary international law may displace, as between states within the relevant region,
rules of general customary international law; and third, so-called persistent objectors may
unilaterally escape the reach of customary international law” at 116).
66 S. S. Lotus (France v Turkey), (1927), PCIJ (Se A) No 10 at 28.
67 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 44 [North Sea Case].
68 This interpretation is supported by a number of ICJ Cases. For a few examples, see Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Judgment,
[1986] ICJ Rep 14 at paras 188-89, 191, 205 [Nicaragua ICJ Judgment]; Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] Rep 226 at paras 68-73 [Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion]. For a comprehensive summary of this interpretation, see Glen Anderson, “Unilateral Non63

13

changing threshold for what constitutes ‘practice’ under customary international law. 69
To be succinct, a combination of textual General Assembly Resolutions, as well as
concomitant state practice will be used to argue for the existence of a qualified right for
UNC secessions under international law. As for the interpretation of the latter, its
importance rests on the fact that, as mentioned by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, a lack
of uniformity in state practice, especially if conflictual, can find support through textual
elaboration as part of opinio juris; insofar as both are assessed simultaneously.70 Thus, in
following this interpretation, this thesis will rely on the supposition that “Article 38(1)(b)
of the Statue of the ICJ [which lists international custom, as evidence of general practice]
includes statements such as those contained in declaratory General Assembly
resolutions…”,71 which, in combination with physical acts and omissions, will reveal the
existence of a qualified right to a UNC secession in customary international law. 72 A
more detailed summary of this interpretation as it pertains to UNC secessions will be
presented in section 2.3.

Colonial Secession in International Law and Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions: Textual
Content and Legal Effects” (2012) 41 Denv J Int'l L & Poly 345 at 380-85 [Anderson, “Declaratory GA
Resolutions”].
69 For more on this see, Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 10.
70 Nicaragua ICJ Judgment, supra note 68 at paras 188-9, 191, 202, 205.
71 Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 388.
72 This interpretation of customary international law defends the view that “…statements, whether in
relation to concrete situations or in abstracto, provided they are framed de lege lata, are capable of
contributing to customary rules of international law.” See Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”,
supra note 68 at 382. Such statements can include “…physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto
(such as General Assembly resolutions), national laws, national judgments and omissions [and]
practice of international organizations…”. See Michael Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International
Law” (1976) 47:1 Brit YB Intl L 1 at 10. This view is equally defended by numerous ICJ decisions. See
e.g. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep 4, Judge
Ammoun, separate opinion at 302-3; North Sea Case, supra note 67 at 38; South West Africa (Libera v.
South Africa), [1966] ICJ Rep 28, Judge Tanaka, dissenting opinion at 291-22; Judgment 188-9,191;
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 68 at 68-73. For scholarly support of this view see e.g.
Rosalyn Higgins, Development of International Law Through Political Organs of the United Nations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 6-7; Gillian D Triggs, International Law: Contemporary
Principles and Practices, (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths Law, 2006) at 62-70; Ian Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 6 [Brownlie,
“Principles of IL”]; Mark E Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory
and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources, 2nd ed (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 14-6.
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The third source of international law is described as “general principles of law.”73
These principles originate from one of two original sources: “meta-legal principles—i.e
principles generated within a philosophical or ethical discourse [which are then]
introduced into a normative system – or ... principles inherent in or developed from a
particular body of law or law in general.”74 Largely, the latter is used by international and
regional courts as “an interpretative tool or as a source of concrete obligations.”75 The
existence of this source of law is valuable specifically where lacunae exist in
international law.76
The fourth and final source of international law refers to “judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.”77 The ‘subsidiary’ aspect of this source of
law does not allow for it to carry any binding capabilities; however, it can provide vital
evidence of the law when necessary.78 In reference to the ‘highest qualified publicists of
the various nations,’ a good example is the International Law Commission. The
Commission, which is comprised of highly trained jurists of international law, “initiate[s]
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification.”79 Contemporarily, they “have
been relied upon extensively by international courts and tribunals as an authoritative
statement of the law on state responsibility.”80 In this thesis, their contribution to the law
on state responsibility will be used in relation to the concept’s conflation with the law on
the prohibition on the use of force.
Apart from the four formal sources of international law, a number of other

VCLT, supra note 12, art 38 (1)(c).
Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed, “Sources of International Law” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (Oxford University Press) at para 33, online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com>.
75 Ibid at para 34.
76 Ibid at para 36.
77 VCLT, supra note 12, art 38 (1) (d).
78 James Crawford, ed, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012) at 38 [Crawford, “Brownlie’s Priniciples of IL”].
79 UN Charter, supra note 21, art 13 (1) (a).
80 Crawford, “Brownlie’s Priniciples of IL”, supra note 78 at 44.
73
74
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instruments are also consulted when considering the content of international law, though
they are not considered binding. Examples of this include reports and studies by nongovernmental or international organizations,81 considerations of humanity82 and
legitimate interests of states.83 Such sources improve the balance between formal and
material sources by providing governments with ‘soft law’ power, which can adapt moreeasily to changing circumstances, and act as a starting point on controversial issues such
as for example, the scope and the extent of the universality of human rights in
international law.84 This proves to be a valuable asset in cases where the law requires
flexibility, as well as subject-matter expertise; factors that international law considers
extremely important.85
Now that the sources of international law that will be used in thesis have been
presented, it is necessary to introduce the outline of this thesis through a brief summary
of its main arguments.

1.3.

Organization of Thesis
Apart from this introductory chapter, this thesis consists of three main chapters.

Chapter 2 will begin with an exploration of the principle of self-determination, starting

This example refers to the use of ‘soft law’ through the expertise of non-state contributors to the
source of a particular area of international law. An example of this is are “manuals and guidance
notes prepared by expert bodies [such as] the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). See Currie, supra note 23 at 152.
82 Crawford, “Brownlie’s Priniciples of IL”, supra note 78 “[c]onsiderations of humanity are the notion
that “human values already protected by positive legal principles which, taken together, reveal
certain criteria of public policy and invite analogy. Such criteria are connected with general
principles of law and equity, and need no particular justification. References to principles or laws of
humanity appear in preambles to conventions in GA resolutions, and in diplomatic practice. The
classic reference is a passage from Corfu Channel, in which the Court relied on certain ‘general and
well-recognized principles’, including ‘elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in
peace than in war’. On occasion, the provisions of the UN Charter concerning the protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms have seen use as a basis for the legal status of considerations of
humanity” at 46).
83 By legitimate interest of states, it is meant that “in particular contexts the applicability of rules of
law may depend on criteria of good faith, reasonableness, and the like. Legitimate interests, including
economic interests, may in these circumstances be taken into account.” See ibid.
84 See Currie, supra note 23 at 151-2.
85 Crawford, “Brownlie’s Priniciples of IL”, supra note 78 at 44-7.
81
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with its history and continuing through to its contemporary meaning in international law.
The focus on self-determination will allow for a thorough analysis of the separate roles
that secession and recognition play in both international law and international relations. 86
Subsequently, this chapter will demonstrate the existence of a right to a unilateral noncolonial secession (UNC) through the principle of self-determination, as well as
concomitant state practice which defines the terms under which a unilateral secession is
possible. The overall objective of this chapter will be to establish the factors necessary
for a legal separation of territory on the basis of self-determination.
Chapter 3 will focus on examining the use of force in international law.
Specifically, it will first delve into the general doctrine on the use of force in positive and
customary international law. This summary will include a historical analysis of the jus ad
bellum, as well as expound on the concept’s ties to the just war doctrine through its
beginnings as part of the notion of iustum bellum (the concept of a just war.).
Subsequently, the chapter will shift to the use of force and the creation of states, defining
under which circumstances is the use of force legal, as well as what type of third-state
support is permitted in circumstances where a right to self-determination is systematically
denied. In doing so, this chapter will comb the use of force in self-determination disputes
in both the colonial and non-colonial settings. The objective of this comparison will be to
demonstrate the legal arguments that support the use of force in cases of external selfdetermination, as well as the threshold for the interference of third-states in such
conflicts. Lastly, a final subsection will elucidate the theoretical aspirations of the
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) concept. This will be completed in order to dispute any
connection between the argument of an obligation to and the right of military
intervention in territorial disputes.

Generally, it is challenging to separate the notion of realpolitik from a territorial dispute that
necessitates a secession. External influences, regional location and geo-strategic interests are only
some of the many factors that can influence a purported or completed secession in international
relations. Therefore, this thesis will analyze both the international legal ramifications of each
secession presented through a case study, as well as point out the inevitable self-interests of thirdstates in their respective military interventions. The exact tenets of state interests in a third-state
military intervention will be provided at the end of Chapter 4.
86
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Chapter 4 of this thesis will present a detailed case study comparison that will
incorporate all of the elements presented in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. The case study will focus
on four territorial disputes, examining the path to their potential statehoods and clarifying
their contemporary status’ under international law. The four case studies in question will
be respectively: Kosovo, Bangladesh and South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The methodology
of the case study will ensure that each territorial dispute includes an external selfdetermination claim, as well as a path to statehood87 which included a third-state military
intervention justified by an alleged commission of human rights abuses deemed as in
extremis. At the conclusion of the case study, its most important elements will be
combined into an analytical framework, which will outline the elements that may be used
to justify or reject the legality of a third-state military intervention on the basis of four
principal requirements. Lastly, Chapter 5 is the concluding section which will provide a
summary of the primary arguments examined in each chapter, as well as clearly define
the exception to the prohibition on the use of force in the context of UNC secessions.

By path to statehood, it is not meant that the entity in question is in fact a sovereign state. Rather, it
is meant that the entity has invoked its right to external self-determination and subsequently, has
requested for it to be accepted as a state under international law.
87
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Chapter 2
Chapter 2: Self-Determination, Statehood and Secession: From
Classical to Contemporary International Law88
Self-Determination is a complicated concept in international law. Although this
thesis will be built on the well-accepted premise that “self-determination is widely
regarded as a peremptory norm (jus cogens)”89 in international law, the applicability of
self-determination in the face of the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty
remains unclear and is often contentious.90 In fact, as the principle of self-determination
seeks to allow ‘peoples’91 to “…freely determine their political status and freely pursue

The author recognizes the existence of the ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ (TWAIL)
school which conducts the study of international law from the perspective of third world states.
Although the author recognizes the importance of the TWAIL school in analyses related to eurocentric-derived concepts such as statehood, recognition and self-determination, it is beyond the
scope of this thesis to include such an analysis for each concept. Therefore, the author recognizes that
they are basing their historical and legal analyses on the basis of international legal concepts derived
from euro-centric scholarship which has been influenced by imperialism and colonialism. For more
on the TWAIL school, see Katz Cogan et al eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016) at 123-5.
89 For an extensive list of scholarship supporting this claim, see Anderson, “A Post-Millennial
Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1185-7, n 4.
90 The issue is divisive in that by virtue of state dismemberment contributing to regional
destabilization, the threshold for when that dismemberment becomes legally acceptable has not been
firmly established in international law. The remedial right theory of secession claims that a secession
is justified when an identifiable group secedes unilaterally from its mother state on the basis of grave
breaches of human rights committed against it (irrespective of other considerations). See Daniel H
Meester, “Remedial secession: a positive or negative force for the prevention and reduction of armed
conflict?” (2012) 18:2 Can Foreign Pol’y J 151 (“[t]he case against remedial secession runs along five
main lines of argument, in that remedial secession would lead to (1) increased incentives for
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right to self-determination, which prima facie indicates that "peoples" is an expression of broad and
general applicability extending to the colonial and non-colonial context.” See Anderson, “Secession in
International Law”, supra note 4 at 351. A more concise definition of peoples will be presented
towards the end of Chapter 4.
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their economic, social and cultural development,”92 the question can be asked, how far
does the principle of self-determination impact the international law on selfdetermination, and do the two share a connection that requires a separate analysis of
each? With respect to the first part of the question, Crawford mentions that the
international law on self-determination can be considered as both a lex lata and a lex
obscura.93 In essence, Crawford points out that a paradox exists whereby the law of selfdetermination exists, yet is obscured by how the international community continues to
receive and perceive it in both a negative and a positive light. 94 This is correct to some
degree, as it is necessary to clarify exactly, who are the bearers of this ‘right’ of selfdetermination? Consider this response to this question by Stefan Oeter:
The overview of the historical evolution of the right of self-determination
has demonstrated that there is a clear core area where the bearer of the right
is beyond dispute. This is the case of decolonization, where State practice
has confirmed that non-self-governing territories (as well as trusteeship
territories) enjoy a clear right to self-determination, understood as a right
freely to determine their political status. The ‘people’ in the sense of selfdetermination in these cases is the autochtonous population of the non-selfgoverning territories that has been grouped together to a polity by carving
out a certain territory in colonial times in order to form a distinct political
entity. These territories became independent States on the basis of the
principle of uti possidetis, which means that the geographical shape of the
territories had been definitely established in colonial times—and they
simply inherited the boundaries from their colonial rulers. Selfdetermination did not mean that there was any scope for a decision of the
local people concerned regarding whether they wanted to belong to the
newly independent State, or to a neighbouring State. State practice clearly
banned such a far-reaching claim, making the inherited territorial
boundaries inviolable.95
To expound on this point, it can be suggested that the original intention behind the
international community’s acceptance of the principle was to tolerate the right of self-
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determination as a means to establish a legal process for decolonization of indigenous
and colonized peoples around the world. Nevertheless, as the decolonization era passed, a
renewed call for the interpretation of the principle outside of the colonial context has
reinvigorated the debate surrounding its breadth and scope under international law. As
further expanded on by same author, the issue of whether self-determination applies to
‘peoples’ outside of the context of colonialism is a matter of fierce debate:
An important strand in international legal scholarship argues that every
group of persons bound together by common objective characteristics, like
language, culture, religion, race, might be qualified as a ‘people’, as long as
such a group has also a common (subjective) understanding of belonging
together and being distinct from all the other surrounding groups. Such an
understanding might be termed as a ‘naturalist’ concept of peoples. Another
strand insists on the territorial element of self-determination. Selfdetermination, thus the argument goes, has always been linked to
historically pre-constituted political entities with a specific territory.
‘People’ in this understanding is not simply a group of persons, one could
also say an ‘ethnic group’, but the constituent people of a certain territorial
entity formed by history…A careful analysis of State practice clearly
supports the second understanding. Beyond the context of decolonization,
there has never been any serious international support for a claim of selfdetermination raised by a simple ‘ethnic group’ having no firm territorial
basis in a pre-existing political entity.96
Therefore, on the basis of understanding how self-determination posits itself within the
tenets of contemporary international law, it is necessary to propound on its historical
evolution in order to establish the extent of its applicability. Prior to doing so, a final
point must be made with regards to the principle of self-determination. The principle can
be further separated between internal and external self-determination. The former refers
to the granting of a certain level of autonomy and self-governance to the peoples in
question within the territorial boundaries of a sovereign state. The latter refers to an
invocation of a right of absolute independence from the sovereign state through an act of
unilateral secession, implying a simultaneous withdrawal of sovereignty and territory.97
This is important to note as, for the purposes of this thesis, the focus will remain on
external self-determination, specifically with respect to its invocation in the non-colonial
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context.
This chapter will demonstrate the interconnectivity between the principle of selfdetermination and the concept of statehood in international law. Overall, the objective
will be to establish how the principle of self-determination has been engrained as a
crystallized norm in international law, clearing the way for how its applicability, when
invoked through a separation of territory, can involve the use of force under particular
circumstances. The second portion of this argument will be expanded on in Chapter 3 of
this thesis.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section of this chapter will
provide a summary of the history of the principle of self-determination. This will be done
in order to present an interpretation of self-determination as a “progressive concept,
counterpoised to the divine right of kings and associated with popular revolution and
anti-colonialism.”98 The second section of this chapter will build on the history of the
principle by identifying how it fits into the ambit of the concept of statehood in
international law. More specifically, a detailed historical analysis of the notion of state
recognition will elucidate how the legal conceptualization of statehood is challenged by
the changing nature of UNC secessionist claims. The third and final section of this
chapter will examine the contemporary applicability of external self-determination claims
through the existence of a qualified right to a UNC secession.

2.1.

History of Self-Determination
It appears that the initial use of the term ‘self-determination’ became popular

sometime during the Enlightenment era.99 Derived from the German term
selbstbestimmung, it originally “referred to the connections between reason, individuation
and emancipation.”100 Although the use of the term may have become popular in the 18th
century, its etymological origin as a liberalist concept can be traced back to nearly the
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beginning of time. Consider this analysis of the early historical roots of selfdetermination by Anderson:
A possible starting point [to the historical roots of self-determination] might
be indigenous hunter-gatherer societies in which the clan had collective
input into decision making, law creation, and leadership. Alternatively, it
might be postulated that self-determination arose with the Greek city-state
and demos kratos, whereby citizens (male and property-owning) politically
coalesced and determined their collective destiny. Other starting points
might include Marsilius of Padua, a fourteenth century Italian scholar who
suggested that the consent of the people was necessary to legitimize the
powers of a ruler, or Stanislaw of Skarbimierz, a fifteenth century Polish
scholar the President of the Cracow Academy, who postulated the thenprogressive view that non-Christian peoples were entitled to their own
independence.101
Indeed, the normative meaning of self-determination can be found in the last word of
Anderson’s analysis: independence. After-all, the relationship that self-determination
holds with independence is one of the primary factors that renders it contested in
international relations, as well as under international law. 102 In large part, this is due to
the well-accepted notion that secessionist movements which invoke their right to selfdetermination, inevitably clash with the metropolitan state from which they seek
independence.103 Nevertheless, although the historical beginnings of self-determination
may remain unclear, according to Anderson, the “contemporary doctrine of selfdetermination can be traced to several key historical influences: the Glorious Revolution,
the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the political theories of Vladimir Lenin,
and the democratic ideals of U.S president Woodrow Wilson.”104 Thus, the following
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sub-section will summarize the historical development of the principle of selfdetermination in Europe by following Anderson’s historical timeline of influential events,
which, in turn, will establish the foundation of the principle in relation with the concept
of the Westphalian state.
2.1.1. The History of Self-Determination before the 19th century
There is no overarching agreement on the origins of the independence movement
in post-Medieval Europe.105 However, as will be pointed out in detail in the next subsection, a starting point, from a euro-centric perspective, can be attributed to the fall of
divine legitimism (also known as European legitimism), or the rule by divine monarchs in
the early 17th century.106 Indeed, its fall from popularity must be briefly summarized
through a historical analysis of popular revolutions. Specifically, it will be established
how the concept of self-determination, coupled with the rising notion of liberalism, acted
as a catalyst for the era of popular revolutions in Europe throughout the 17th and 18th
centuries.
The removal of the English monarch, James II, through the Glorious Revolution
(1688-1689) and his subsequent replacement by a representative parliament,107 can be
understood to be the first step in adopting the philosophical notions of liberalism as
evinced by such scholars as John Milton and later by John Locke and Baron de
Montesquieu.108 In fact, as argued by Anderson, the Glorious Revolution found scholarly
support through the writings of such authors:
The unofficial philosophical basis for the [Glorious] Revolution was found
in John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, which posited that
government was a trust instituted for the benefit of citizens and attended
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with their consent. The overriding aims of government were to preserve the
physical integrity of citizens, their liberties, and their property. Locke
argued that if government violated these basic principles it would become
illegitimate, and citizens could then establish a new government to achieve
these ends. Such changes, however, were only justified following “a long
train of abuses.” Something more than “great mistakes in the ruling part,
many wrong and inconvenient laws, and . . . slips of human frailty” was
required.109
Therefore, if one is to accept the significance of the liberalist school in the relative
success of the Glorious Revolution, it becomes clear that its theoretical underpinnings
can be better explained through the lens of formalist independence in the then dynastydominated Europe. Further, Anderson adds that although the nature of the Revolution
primarily revolved around representative government, its emphasis on promulgating the
illegality of the ‘divine right of kings’ make of it “an early progenitor of modern selfdetermination, even if it was as yet unrecognizable through modern eyes.”110
Following in the footsteps of the Glorious Revolution, a wave of change swept
across Europe and the colonized world. Building on the ideals of government that
represents the will of the people and is equally governed by it, the United States of
America declared its independence from England on July 4, 1776. Upon a close review of
the United States Declaration of Independence, the normative and textual meaning of
self-determination becomes evident:
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people
to dissolve the political bonds which had connected them with another, and
to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the
causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving the just powers from the consent of the
governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute
new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing
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its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness. Prudence indeed, will dictate that Governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and
accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to
suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the
forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce
them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off
such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. 111
Indeed, the most salient message in the Declaration was its insistence on the right of the
American people, as a collective group, to choose their destiny if an elected government
transiently violated their trust. Generally, this is seen as the first instance, from a eurocentric perspective, that a state codified the right of its peoples to self-determination in a
domestic democratic constitution, alienating the notion of colonial and monarchical rule
on the basis of conquest and a ‘divine right to rule’.112 Conclusively, “[t]he American
Revolution…added a progressive constitutionally-based aspect to self-determination. The
conservative shackles of the Glorious Revolution, which only viewed political change as
a remedy of very last resort, were perhaps slightly relaxed.” 113
As will be demonstrated in the next section, the American Revolution would not
hasten independence for the rest of the world seeking to end monarchical rule; apart from
one state: France.114 In the early 18th century, French Philosophers such as Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Baron de Montesquieu contributed greatly to the literature that would
influence the era of popular revolutions. For example, their writings were instrumental in
supporting the work of American revolutionaries such as Thomas Jefferson, who used
them to advocate for independence from England.115 With regards to the series of events

“Declaration of Independence of the United States of America”, online: <
www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript">.
112 Thürer & Burri, supra note 44 at para 1. See also Raic, supra note 13 at 173.
113 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1195.
114 Infra note 173.
115 George E Rudé, “The Outbreak of the French Revolution” (1955) 8:1 Past and Present J 28 at 33-6.
See also Robert W McGee, “Secession Reconsidered” (1994) 11:1 The J of Libertarian Studies 11 at
15-8; Francis D Cogliano, A Companion to Thomas Jefferson (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing,
2012) at 127.
111

26

that led to the French Revolution, as France found itself on the brink of civil war and
facing grain shortages through a near-empty treasury, Louis XVI (the monarch at the
time) began to slowly lose power with the French people and nobility. 116 Once it became
known that he would side with the nobility, furthering the economic suffrage of France,
the middle-class represented by the ‘Third-Estate’ revolted in June, 1789.117 A power
struggle ensued, and Louis XVI was eventually deposed and subsequently executed.
Although the French Revolution would continue attempting to implement its reforms for
many years following the initial revolt in 1789, the text it produced, also known as la
Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (the Declaration of the Rights of Man),
would become one of the first documents in modern European history which codified an
extensive, agnostic and humanistic purview of universal human rights.118
Unfortunately, although the text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man created a
positive precedent with respect to its support of universal human rights for French
citizens, its interpretation by the newly-formed French state authorities demonstrated
early how the concept of self-determination can be used to violate the same principles it
theoretically strove to uphold. In particular, annexations of foreign territories by French
armies became a popular interpretation of the Declaration’s ‘French revolutionary selfdetermination’, which sought to ‘liberate’ any peoples under monarchical rule through
the use of force.119 Nevertheless, the underlying achievement of the time was the fact that
self-determination became intertwined with the notions of liberalism and independence,
two important factors when considering how the principle of self-determination
developed into a peremptory norm of international law.
To conclude, it can be understood that the notion of a peoples’ right to selfdetermination became engrained as a tangible concept as part of its promulgation through
three popular revolutions (Glorious, American and French, respectively) between the 17 th
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and 18th centuries. Consequently, a contentious debate on its true meaning began in the
19th century. In particular, the question of whether self-determination is a legal concept or
a political one shaped the sphere of its development in both classical and, subsequently,
contemporary international law. The next subsection will briefly touch on this point,
while also summarizing the inception of self-determination in post-19th century Europe,
followed by its association with nationalism, as well as socialism, and ending with its
eventual codification in the United Nations Charter in 1945.
2.1.2. The History of Self-Determination after the 19th century
After the Glorious, American and French Revolutions, the principle of
nationalism began to slowly give way to the concept of self-determination. Although the
exact timeline of when the principle of self-determination transitioned from a political
concept into a legal one is unclear, the fragmentation of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman
and German Empires in the wake of the end of the First World War certainly contributed
to its rise in popularity in early 20th century Europe.120 Nevertheless, certain scholars
have attempted to theorize on when the principle bridged the politico-legal divide. For
example, Crawford separates the history of self-determination into two parts: prior to and
after 1945.121 Although, as previously mentioned, some scholars attribute the codification
of self-determination to being founded as far back as the French and American
Revolutions,122 Crawford prefers to associate its inception as an “operative principle
[which] dates from the Bolshevik revolution and the peace settlements at the end of First
World War.”123 Indeed, he points to the fact that there was little legal development of the
principle before 1945,124 even if it was considered in principio as early as 1920 in the
Aaland Islands case.125 An alternative viewpoint to the origins of the principle is
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presented by Thürer and Burri, who suggest that the legal development of the principle
occurred as early as 1941.126 Although both claims have validity due to the political
situations surrounding the development of the principle during that time (i.e. the
promulgation of self-determination claims during the Second World War), for the
purposes of this thesis, the principle of self-determination can be considered as having
been developed in the legal sense sometime between the start and end of the Second
World War. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to recognize that, even if the principle of
self-determination was first identified as being entirely political in nature, 127 its influence,
even as a political concept, on the wave of socialist revolutions which took place in the
beginning of the 20th century,128 as well as its subsequent consideration in the League of
Nations at the conclusion of the First World War, warrant its consideration as part of this
historical summary.
The principle of self-determination was attractive to socialist thinkers in large part
due to the fact that it highlighted the inequalities of imperialism, as well as of
monarchical rule and conquest.129 In other words, the imposition of government through
imperialism, colonialism or monarchical rule naturally violated a peoples’ right to self-
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determination, which (in the opinion of socialist thinkers such as Vladimir Lenin) could
only be solved through a federation which encompassed the self-determination rights of
all.130 This view, which was promulgated by Lenin in the early 20th century, sought to
underline the importance of the principle. Anderson describes Lenin’s interpretation of
self-determination as existing in three strands:
First, self-determination could be utilized by nationalist groups to freely
determine their political destiny, which, by necessity, included a right to
UNC secession. Second, self-determination could be invoked in the
aftermath of military conflicts between sovereign states to allow the citizens
of conquered territories to determine by whom they would like to be ruled.
Third, self-determination could be anti-colonial, intended to expedite the
freedom and political independence of colonial peoples. 131
As can be formulated from Anderson’s summary, multiple problems can be identified in
Lenin’s argument for a peoples’ right to self-determination. First, all three strands, even
just in principle, did not come to fruition during the existence of the USSR (United Soviet
of Socialist Republics) between 1922-1991. Second, although provisions for selfdetermination were included in several versions of the USSR constitution,132 their actual
invocation and execution were nearly impossible, overshadowed by the provisional and
ultimate objective of implementing socialism.133 Therefore, it can be inferred that,
although Lenin and the Bolsheviks propagated the idea of ‘national self-determination’ as
an important political weapon to rid the world of imperialism, democracy and capitalism;
the real intention behind it was most likely the spread of socialism, to which national selfdetermination belonged mostly as a propagandistic tool.134
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Self-determination was not solely limited to socialist thinking in the early 20th
century. In fact, at the onset of the end of the First World War, it was officially codified
through a mandates system introduced in the Covenant of the League of Nations.135
Originally proposed by United States’ President Woodrow Wilson as part of the peace
negotiations after the First World War,136 the principle defended the idea of
independence, as well as the notion of peoples being able to select their future absent of
any foreign claims of territory or interference. 137 In other words, “Wilson…came to view
self-determination as encompassing the notion that governments must be based on “the
consent of the governed. Citizens were therefore to have a direct and meaningful input
into who would represent them.” 138 Yet, even though Wilson’s intention was to provide
autonomy to formerly conquered and colonized peoples, his ideals quickly unraveled
once the potential consequences of his words became evident through their direct
resistance against two core concepts of the euro-centric system of states: state sovereignty
and territorial integrity.139 Thus, the liberal- democratic interpretation of selfdetermination was eventually left behind in the face of the potential consequence of
anarchy and civil wars should it be fully implemented on an international scale.140 In
other words, it became evident that it would be better to live in a society with less formal
independence for indigenous peoples and communities, but more collective peace, than in
a society whereby each peoples can lay claim to a historic right of territory on the basis of
oppression or colonialism, and demand self-governance and territorial independence.
Largely, this assertion is true to this day given the fact that internal self-determination
and greater autonomy is considered a much more desirable approach than acceptance of
an external self-determination claim executed through secession. Additionally, as
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“international boundaries are constructions of humans at a specific point in time,”141 there
can be very little room for argument that a return to historical boundaries should not have
a set temporal standard. It should also be mentioned that contemporary international law
addresses the contentiousness of historical territorial boundaries through the uti possidetis
juris principle, which a priori, prevents territorial boundaries from changing in cases of
self-determination.142

Hence, all things considered, the principle of self-determination’s legal evolution
can be attributed to the post-Second World War period, starting with its inclusion in the
United Nations Charter.143 Eventually, treaties,144 international cases,145 and affirmations
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through United Nations General Assembly resolutions,146 confirmed the crystallization of
the principle into a peremptory norm of international law.147 Furthermore, the principle
became cited by domestic courts. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Quebec Secession Reference (1998), discussing the potential secession of the province of
Quebec, stated that:
…the existence of the right of a people to self-determination is now so
widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has
acquired a status beyond "convention" and is considered a general principle
of international law. 148
Similar examples of these affirmations can be found in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights149 as well as Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the United Nations
Charter.150 As such, the importance of this principle must be examined through both a
legal and a historico-political lens, in an effort to identify how it has come to be identified
with the act of secession. Additionally, the consideration of the principle alongside other
concepts that it touches on directly, such as statehood formation and the recognition of
states, requires further inquiry. The next section will expand on these considerations by
examining the post-Second World War development of the relationship between the three
concepts, as well as their contemporary status’ under international law.
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2.2.

Statehood, Recognition and Self-Determination
The legal challenges associated with the interpretation of the principle of self-

determination begin when attempting to understand it as part of the process of state
creation. Moreover, whether the principle exists as a legal right or a political one remains
a divisive issue. Principally, this contention can be attributed to the fact that “[s]elfdetermination as a legal right or principle threatened to bring about significant changes in
the political geography of the world, not limited to the dismemberment of Empires.”151
Thus, a potential change of ‘political geography’ prompts the study of the concept of
statehood in international law. This section will do this by addressing the interrelatedness
of self-determination, secession and statehood processes, specifically within the context
of newly formed states through UNC secessions. Additionally, this section will expand
on the act of secession – a corollary process in certain cases of self-determination – from
which the notion of state recognition can be properly analyzed and its significance
defined from both the legal and political perspectives.

2.2.1. History of Statehood in International law
The birth of independent states in Europe relates closely to the development of the
concepts of statehood, recognition and self-determination in international law. Indeed, the
rise in unilateral secessions in the 18th and 19th centuries provides a clear example of how
the concepts evolved since the development of European statehood starting in early 17th
and 18th century Europe.152 According to Fabry, a clear connection can be drawn between
the birth of European states and their respective state recognitions through the Westphalia
Treaties, which are “conventionally understood as ushering in sovereignty as a new mode
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of political and legal organization.”153 Although this claim is not universally accepted,154
Fabry points out that:
Mindful of possible pitfalls of being too categorical about the exact date of
origin of [state] institutions, two points can be made about the early phase
of recognition of new states. It could emerge as a full-fledged and discrete
practice only once European countries came to regard themselves as
forming a large association of formally like entities and once positive law
of this association gained a distinct foothold over natural law as its defining
institution. 155
As can be deduced from Fabry’s analysis, state recognition is not only connected with the
birth of European statehood, but also with the general secularization of classical
international law that began to take place towards the end of the 18th century156 (also
known as the rise of legal positivism157). Thus, in order to better understand the geopolitical landscape of 18th century-Europe, it is necessary to present a short summary of a
number of important historical events which furthered the development of the concept of
statehood in relation to classical international law.
The principle of European legitimism (also known as dynastic legitimism)
dominated the nature of statehood up until the 18th century. Grant describes it as the
“prevalent theory of sovereignty during the age of monarchy.”158 At its core, this model

Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States
Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 23.
154 Ibid (“[w]hile Martin Wight finds some evidence of modernity as early as the Council of Constant
(1414-18), F H Hinsley argues that we can only talk about a fully formed system of independent
states since the beginning of the eighteenth century…” at 24).
155 Ibid at 23.
156 The first “writings on recognition of new states can be traced to the German jurists Jacob Moser
(1778), Johann von Steck (1783), and George-Friedrich von Martens (1789).” Their works rose in
importance due to an increased interest of legal positivism towards the end of the 18th century,
which sought to define the practice of states as a way to formulate legal guidance for the creation of
new states moving forward. See ibid at 24.
157 See Currie, supra note 23 ([l]egal positivism is “[g]enerally characterized by three core
suppositions. First, true law is created only by a “laying down” of that law, at a discrete point in
history. Second, this “laying down” must be performed by a sovereign entity. Third, such laws are
effective, even if unjust when measured against some other, moral (or natural law) standard. Thus,
for extreme positivists, law exists only to the extent that it is effectively imposed by a sovereign
power, and it persists as law even if viewed as unjust by some other measure” at 15).
158 Ibid at 8.
153

35

rested upon the ‘principle of inheritance’159 – whereby the monarch had personal
ownership of the land and had a “historic right to rule the state.”160 In essence, even if
monarchs were to be dethroned, they would continue to reign as the rightful sovereign of
their lands and properties. While this concept was firmly entrenched up until and
throughout 18th century-Europe, it began to lose traction after the American and French
Revolutions, and was abandoned altogether in 1918 after the disappearance of “the four
great monarchies (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey).”161 As mentioned in
the previous sub-section, this disappearance can be attributed prima facie to the rise of
liberalism. The liberalist school of thought, as promulgated by scholars such as John
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, believed that citizens of states were
the ‘source of political authority’162 rather than the monarch. This belief was based on the
notion that humans had the ability to reason and were therefore “capable of determining
the political direction of their countries.”163 Additionally, the liberalist school posited
that, for a government to be legitimate, “it must be based on the will of the people – those
subject to it – and not on the ‘benevolent will of kings.’164 According to Locke, a prolific
scholar of the liberalist school, the consent of the people was the key element to the
foundation of states.165 With the declining notion of dynastic legitimism in Europe, the
notion of statehood became more and more secularized, and consequently developed as
part of a custom of democratic and mostly-independent states. Additionally, the decline
in the legitimacy of unprovoked foreign conquests (apart from the Napoleonic era) was
also responsible for advocating for a system of independent states by way of
recognition.166 Nonetheless, two major events are said to have been the primary catalysts
for the development of the concept of state recognition from a political to a legal concept:
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respectively, they were the American and French revolutions of 1776 and 1789.167 It is
necessary to elaborate on the circumstances that led to their commencement, as well as
their subsequent influence on the Congress of Vienna168 which solidified the notion of
independent states in Europe.
The matter of recognizing an emerging state, created through a manner other than
dynastic European legitimism, can be traced back to the proclamation of independence by
the thirteen colonies to create the United States of America (US) on July 4, 1776. In
particular, the issue of recognizing a former colony became a notion of concern for many
European states, who were forced to consider the potential diplomatic and military
implications of such an action. Hence, for nearly a decade after the proclamation, support
for the US was only expressed by-proxy by powerful imperialist states such as France
and Netherlands, which were favourable to the revolution, but in a bid not to inflame a
new European conflict, promoted their interests and their support to the US
revolutionaries through private companies or secret organizations. 169 More specifically,
while both states refused to officially recognize the sovereignty of the United States, they
supplied it with advisors and military arms to support the American war effort against
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Britain.170 Eventually, the Netherlands recognized the United States in 1782 by
“admitting Adams [US representative] as minister plenipotentiary and thus
acknowledging the United States as a sovereign state.”171 Subsequently, Britain conceded
and recognized US independence in a peace treaty in 1783. The consequences of this
example of recognition are summarized by Fabry:
The United States became widely recognized and thus admitted into
international society only after it had become acknowledged as independent
by its parent country. To treat it as a sovereign state before this
acknowledgment was considered by most states to be a hostile act violating
the rights of the British crown…The American case revealed other
important things in regards to state recognition. It demonstrated the fate
awaiting unrecognized entities: before its acknowledgment and despite the
assertions of the Declaration of Independence, the United States could not
sign international treaties, have diplomatic relations, form formal military
alliances, raise foreign loans, join international organizations, or benefit
from regularized trade and commerce. Its survival depended almost solely
on its internal strength.172
Finally, France recognized the United States through a treaty with US commissioners in
1788.173 Although the recognition of the United States established a precedent in dynastic
Europe for the creation of states through ‘consent of the governed’,174 another event in
the same century created a lasting effect that would impact European dynastic legitimism
in particular: the French Revolution of 1789. The French Revolution was a further
disruption to the “order based predominantly on the rule of legitimate royal houses.” 175
As previously mentioned, actions such as the passing of the Declaration of Man and of
the Citizen which acknowledged the right of peoples to freely choose their government,
were not readily accepted by the rest of the European community. On the contrary, as a
result of Napoleonic defeat, such notions were disregarded entirely until the early 20 th
century.176
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Although the French Revolution espoused the notion of self-determination,
contradictions persisted with respect to how it could be administered as a principle of a
newly secularized and universal customary law. By acknowledging that the principle of
self-determination was valid not simply for France, but for the entire world, the French
revolutionaries decided that they had the ultimate obligation to propagate this right to the
peoples of the world. In other words, they believed that France had a right to interfere in
the affairs of foreign states so long as it meant the reinstitution of the ‘will of the
governed’.177 Although, as previously mentioned, this idea failed in large part through the
defeat of Napoleon in 1815; a consensus on allowing new states to be formed without the
consent of their original sovereign state was disavowed entirely if such ‘independence’
came as a result of a foreign invasion or occupation. Fabry suggests that this claim
confirms two points with regards to the concept of statehood in the 19th century:
International legitimacy in the pre-1815 period clearly centered on the
notion of state rights in customary international law, which, given that most
states were hereditary monarchies, was taken to imply dynastic
rights…[and] the insistence on these rights despite changes in effective
statehood (i.e., appearance and disappearance of de facto states) shows that
the ability to take effective control of a territory, whether from within or
without, could not, by itself, establish legitimate titles. 178
Stated otherwise, the pre-1815 history of state recognition began through a reverberation
of dynastic legitimism, leading to the development of certain precedents as a result of the
subsequent revolutions in the United States and France. Additionally, the occupation of
territory, which occurred frequently during this time on account of multiple intra-state
armed conflicts in Europe, did not lead to an acquiescence of de jure land rights.179 These
two points should not be disregarded with respect to state recognition. In fact, they could
be said to be precursors to the ensuing dissolution of euro-centric colonial empirical
model of statehood and the extensive decolonization of the world which took place
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towards the end of the 19th and 20th centuries.180 The next sub-section will explore the
impact of these two points as a result of the conceived pre-1815 understanding of state
recognition, leading to analyze the concepts that emerged as a result of its relative
success in Europe: self-determination and secession.
The American and French Revolutions of 1776 and 1789 led to an overturn of the
European dynastic order; however, it was another area of the world that would usher in a
new era of sovereignty. Between 1810 and 1830, Central and South America “witnessed
the birth of twelve new countries.”181 In fact, according to Fabry, it was here (and not in
Europe) that dynastic legitimacy received “its first sustained blow.” 182 More precisely, as
colonies seceded from their colonizing states, a debate raged around the question of
whether an existing state’s recognition was a sine qua non for statehood or not.183 For
example, multiple scholars at the time could not come to a consensus on whether an
existing state’s recognition legitimized a secession in the eyes of the classical
international legal system. As per Anderson:
[For example,] Pufendorf maintained that the existing state's recognition
was necessary for a secessionist entity to obtain statehood. A priori, an
entity created by consensual or unilateral secession must enjoy the existing
state's recognition before statehood could be legally conferred. Other early
scholars, however, such as Vattel, took a different view, arguing that the
existing state's recognition was unnecessary.184
Nevertheless, even as scholars were unable to come to a consensus on the legal strength
of state recognition, one potential theory observes that the debate on the legitimacy of
state recognition as a legal requirement for statehood could be considered as settled from
1809, as “various Spanish colonies declared their independence from Madrid and
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functioned without any effective Spanish opposition for over a decade.” 185 It goes on to
claim that although the US feared a potential military conflict with Spain, it felt pressure
to recognize the former Spanish colonies in an effort to encourage the secession of
colonized states from colonial rule. Subsequently, in June 1822, “contrary to Spanish
desires, U.S. President James Monroe extended recognition to Colombia. Similarly, the
British extended recognition to Argentina in February 1825, Colombia in April 1825, and
Mexico in December 1826.”186 It is clear from these examples that the consent of Spain
was not considered by the US in recognizing its former colonies, thereby changing the
previous custom which dictated that recognition be granted to a seceding colony only
after the official recognition of the secession by the colonizing state. On a side note, even
though the de facto recognition of secessions became an “undisputed standard of
recognition in America and the Americas,”187 its challenge to legitimist powers
established a new standard in customary international law which assumed that the newly
formed state would observe and be bound by all international treaties concerning it, prior
to its accession to statehood.188 Although this notion imposed a respect for a legal system
derived from the same colonizing states that conquered territories in the first place, the
challenge to the status quo imbued the first step in throwing off the yolk of legitimist
powers in former colonies.
Nevertheless, the disagreements on the legitimacy of de facto and de jure state
recognitions had not been resolved towards the end of the 18th century.189 It was only in
the middle of the 19th century, and with a crumbling Ottoman Empire, that states began to
realize that state recognition plays an important role in the political formation process of
statehood. As further explained by Frowein:
In the 19th century some examples of collective recognition became
important. Art. 7 Paris Peace Treaty (1856) ([1855–56] 114 CTS 409) was
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generally seen as a collective act with regard to admission and recognition
of Turkey as a member of the European legal order. [Additionally,] the
Berlin Congress (1878) amounted to the collective recognition of territorial
changes and the independence of several States formerly under Turkish
sovereignty.190
Through the Paris Peace Treaty, the debate around state recognition now remerged with a
focus on collective recognition of statehood, and whether it provided legal status to a
newly formed state or not. Eventually, this debate led a congregation of states to sign the
Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International
Conference of American States191 (commonly known as the Montevideo Convention) in
1933. The Convention set out four criteria as necessary for a state to achieve legitimacy
under international law. According to the Convention,
[t]he state as a [legal] person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory;
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other
states.192
Nonetheless, the vagueness of the four criteria, coupled with their applicability to a
changing dynamic of statehood in the 20th century, has not solved the issue of
determining a strict set of rules required in order for an entity to become a state under
international law. In many ways, this has left the emergence of new states in the 20 th and
21st centuries, a matter of open and contested debate. Notwithstanding the fact that the
extent of the Conventions’ influence has been a matter of contested debate, 193 it must be
noted nonetheless that it continues to serve as the cornerstone of modern statehood in the
21st century, with the ‘classical criteria’ of statehood continuing to define the
effectiveness and existence of a ‘state’ under international law. 194
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As the Montevideo requirements set out the only codified legal guidelines for
obtaining statehood in the early 20th century, an important question began to be posed
after the First World War: under what conditions should an entity be refused statehood.
In other words, are there conditions or circumstances under which a state should refuse to
recognize an emerging state?195 Frowein explains the importance of considering this
question, as the actions of an emerging state and its relations with other states cannot be
ignored if its statehood claim of may be illegitimate. He explains this dilemma in the
following manner:
To establish what States consider to be the essential criteria for statehood,
it is more expedient to consider under which circumstances they refuse
recognition as a State (Non-Recognition). There are two main reasons why
States have withheld full recognition although, at least on the face of it,
some entity resembling a State existed. The reason most frequently given is
lack of independence in relation to a State which has brought the new entity
into existence by unlawful intervention… It is this reason which was
advanced for the non-recognition of Manchukuo as a Japanese ‘puppetState’ in the 1930s or of Croatia as a German creation of that sort in the
1940s… A second reason, which was used to withhold recognition in the
case of Rhodesia (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), was the fact that independence had
been brought about by a white minority government in a former colonial
territory in the 1960s. The clear lack of any act of self-determination was
seen as justifying non-recognition.196
Put differently, the violation of peremptory norms of international law such as the
unlawful use of force (military intervention and invasion)197 or denial of the right to selfdetermination for all peoples within an emerging state, could delegitimize the emerging
states’ bid for statehood from an international legal perspective, and consequently
alienate it from recognition by other states.198 The importance of complying with
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peremptory norms as part of the statehood formation process will be expanded on in more
detail towards the end of this chapter; however, the connection between the process of
statehood formation and the concept of state recognition cannot be ignored when
analyzing the principle of self-determination.
In sum, the history of state recognition emerged out of a dying European dynastic
order. Although the revolutions in France and the United States disseminated the notions
of self-determination and elected government, state recognition remained largely a
symbolic measure until the early 19th century. Through the development of the definition
of statehood in international law, a positivist campaign to codify its requirements ended
with the signing of the Montevideo Convention in 1933. Although the Convention
emerged as the foundation for the contemporary requirements of statehood, it failed to
engender change in the legal interpretation of the statehood formation process in the face
of decolonization and conflict (specifically, for ‘peoples’ seeking self-determination.)199
Further, throughout and after the First and Second World Wars, the concept of statehood
shifted from embracing self-determination, to its incorporation into the decolonization
campaign orchestrated by the United Nations in the early 1960s. However, state
recognition reemerged as a contested subject in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. In fact, through the adoption of the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,200 which set the stage for a more modern
interpretation of statehood requirements for emerging states in Eastern Europe, it became
less clear whether state recognition can continue to be interpreted as a symbolic rule
under international law. In order to solve this issue, the next sub-section will explore the
connection of state recognition with the act of secession, as well as its relationship with
the principle of self-determination and the concept of state sovereignty. This will be
accomplished through a brief contemporary analysis of the Montevideo criteria, as well
as a summary of the issues posed by its applicability to secessions completed on the basis
of self-determination. Subsequently, a summary of the three theories of recognition will
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demonstrate the strength of the declaratory theory of recognition in cases of external selfdetermination, establishing the importance of considering the legal aspects of a UNC
secession, rather than relying on its recognition by other states as a way of legitimizing its
existence.
2.2.2. The “Montevideo” criteria explained
The challenge of interpreting the four criteria of statehood outlined in the
Montevideo Convention is that “…[i]nternational law does not impose rigid or arbitrary
quantitative criteria when it comes to [their] requirements. There must be some territory,
some permanent population, some effective government and enough independence to
enter into international relations.”201 Therefore, when looking at each criterion
individually, it becomes evident that their classical definition is viewed more as a flexible
legal rule rather than a rule of law strictu sensu. In order to demonstrate this, as well as
how the arbitrariness of the criteria impacts the act of secession, a careful study of each
criterion is necessary.
The first criterion requires a state to have a defined territory. The debate over
what is meant by the term “defined” has led scholars to suggest that its most fair
interpretation, is that a defined territory must be based on territorial boundaries that the
state in question agrees upon (even if such territorial boundaries are contested by other
states.)202 This is supported by two ICJ cases, North Sea Continental Shelf203 and
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad.204 The only instance where this claim
could be challenged is where a state consistently changes its boundary claims for a
‘defined territory’. For example:
…Serbian Krajina's attempted secession from Croatia failed to satisfy the
defined territory criterion, due to the constantly shifting nature of its
external borders. It was unclear, for instance, which municipalities were
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included within Serbian Krajina and which were excluded…205
Therefore, as can be seen through this example, a defined territory can be claimed by an
emerging state, under the condition that the original boundary claim cannot be changed
once an act of secession is initiated.
The second criterion requires that a state have a permanent population.
Concerning the stringency of the term ‘permanent’, the Western Sahara206 advisory
ruling pointed out that a population of a territory does not need to be permanent in the
sense of its constant habitation within the confines of the claimed territory.207 This view
has been supported by most scholars when analyzing claims of land title based on a
permanent population criterion in remote communities such as the Arctic, Antarctic and
northern parts of Greenland for example.208 Consequently, this criterion can be
interpreted as requiring only that a defined population, considered as inhabiting within a
defined territory, exist for a claim of statehood to be made legitimate.
The third criterion requires a state to have an effective government. Out of the
four criteria, this one has proven to be the most complex in its interpretation, in particular
with regards to its applicability in cases of decolonization. 209 For example, Anderson
suggests that the challenge of the traditional definition of the concept can be seen through
“two interrelated limbs: first, there should be a political, executive, and legal structure for
the purpose of regulating the population; and second, this political, executive, and legal
structure must be effective, which means that it must be able to project authority
throughout the population…”.210 Of note is that this interpretation has shifted with the
emergence of the principle of self-determination, which has affirmed that a government
of a state does not have to be fully effective in order for this criterion to have been
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satisfied. 211 Nevertheless, this interpretation has not been universally accepted by
contemporary legal scholarship. For example, Crawford provides an alternative view,
claiming that the effective government criterion is central to the existence of the state.
This is evidenced by the fact that “…territorial sovereignty is not ownership but
governing power with respect to territory.”212 The challenge with accepting that a state
must have an effective government prima facie is that it becomes exclusionary in cases of
unilateral secessions, specifically when an entity secedes to form an emerging state, yet
whose government does not possess the capacity to execute its functions as a state
(legislative, executive and/or judicial). As an entity invoking its right to selfdetermination could unilaterally secede on the basis of that right, the effectiveness of its
government could not meet the requirements of effectiveness, as interpreted by Crawford,
at the time of the secession. Thus, the question can be asked: in that particular scenario,
does the entity lose its legal personality as a new state on the basis of it not meeting the
requirement of having an effective government? The answer may lie in the
‘compensatory force principle’, which, as suggested by Raic and Anderson, can explain
the exceptional status of a state government post-secession:
In the second half of the twentieth century…the effective government
criterion has been modified by the law of self-determination. This
modification-termed by Raic the "compensatory force principle" has
ensured that a state created by UNC secession and in conformity with the
right of peoples to self-determination will not be required to strictly satisfy
the effective government criterion. Conversely, contemporary international
law indicates that a state created by UNC secession in violation of the right
of peoples to self-determination will be simply unable to satisfy the
effective government criterion. On this basis, it might be asserted that the
effective government criterion has been reformulated as coextensive with
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the right of peoples to external self-determination.213
State practice has also supported the existence of the compensatory force principle. In
fact, multiple cases of state secessions during the decolonization era of the 1960s, such as
Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, Angola and Republic of Congo, provide evidence of how a state
can be created without an effective government in place.214 Outside of the decolonization
context, states created by UNC secessions on the basis of systematic denials of selfdetermination such as Kosovo, Bangladesh and Eritrea have similarly been granted
statehood without governments that were considered effective at the time.215 A priori, it
can be concluded that a putative state must have at least a functioning government;
however, full effectiveness of the government is not a stringent requirement in cases of
self-determination, and must be carefully analyzed on a case-by-case basis, as in the case
of Kosovo, where a complete absence of government did not preclude it from obtaining
statehood.216
The fourth and last criterion requires that a state must have the capacity to enter
into relations with other states. Crawford and Anderson both agree that this criterion is
actually a combination of both the effective government criterion and a ‘fifth’ criterion of
independence.217As independence is a crucial factor in cases of UNC secessions (even
more-so in cases of self-determination),218 a consortium of scholars has advocated for its
inclusion into the contemporary criteria for statehood. 219 There is widespread agreement
that the criterion can be divided into two categories, formal and actual independence.
Formal independence refers to the seceding entity as being self-governed, deriving its
rule of law from domestic legislation such as a constitution or a declaration of
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independence. Conversely, actual independence stipulates that the state must take its own
directives with regards to its independence. In other words, a bona fide statehood must
exist which ensures that the state acts on its own will and in good faith without foreign
interference.220 Stated otherwise, both categories of independence must exist
concomitantly. Therefore, the criterion of having the capacity to enter into relations with
other states relies on the requirements of formal and actual independence. This
interpretation must be carefully considered, given that a state without independence or an
effective government (even in the ‘not-entirely effective’ sense) will be unable to enter
into relations with other states, and hence, may not earn legal personality under
international law.221
In sum, the four criteria, although fundamental to the conceptualization of
statehood in international law, are vague in their respective definitions while still
representing a flexible legal rule under international law. The most convincing factor
evidencing this claim is that independence, although not officially recognized under the
Convention, “…remains a central criterion for statehood.”222 Nevertheless, it should also
be noted that the concept of independence can be correlated directly with the concept of
sovereignty, which “can be notoriously vexing to define.”223 In large part, this is due to
the fact that state sovereignty should presumably acknowledge a state’s ability to act
independently. The next sub-section will explain this correlation, as well as how the
concepts of sovereignty and state recognition fit into the tenets of the modern
conceptualization of statehood under international law.
2.2.3. Sovereignty, Statehood and Recognition
Identifying the characteristics of a state which grant it ‘legal personality’ is a
challenging task. Apart from referencing the Montevideo criteria, no general agreement
exists on the matter, leading one to rely on scholarly opinion to understand the concept of
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a new state achieving sovereignty in both a legal and a political sense. 224 As mentioned
earlier, Sovereignty is of fundamental importance within the context of statehood as it
defines the exclusive status of states within international law. No other entity possesses
such an exclusive right and status. When consulting opinio juris on the subject, one is
pointed to the words of Justice Alvarez who stated in his dissenting opinion in Corfu
Channel that:
By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributes
which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States,
and also in its relations with other States. Sovereignty confers rights upon
States and imposes obligations upon them…225
Alternatively, in Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria,226 Justice Anzilotti
interpreted sovereignty as factually being conflated with independence. He held that:
The term independence is no more than the normal condition of States
according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty
(suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant that the State
has over it no higher authority than that of international law. 227
As can be seen from both definitions, the concept of sovereignty surpasses any criteria
that may formulate statehood and by that fact is considered jus cogens in international
law. This view is further expanded on by Crawford to include ‘international rights of a
state’ as well:
In its most common modern usage, sovereignty is the term for ‘the totality
of international rights and duties recognized by international law’ as
residing in an independent territorial unit – the State. It is not itself a right,
nor is it a criterion for statehood (sovereignty is an attribute of States, not a
precondition).228
In demonstrating the potency of sovereignty as an attribute only subject to the
overarching limits of international law,229 Crawford confirms that it is in fact a qualified
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and not an absolute right. In other words, a state can assert sovereignty and legal
jurisdiction only over its own territory, and is restricted only by the limits imposed on it
by international law through treaties, customs and general principles. 230 Indeed, by
concluding that sovereignty is not absolute, it can equally be inferred that a unilateral
secession’s withdrawal of territory from part of an existing state to create a new one, by
virtue of that separation, also leads to a withdrawal of sovereignty and legal title from the
existing state’s territory.231 Thus, once the territory has withdrawn from the existing
territory to create a new state, a final step looks to the recognition of the new territory as
playing an important role in its existence. The next sub-section will explore the role of
state recognition in greater detail, outlining the three theories of recognition, and
establishing whether the role of state recognition in international law is simply a
symbolic act acknowledging the legitimacy of the state or an absolute sine qua non for
statehood under international law.
2.2.4. Three Theories of Recognition in International Law
As previously mentioned, the theoretical approach to recognition was initiated in
response to the growing confusion surrounding the creation of new states. In other words,
it was developed in order to establish an understanding of the requirements for statehood
beyond the Montevideo Convention criteria.232 Additionally, as statehood in international
law derives its roots from a euro-centric concept founded during the era of European
imperialism, the understanding that states are not a creation of international law, rather
that international law is premised on their existence, must be emphasized.233 Moreover,
the practice of states towards recognition in the past century has consistently focused
more on the grounds for non-recognition of emerging states, paving the way to suggest
that statehood will not be granted if an egregious violation of international law was
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committed as part of the statehood formation process.234 This section will briefly
summarize the three main theories of recognition: collective-constitutive, declaratory and
constitutive, with the objective of confirming the reasons for which the declaratory theory
is considered as the primary theory that explains the role of recognition under existing
international law.
2.2.4.1. The Collective and Collective-Constitutive Theories
The collective and collective-constitutive theories of international law stipulate
that recognition by other states is a sine qua non for statehood.235 The most significant
difference between the two theories is that the collective-constitutive theory suggests that
collective recognition by states is a sine qua non for statehood, whereby the collective
theory of recognition stipulates that any number of states (even individual states) can
grant their recognition to acknowledge a state’s legal existence. Although both theories
tend to focus on the creation of new states in the 20th century, no mention of support for
the constitutive theory can be found when referencing international treaty law.236 On the
contrary, in regards to the collective-constitutive theory, suggestions of recognition as
being implicitly connected to membership in the United Nations (UN) do exist.237 One
such suggestion looks at Article 4 of the UN Charter as evidence that “admission to the
UN is tantamount to the conferral of statehood by collective means.”238 Several issues
exist with this claim. First, the term ‘state’ was used specifically in the wording of Article
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4 (1) of the UN Charter to contrast the wording in Article 1(2) of the League of Nations
Covenant,239which granted membership to “any fully governing State, Dominion or
Colony.”240 The exclusion of such entities was intended to avoid the admission of
member-states not considered as having the status of a sovereign state. Second, as
suggested by Anderson, when analyzing the travaux preparatoires of the UN Charter, a
response to the “Norwegian proposal to endow the UN with the power to recommend
collective recognition of statehood was discarded.”241In essence, both constitutive and
constitutive-collective theorists see the consent of states as the ineluctable feature for
obtaining statehood under the current system of states. Nevertheless, scholars have not
entirely discarded support for the collective recognition theories. For example, Dugard
indicates that there are several major issues with the arguments that interpret collective
recognition as having weak legal standing under international law. First, the implication
that a ‘state is a state through the recognition of other states’, suggests that there is no
absolute existence of states.242 A primary example of this is Kosovo, which exists as an
independent state (as confirmed through its acknowledgement by over 100 states);243
however, its non-recognition by a number of powerful states such as Russia,244 India245
and China246 implies that, to them, Kosovo does not exist as a state and thus cannot be
granted the same international rights as other sovereign states. Similar issues occurred
during the Cold War with the recognitions and non-recognitions of East and West
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Germany, and North and South Vietnam and Korea by the US and the USSR. It should be
noted that efforts were made to prevent this from occurring. Writing shortly after 1945,
scholars such as Hersch Lauterpacht and Hans Kelsen suggested that an obligation must
be imposed on states to recognize new states on condition that they fulfill the Montevideo
criteria for statehood; however, their suggestions failed in large part due to the reluctance
of states to impose rigid guidelines to the formation of statehood in the 20th century.247
Second, the constitutive theory suggests that a non-recognized state has no rights
or obligations vis-à-vis other states so long as it remains unrecognized.248 According to
Dugard, this has also proven to be untrue when applied against state practice. For
example, Israel, although not recognized by multiple states in the Middle East, maintains
its international legal obligations and vice versa.249 In fact, a growing scholarship
maintains that non-recognized states are being held accountable for violations of
peremptory norms of international law.250 Additionally, an extension of this argument
claims that the dissolutions of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union created a set of new
guidelines for the recognition of states.251 In essence, “[t]hese Guidelines provided that
recognition should only be granted to states that respect the provisions of the UN Charter,
guarantee the human rights of any ethnic and national minorities, respect the inviolability
of internationally recognized boundaries, subscribe to nuclear non-proliferation and meet
international standards regarding human rights.”252 However, as discussed by Anderson,
this interpretation has also been found to have no legal basis:
The legitimacy of this claim, however, is highly suspect. To begin with, the
long title of the Guidelines—Declaration on the Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union—
inherently suggests that they are targeting acts of recognition and not the
conferral of statehood. This view is also borne out by reference to the
language employed throughout the Guidelines, which arguably suggests
that new states may exist prior to recognition…Had the Guidelines been

Dugard, “The Law of State Secession”, supra note 152 at 46.
Ibid.
249 Ibid. See also Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 26.
250 Dold, supra note 233 at 92.
251 See supra note 144.
252 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, supra note 4 at 367.
247
248

54

intended to propound a constitutive approach to recognition, paragraph four
would more than likely have employed the words ‘entity’, ‘territorial entity’
or ‘putative state’ in place of the word ‘state’.253
As can be deduced from Anderson’s analysis, a close interpretation of the guidelines
confirms that they are indeed nothing more than just that – guidelines – which are meant
to serve as a threshold for considerations of recognition for newly formed states. 254 In
sum, the constitutive and constitutive-collective theories possess serious legal gaps. The
leading legal theory – the declaratory theory of recognition – addresses those gaps by
emphasizing a more juristic approach to the international law on statehood, rather than a
reliance on the act of state recognition.
2.2.4.2. The Declaratory Theory
The declaratory theory rests on the premise that recognition of a putative state by
other states is not a sine qua non for statehood.255 Stated succinctly, the declaratory
theory of recognition establishes that the recognition of states, although an important
symbolic gesture, is not a legal requirement of statehood. Although the UN Charter does
not explicitly address this recognition, “[r]egional treaties…indicate support for the
declaratory approach. [Specifically,] Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention and
Articles 13 and 14 of the Charter of the Organization of American States suggest that
statehood antedates recognition, thereby supporting the declaratory recognition
theory.”256 Additionally, customary international law has historically insisted on the
applicability of international law norms in cases of aggression or conflict by both
recognized and non-recognized states:257
In December 1974 the General Assembly adopted the nonbinding
Definition of Aggression, Article 1 of which provided that "[a]gression is
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity
or political independence of another State, ‘where "the term 'State' . . . [i]s
used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a
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member of the United Nations’.258
This is important to note as the next three chapters will demonstrate that, although a right
for a UNC secession is permitted under international law, the process by which an entity
becomes a state is of equal importance as the act of secession itself. More precisely, the
violation of peremptory norms as part of the statehood process by an UNC secessionist
entity will lead to the rejection of its statehood as part of the obligation of nonrecognition. Prior to moving into a summary of the relative state practice with regards to
UNC secessions, it is necessary to briefly expand on this point.
As pointed out by Judge Skubiszewski in the Case Concerning East Timor
(Portugal v Australia),259 in the context of a breach of a peremptory norm (in this case, it
was the illegal use of force), the rule of non-recognition as a result of such a breach exists
in a self-executing function.260 In essence, this signifies that “ individual states are legally
obligated to not extend recognition to UNC secessionist entities that have violated
peremptory norms during their formative process.”261 Additional jurisprudential evidence
with regards to the legal obligation of non-recognition can also be found in the Namibia
Advisory Opinion.262 In that Case, the ICJ opined that each state is
Under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in
Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia,
and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the
Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or
lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration.263
Fundamentally, the court imposed an obligation on each state to alienate and deny any
legitimacy to a state which has breached a peremptory norm of international law. If one
applies this analogy to the case of a putative state committing the same offence, it can be
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concluded that the notion of compliance with peremptory norms as a requirement of
contemporary statehood has crystallized into a customary international law.264
As can be reasoned from the statement above, the complexity of analyzing
putative statehood inevitably comes back to the issue of collective-recognition of the
putative state by existing states.265 In response to the claims by scholars such as
Dugard266 or Devine267 that compliance with peremptory norms is not a requirement for
statehood due to its legitimization via the collective recognition of states, Anderson
points to the fact that this argument establishes a two-state system in international law;
“first, those that exist in international law and have legal effect; and second, those that
exist in international law and do not have legal effect.”268 This is problematic for several
reasons. If a state can exist by virtue of satisfying the statehood criteria, but has no legal
personality on the basis of its violation of peremptory norms as part of its formation
process, the international legal order of sovereign states can be said to have had its
threshold for statehood dissipated. This argument cannot be accepted for the simple
reason that any UNC secessions that have been found to violate peremptory norms of
international law are only granted legal effect by states that ignore international law on
the basis of their foreign policies. In other words, Russia may grant legal effect to
Abkhazia through the signing of cooperation treaties; 269 however, this neither grants
Abkhazia international legal personality, nor does it validate the illegality of the treaties
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sub silentio. Similarly, the rejection of the TRNC as a state both through domestic law in
Britain270 and through international law271 cannot be superseded by the fact that Turkey
granted the TRNC ‘legal effect’ through its recognition. Without analyzing the details of
the TRNC and Abkhazian secessions; one common factor can be identified which
prevents either entity from being granted legal personality regardless of their claim to a
right of external self-determination; the fact that multiple peremptory norms were
violated as part of their respective secessions and subsequent annexations in Cyprus and
Georgia respectively.
In conclusion, it can be suggested that compliance with peremptory norms of
international law is a precondition for a successful UNC secession to emerge as a state in
international law. As pointed out by Anderson, major scholarly opinion supports this
view, with prominent scholars such as Raic272 and Crawford273 enlisting their support to
the establishment of a newly emerged international legal standard for statehood which
states that "…the existence of a State under international law is to be determined on the
basis of (a) criteria based on the concept of effectiveness (the traditional criteria) and (b)
criteria based on legality [compliance with peremptory norms]."274
Now that this point has been clarified, it is necessary to return to the issue of state
practice with regards to the declaratory theory of recognition. Additional examples of
state practice that reaffirm the declaratory interpretation include such incidents as Britain
seeking compensation from Israel for a downed military jet (even though Britain still had
not recognized Israel as a state), or several states in the Middle-East making claims
against Israel’s alleged violations of the UN Charter while equally not recognizing its
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status as a state. 275 In addition to most scholars supporting this view,276 multiple judicial
decisions have reaffirmed the declaratory nature of recognition in international law. 277
Some of the more recent examples,
…can be found in the decisions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission,
established to advise the European Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. In its
Opinion No. 1, handed down on 29 November, 1991, the Commission
stated that “the effects of recognition by other states are purely declaratory.”
This position was reiterated by Opinion No. 8, handed down on 4 July 1992,
which held that “recognition of a State by other States [only has] declarative
value . . . Support for the declaratory recognition theory is also arguably
found within the Canadian Supreme Court advisory opinion, Reference re
Secession of Quebec. There, the court noted that although recognitions
would be politically advantageous for a newly seceded Quebec, they would
not be a sine qua non for statehood. Indeed the court explicitly held that
“recognition by other states is not . . . necessary to achieve statehood.”278
Notwithstanding the popular support for the declaratory theory in international law,
several issues have been identified as challenging its legitimacy which must be
addressed.279
First, as the declaratory theory relies profoundly on the Montevideo Convention
criteria,280 two challenges can be raised to the fact that “[i]n the first instance, these
criteria may be objectively ascertainable, but in practice, it is left to each State to decide
subjectively whether the criteria have been met…[and in the second]…the Montevideo
criteria are no longer the only criteria for statehood, but there is no certainty as to
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precisely what the new criteria are.”281 To summarize, the question of how many criteria
exist in the modern conceptualization of statehood is often left unanswered by the
declaratory theorists. Although such criticisms are salient in that they point out a general
vagueness of the Montevideo Convention criteria, the obscure interpretations of existing
law are prevalent in large areas of public international law and thus are not exclusive to
the issue of state recognition. Moreover, the consistency of opinio juris through state
practice with regards to state recognition, has exacerbated the notion that it exists de lege
lata, denoting its existence as part of customary practice limited to the sovereign decision
of each existing state.282
A second major criticism of the declaratory theory is that it recognizes that a state
may exist without the recognition of other states.283 In other words, if a state can exist
without recognition by other states, this would indicate that, logically, it cannot enter into
relations with other states, not complying with the fourth criterion of statehood under the
Montevideo Convention.284 Although this claim has merit, an a contrario reading of this
requirement suggests that the criterion for entering into relations with other states does
not indicate a threshold for demonstrating a capacity to enter into relations with other
States.285 Rather, a state can exist insofar as it meets the requirement of formal
independence, meaning, for example, that the state in question must not be considered a
proxy state or basing its actual independence on a foreign occupation. In other words, this
indicates that, hypothetically, a state can exist, even if a number of other states do not
recognize its existence. Kosovo and Israel are prime examples of states which remain
unrecognized de jure by a number of states, yet remain active in the international
community, which by majority, accepts their legal status as such.286 In essence, this
criticism can be downgraded to the indication that a state can exist (regardless of how
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many states recognize it),287 insofar as it meets the Montevideo criteria, and has not been
created in violation of peremptory norms (via foreign state occupation, illegal use of
force, violation of territorial inviolability etc.). In reality, a state created out of such a
violation would be neither granted legitimacy nor be recognized by the international
community, while a state created in accordance with international law would. Therefore,
there is a very small probability that a state created in accordance with international law
will be left alienated by the majority of the international community. Concerning those
entities that were created through a violation of peremptory norms of international law,
examples such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia (recognized only by Russia, Nicaragua,
Venezuela and Nauru)288 or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC –
recognized only by Turkey),289 indicate that, apart from alienation by the international
community, from an international law perspective, their status as ‘states’ is illegal and
infringes on the territorial sovereignty of their metropolitan states (in this case, Georgia
and Cyprus respectively).290
A final criticism of the declaratory theory is how it interprets and explains the
concept of failed states.291 It is claimed that the declaratory theory does not adequately
explain how a failed state is able to fulfill the third and fourth criteria of the Montevideo
Convention.292 Examples of perceived failed states include Somalia, South Sudan and
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Yemen, among others.293 Although constitutive-collective theorists such as Dugard are
correct in pointing out that a failed state will find it difficult to prove that it has an
effective government or a capacity to enter into relations with other states, the
preponderant legal issue in responding to this argument lies in the principle of
effectiveness as applied to the two aforementioned criteria.294 In applying the principle of
effectiveness to the individual cases of failed states, it can be seen that, regardless of the
effectiveness of a government or its overall capacity to enter into relations with other
states, there is yet to be a case of a pre-existing state that has not been able to fulfill either
of the two criteria. This fact is applicable across the spectrum of failed states. Even in
Somalia or North Korea, an internationally-recognized government, which represents the
territory of the state, is able to enter into relations with other states through a functioning
government (even if the effectiveness of that government can be questionable).
Therefore, it can be suggested that this argument functions more on the basis of analyzing
the legal status of the government of a state, a concept that has been rejected by
international law as representing the legal status of the state itself. 295 Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, the issue of recognition of new states in the 21st century has been
connected to the rise in unilateral secessions, and therefore the role of state recognition
must be developed to focus on the legality of secession itself, rather than the act of
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recognizing a state, which typically follows it. The next section will further address this
point by identifying the circumstances under which a right of a UNC secession is
permitted under international law.

2.3.

A Right to UNC Secession
In 2016, while speaking to the European Subcommittee of the United States

Congress, Paul Williams, President and Co-Founder of Public International Law and
Policy Group, estimated that there were more than 60 ongoing national self-determination
conflicts around the world.296 Additionally, he alleged that, since 1990, half of the
world’s active armed conflict zones involved disputes related to self-determination, with
an estimated civilian death-toll of over 20 million.297 Clearly, questions of the
applicability and the use of self-determination have become prevalent in the
contemporary world, and hence, call for a principled solution that can be justified under
international law.
As previously mentioned, the principle of self-determination has been affirmed as
a legal right through both state practice and numerous international legal instruments.
Although this has established the legal right to self-determination; it has not clarified
whether that legal right encompasses the right to a UNC secession. One of the most
difficult questions that the right to self-determination fails to clearly answer is: to which
peoples can this right be applied to? In other words, although it is clear that such a right
was granted to peoples requesting independence during the era of decolonization,298 the
scope of its applicability to peoples outside of the decolonization context is less clear and
hence, requires further examination. With that said, an approach to defining the right of a
unilateral secession outside of the colonial context requires confirmation as well.
Anderson approaches this issue in the following manner:
Unlike many other human rights, self-determination is applicable to groups,
or "peoples" (defined as a nationally-based substate group) that are
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empowered to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development." This means that should a
people within an existing state be systematically and egregiously denied this
right, then the prospect of UNC secession will become available. Thus,
should a people within an existing state be denied their right to internal selfdetermination, then a right to external self-determination, or UNC
secession, will arise.299
Although Anderson provides a clear interpretation of the principle of self-determination,
the right to secede under certain conditions must not be interpreted as an absolute right of
secession in every instance of denial of internal or external self-determination. Indeed,
the legal basis for a UNC secession can be found in customary international law as a
qualified right which is permissible only under certain conditions.
As part of customary international law, two requirements must be satisfied in
order for the law to be deemed as admissible: state practice and opinio juris. Prior to
moving forward, it is necessary to briefly propound on the two criteria, specifically with
regards to their interpretation as it pertains to UNC secessions. In short, a
…mere textual articulation of a qualified right to UNC secession in
declaratory General Assembly resolutions, without other concomitant state
practice, such as grants of recognition in response to UNC secessionist
disputes, will not constitute a binding rule of customary international law.
This is because the requisite element of opinio juris will not have been
satisfied.300
This component of customary international law is vital in understanding from where a
qualified right to a remedial UNC secession derives its legality. As mentioned in the
introductory section of this thesis, although it can be generally agreed that state practice
is a vital component of customary international law, the threshold for the uniformity of
that practice has changed over time. Anderson refers to this ‘change of threshold’ as the
‘new species of opinio juris’.301 He explains that
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This new species of opinio juris tailored to the context of declaratory
General Assembly Resolutions would seem to contradict the more
traditional formulation, as expressed in the Lotus Case and North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, which provided that opinio juris could only be
established after a train of consistent state acts or omissions attended by the
requisite psychological belief that such acts or omissions were rendered
legally obligatory.302
Indeed, the nature of opinio juris first questioned and consequently overturned the
previous notion of customary international law as requiring consistent state practice in
order to become accepted law. As further explained by Oscar Schachter,
…in place of a practice that began with the gradual accretion of acts and
subsequently received the imprimatur of opinio juris, the Court reversed the
process: an opinio juris expressed first as a declaration would become law
if confirmed by general practice [instead of consistent practice].303
This view of a more enhanced notion of opinio juris is also supported by Tullio Treves
who suggested that
…the practice relevant for establishing the existence of a customary
international rule must neither necessarily include all States, nor must it be
completely uniform. Whatever oppositions of behaviour and of opinion
there may have been in the formative stage of the rule, the existence at a
given time of the rule requires that the generality of States consider the rule
as binding.304
Fundamentally, apart from the general practice of states, other sources of law such as
diplomatic correspondence, travaux préparatoires, procès verbaux, policy statements,

one: “Opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the
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press releases, the opinions of government legal advisers, official manuals on legal
questions [etc.], can be considered to formulate a customary practice alongside opinio
juris. 305 Specifically, such forms of correspondence can be considered to formulate
customary practice where the language of “key words and phrases of UN instruments
remain[s] ambiguous and obscure.”306 This is vital to underlining the existence of a
qualified right to a UNC secession under international law, and more importantly, a right
to the use of force by a third state in cases of UNC secessions where human rights abuses
by the existing state reach levels deemed to be in extremis. Therefore, in utilizing this
understanding of both state practice and opinio juris as forming customary international
law, it can now be established where the qualified right of UNC secession derives its
legality from.
The legal basis for UNC secessions finds its genesis in Principle 5 paragraph 7 of
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(Friendly Relations Declaration). 307 A closer analysis of Principle 5 reveals that states
found to be conducting themselves in violation of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination will inevitably not be protected by the beginning of paragraph 7, which
reaffirms that there is no authorization for “any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States.”308 Thus, it can be concluded that the respect for the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of a state can only exist where the state represents its peoples’ internal selfdetermination rights without distinction.309 Anderson explains this requirement in the
following manner:
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The Friendly Relations Declaration therefore allows self-determination to
predominate over state sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event of
deliberate, sustained, and systematic human rights violations against
peoples. By doing so, the Declaration draws a link between internal and
external self-determination: the neglect of the former provides justification
for the invoking of the latter, which may be exercised by UNC secession.
This is a seminal development, challenging—albeit modestly—the longentrenched incontrovertibility of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity.310
Notably, Anderson is certainly neither the first, nor the only, scholar to perceive the
Friendly Relations Declaration as allowing a qualified right to a UNC secession. For
example, Cassese has equally suggested that
…although secession is implicitly authorized by the [Friendly Relations]
Declaration, it must however be strictly construed, as with all exceptions. It
can therefore be suggested that the following conditions might warrant
secession: when the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently
refuse to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and
systematically trample upon their fundamental rights, and deny the
possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework of the
State structure. Thus, denial of the basic right of representation does not
give rise per se to the right of secession. In addition, there must be gross
breaches of fundamental human rights, and, what is more, the exclusion of
any likelihood for a peaceful resolution within the existing State
structure.311
As can be interpreted from both analyses, the implied authorization of a UNC secession
can be found within the Friendly Relations Declaration. This analysis has been shared by
an extensive list of legal scholars, albeit with varying levels of acknowledgement to the
circumstances under which a right to a UNC secession exists, can exist or may exist. 312
The significance of the Friendly Relations Declaration has also been recently
mentioned in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion by the ICJ. As part of the Advisory Opinion,
an emphasis on the respect for the right of self-determination, as well as the
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consequences of ignoring that right, become abundantly clear. For example, Judge
Abdulqawi Yusuf held that
…if a State fails to comport itself in accordance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, an exceptional situation may arise
whereby the ethnically or racially distinct group denied internal selfdetermination may claim a right of external self-determination or separation
from the State.313
Equally, Judge Cançado Trindade contested in a separate opinion that
Recent developments in contemporary international law were to disclose
both the external and internal dimensions of the right of self-determination
of peoples: the former meant the right of every people to be free from any
form of foreign domination, and the latter referred to the right of every
people to choose their destiny in accordance with their own will, if
necessary — in case of systematic oppression and subjugation — against
their own government. This distinction challenges the purely inter-State
paradigm of classic international law. In the current evolution of
international law, international practice (of States and of international
organizations) provides support for the exercise of self-determination by
peoples under permanent adversity or systematic repression, beyond the
traditional confines of the historical process of decolonization.
Contemporary international law is no longer insensitive to patterns of
systematic oppression and subjugation.314
Nevertheless, the opponents of a qualified right to a UNC secession315 generally claim
that the right is largely hypothetical and ‘is therefore limited to an obiter dictum’ reading
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of the aforementioned ICJ case and UN declarations.316 Additionally, another argument
claims that most legal scholars do not firmly admit that a qualified right to secession
exists under international law, rather opting for the conclusion that it may exist instead.317
For example, Jure Vidmar states that
…the relevant judicial decisions and academic writings do not provide
sufficient evidence to suggest that in international legal doctrine, remedial
secession is a universally-accepted entitlement of oppressed peoples.
But…the idea underlying remedial secession—the last resort for ending the
oppression of a certain people— can still influence the recognition policies
of states.318
Vidmar’s point is relevant in that it provides a well-articulated opinion of those that argue
for the existence of a right to a UNC secession. However, as previously mentioned in this
sub-section, the obscure language of a UN document can find clarification through an
assessment of secondary correspondence. Thus, when assessing such criticisms with
regards to the right of a UNC secession as existing in the Friendly Relations Declaration,
it is necessary to consider that
…the answers [to the criticisms leveled by opponents of remedial secession
such as Vidmar] lie in the declaration’s drafting, which, as the travaux
préparatoires reveal, was split between opposing viewpoints: those states
that favored the inclusion of a qualified right to UNC secession and those
states that did not. The communist bloc, with its traditionally more open
stance towards self-determination, argued in favor of an inherent right to
UNC secession. This was opposed by many Western and African states,
however, which felt that self-determination did not include such a right,
qualified or otherwise. Confronted with these opposing viewpoints, the
representative for the Netherlands suggested a compromise that allowed for
UNC secession in circumstances where ‘basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms . . . were not being respected.’ To satisfy the group
of states opposed to any right of UNC secession, paragraph 7 was thus
crafted to avoid any overt mention of UNC secession, even though an a
contrario reading reveals that it was implicitly made under certain
circumstances.319
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If the Friendly Relations Declaration is interpreted in this manner, the evidence behind
the negotiations of this Declaration become evident; the right to a UNC secession exists
only insofar as the peoples of a particular state “are subjected to deliberate, sustained, and
systematic discrimination on the grounds of ‘race, creed or colour’, which includes racial,
religious, linguistic, cultural, and customary discrimination.”320
Additionally, it is necessary to mention that the text of this Declaration has been
“vicariously integrated into numerous subsequent General Assembly Resolutions [and
Declarations].”321 Some examples include the Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression,322Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International
Disputes,323 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations,324 Declaration on
the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten
International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this
Field325and the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration.326All of the aforementioned documents
reiterate the text of Principle 5 (7) of the Friendly Relations Declaration mutatis
mutandis, solidifying the existence of a qualified right to a UNC secession under
customary international law.327
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Lastly, it must also be mentioned that, although the aforementioned texts provide
a qualified right to a UNC secession prima facie, they do so for cases of human rights
abuses which can be considered as in moderato and in extremis. More precisely, human
rights abuses such as systematic political oppression, which can be considered as human
rights abuses deemed as in moderato, differs from the systematic denial of human rights
coupled with their abuses that can include forced exile and migration, genocide and
ethnic cleansing (that can be deemed as in extremis). This view is further expanded on by
Christopher Borgen, who claims that
Jurists who interpret the law of self-determination [in this view] generally
contend that any attempt to claim secession as a remedy must at least show
that (a) the secessionists are a “people” (in a sense recognized by the
international community); (b) the state from which they are seceding
seriously violates their human rights; and, (c) there are no other effective
remedies under either domestic law or international law. 328
As the next paragraph will demonstrate, when analyzed side-by-side with state practice,
only the qualified right to a UNC secession coupled with human rights abuses deemed as
in extremis has been able to find support under customary international law.329
Now that the ‘new species of opinio juris’ has been defined, it is necessary to
recognize the concomitant state practice with regards to the right to a UNC secession.
Over the past fifty years, several cases stand out as providing evidence of state practice
with regards to invoking a qualified right to UNC secession: Bangladesh, Croatia, East
Timor, Eritrea and Kosovo to name a few. 330 These cases share two common factors that
legitimized their actions; their UNC secessions became legal “in response to human
rights abuses in extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and genocide) as opposed to in
moderato (political, cultural, and racial discrimination),” as well as an invocation to a
right of self-determination which was subsequently denied without significant
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consideration. On the basis of these examples, it can therefore be concluded that a right to
a UNC secession exists in international law only as an ultimum remedium.331
Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that the objective of this thesis is to build on the
concept of a right to a UNC secession, by proving that a right to the use of force by a
third-state in support of a UNC secession exists under international law. The next chapter
will define the ambit of the use of force in international law in order to demonstrate how
its development throughout history and in contemporary times can be applied to cases of
UNC secessions.332
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Chapter 3
Chapter 3: State Creation & The Law on the Use of Force in
International Law
As mentioned in Chapter 1, state creation through unilateral secession is
controversial in both its application under international law and its effectiveness in the
face of growing discontent with the act of secession in the contemporary world. Although
state creation occurred more frequently throughout the 20th century in large part due to a
number of armed conflicts and a period of decolonization, the legal dilemma of whether a
state can be created through the use of force continues to split the legal scholarly
community.333 Questions such as ‘could an oppressed peoples use force in order to create
their own state?’,334 or ‘how does state creation function when the entity in question is
involved in an independence struggle?’, involve multiple layers of analysis, and hence,
require a detailed study of the international law on the use of force de lege lada.
This chapter consists of two main parts. The first part will introduce the history
and the general doctrine of the use of force in international law, as well as its current
applicability as it pertains to the UN Charter. Subsequently, the second part of this
chapter will focus on demonstrating how the contemporary doctrine on the use of force in
international law can be applied to the creation of states, and consequently, its status
within the context of direct and indirect third-state support of unilateral non-colonial
secessions. Additionally, a clarification of how the use of force in self-determination
conflicts is framed within the ambit of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention will be
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presented. This will be done in order to dispel the notion that an absolute obligation to a
humanitarian intervention exists in international law, and further, to set the stage for the
identification of the exception to the prohibition on the use of force as it pertains to UNC
secessions. Accordingly, this will support the primary argument of this thesis: that an
exception exists under international law for the external use of force by a third state in the
event that a peoples’ right of self- is systematically denied, and is coupled with human
rights abuses deemed as in extremis.

3.1. General Doctrine of the Use of Force in International Law
The challenge of understanding the international law on the use of force begins
with understanding its most enticing concept: that it “prohibits the use of force by states
against other states, subject only to certain narrowly defined definitions.”335 The central
international law on the prohibition on the use of force is found in Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter which states that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.336
Although states do not agree on the exact meaning of Article 2(4),337 the ICJ in Armed
Activities on the Territory of Congo has proclaimed it to be a founding principle of the
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UN Charter.338 Additionally it is suggested that “[s]tates and commentators generally
agree that the prohibition is not only a treaty obligation but also customary law and
even ius cogens, but there is no comparable agreement on the exact scope of the
prohibition.”339 The questions surrounding the scope of the prohibition on the use of force
inevitably fall within the category of territorial conflicts. After all, military incursions by
Russia into Georgia in 2008, or military skirmishes in Nagorno-Karabakh between
Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2016, are only two of the more recent examples that
demonstrate that inter-state armed conflicts persist to this day.340 Although such
examples may demonstrate that the prohibition on the use of force in international law is
not absolute, it is still important to note its extensive development and implementation
throughout time. Thus, prior to exploring the applicability of the jus ad bellum in
contemporary international law, it is necessary to briefly summarize its history and the
developments which led to its codification in the UN Charter.
3.1.1. History of Jus ad bellum
Attempts to limit the indiscriminate and unilateral use of force by States can be
traced as far back as the ‘iustum bellum’341 concept introduced by theologians such as
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Plato (428-527), Saint Augustine (354–430) and, later, Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–
74).342 For example, Saint Augustine undertook the task of applying the notion of justice
to armed conflict. In doing so, he attempted to connect the dialectical teachings of
Christianity with the concept of a just armed conflict that in principio would lead to a
peaceful co-existence of society.343 Virtually half a century later, Saint Thomas Aquinas
“[sought] to reconcile the Greek concept of natural law with Christian theology. Aquinas
[held] that natural law is that by which God governs the universe-and…that man as a
creature has the eternal law imprinted on him and by it derives the natural inclination to
proper acts and ends.”344 For Aquinas, law served as a measurement of human activity,
with the corresponding action resulting in the rule of reason satisfying a moral
obligation.345 Consequently, this allowed him to write extensively on the notion of a just
war. As expanded on by Nick Vorster:
…Aquinas’s classical discussion of just war is found in the Secundasecundae part of Summa Theologia that gives a typology of the various
virtues. This indicates his concern to place warfare within the overall moral
scheme of the Christian aim of salvation. Aquinas distinguishes four
cardinal virtues, namely prudence that applies reason to practical situations,
justice that directs the will to good acts, and courage that helps us to act in
situations of danger and temperateness that controls our sensual desires. 346
Apart from the four cardinal virtues, Aquinas also outlined three criteria that should
govern a just war: the war must be waged by a recognized authority (prince), the causus
belli must be just (i.e. in response to an injury by an enemy) and lastly, the intent of the
war must be done in good faith and to promote the common good, while negative
consequences after the war, if egregious enough, could turn a just war into an unjust one
ex post facto.347 These ‘criteria’ are important to keep in mind as they will re-emerge in
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the justifications for the acceptance of the legality of humanitarian intervention later in
this chapter.
The early modern age (16th – 18th centuries), equally left an impact in postMedieval Europe. In fact, developments during this time set the stage for the expansion
of the just war doctrine throughout the Enlightenment period.348 Although these
developments did not occur solely as a result of the work of Enlightenment-era scholars,
historical, religious and territorial developments in Europe also contributed to the
changing nature of how warfare was perceived in the early modern age:
During the first half of the 16th century, the context in which the old jus ad
bellum operated radically changed. The Reformation caused the collapse of
the religious unity of the Latin West and struck a mortal blow to the main
pillars of authority—canon law and ecclesiastical jurisdiction—upon which
the bridge between the doctrine and reality of just war rested. The
discoveries and conquests in the New World necessitated a frame of
reference for the laws of war other than those of Christian theology, canon
and Roman law. The rise of great dynastic power complexes such as
Habsburg Spain, Valois France, and Tudor England, out of which the
modern sovereign states grew as well as the Military Revolution and the
massification of armies, navies, and warfare it brought, denied the notion of
war as a limited law enforcement action. All this brought important changes
in the jus ad bellum, without however signaling the utter demise of the just
war doctrine.349
These changes, coupled with a more humanistic vision of Europe allowed for important
amendments to be made to the notion of what constitutes a ‘just war’. For example,
Francisco de Vitoria, a theologian and scholar at the infamous School of Salamanca,350
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“introduced the concept of bellum justum ex utraque parte (war just on both sides) at the
subjective level.”351 This allowed for a more inclusionary vision of war that did not
discriminate against a just or unjust side in a conflict, a significant development from the
early theoretical tenets of Aquinas who suggested the opposite. 352
Aquinas’ work was further developed on the subject of war by Hugo Grotius
(1583-1645), who claimed individuals to have the same natural rights as states. As
explained by Patrick Capps:
It is by this analogy that [Grotius was] able to claim that war is a form of
punishment for those states which violate natural rights. To explain, in the
same way as for natural human agents, natural law establishes a set of
narrow natural rights which govern the conduct of states. The content of
these natural rights are identical to those held by human agents. So, states
have rights to their continued existence, their territory and property, to
freedom from impediment on the high seas, and a right to have promises
kept. From this final natural right, the agreements which states enter into
through their direct and indirect consent are binding as a matter of natural
law.353
In underlining the importance of natural law in state interaction, Grotius saw war as a
form of punishment for the violation of that natural law – a method of restraint in an
international system without a physical enforcement mechanism. 354 Additionally, Grotius
identified the recto intentio in war, which “implied that the war needed to be waged with
the intention of doing justice, and ultimately, to attain a just peace.” 355 This synthesized
the theological-canonist vision of just war, with the more humanistic vision of war as a
legal concept.356 Lastly, a crucial finding by Grotius enabled the identification of the
concept of war as being related to the concept of statehood, otherwise known as the
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‘doctrine of state of affairs’.357 More precisely, “[w]hereas under the medieval just war
doctrine, war had been conceived of as a limited law enforcement action by a prince and
his adherents against the perpetrator of the injury which had caused the war, in Early
Modern Europe, war became clashes between sovereign states in their entirety.” 358 Such a
development allowed for the rise of the sovereign order of states, a phenomenon that was
well-noticed within Early Modern Europe. Overall, in undertaking a more secularized
interpretation of classical international law, Grotius was able to extensively contribute to
the development of the jus ad bellum.359
Alberico Gentilli (1587-1608) was another Enlightenment-era scholar who
contributed to the notion of just war by stressing the primacy of a more humanistic,
secular and organized approach to analyzing warfare. For example, he suggested the
importance of diplomacy and arbitration as a first rule of settling disputes before
engaging in armed conflict.360 Additionally, he solidified the idea first proposed by
Francisco de Vitoria; that both sides in a war have a right to wage war, and “as such, the
laws of war were to be applied indiscriminately to both sides.”361 This new vision of
warfare, which was built on the concepts of Roman Law (an approach initiated by
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Grotius),362 “…articulated the concept of legal war, or war in due form.”363 This was a
significant addition to the development of jus ad bellum as a humanistic concept with a
certain degree of legal objectivity. As explained by Randall Lesaffer, Gentili’s
contribution tried to drastically change the way the notion of ‘war’ was interpreted during
that time:
Gentili brought this new conception of war to its full complement in his just
post bellum. Since one could not be certain about the justice of war and
since victory did not indicate justice, the outcome of war itself—or in the
absence of clear victory, of the peace negotiations—determined the
attribution of the claims over which the war was waged. This radically
changed the conception of war from a law enforcement action (executio
juris) into a substitute for a legal trial: a form of dispute settlement.
Whereas under the just war doctrine, the attribution of property and all
kinds of claim had to be vested in the justice of a cause preceding the war,
under the doctrine of legal war it was vested in the outcome of war itself.
The jus post bellum became a jus victoriae.364
By analyzing the conception of war from an outcome-based perspective, Gentili sought to
underline the importance of moving away from attempting to justify war, while equally
focusing on the success of the final outcome of the conflict. In turn, this demonstrated
how armed conflict, regardless of which entity or state was the aggressor, could rely more
on the jus post bellum or the jus victoriae, rather than simply the notion of iustum bellum
on its own.
Irrespective of the scholarly developments on the jus ad bellum produced by
Vitoria, Grotius or Gentilli, the just war doctrine, in the classical sense, was still very
popular among the rulers of Early Modern Europe. In fact, “…princes and republics of
Early Modern Europe went to a lot of trouble to justify their decision to resort to war.
Formal declarations of war were often substantial texts in which the reasons for the war
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were explained in detail; these, as well as the less formal manifestos of war, were widely
distributed. In these declarations and manifestos, the discourse of just war was
utilized.”365 Furthermore, the 17th-18th centuries became popular with the expansion of
‘defensive wars’, meaning that states were becoming more adept to wage war for
defensive, rather than offensive reasons. Of course, the just war doctrine eventually
evolved to reflect this interpretation. Under this development, “…all just wars were
defensive sensu lato to the extent that they constituted a reaction against prior injury by
the enemy—armed or otherwise. But they were only defensive sensu stricto if they were
fought in reaction to a prior or threatening armed attack by the enemy, however big or
small it might have been.”366 Although it is logical to assume that some of these
developments may have occurred as a result of the doctrine’s development, it can be
suggested that most likely, the development was a reaction by states to the growing
reliance on regional treaties and alliances which became popularized during this period of
history.367 Overall, the strength of the just war doctrine as a norm of classical
international law began to fade, with less and less states paying consideration to its moral
and just considerations of warfare.368 Conclusively, although the practice of states and
rulers in Early Modern Age Europe still mirrored a theological interpretation of the just
war doctrine, with the decline of religious influence and the rise of humanism throughout
the 18th century, “the language [of warfare] changed to the extent that the protection of
the security and interests of the state came to supplement, and with time, supplant the
invocation of rights.”369
The 19th century brought with it an even more humanistic approach to interpreting
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international law. In general, although the ‘law of nations’ was described in the early
Enlightenment period to be a dualist system separated between natural and positive law,
“[t]he legal positivism of the 19th century brought this dualism to an end, as natural law
was cast out of the world of law and reduced to a code of morality. Thus, modern
international law shrunk to what had been the secondary, voluntary or positive law of
nations…[and] the just war doctrine was therefore ousted from the field of international
law.”370 Indeed, the interpretation of warfare continued to change from a proactive
mechanism to largely a reactive one. Although the notion of a more defensive tone being
used to justify warfare occurred in the two centuries prior as well, this was the first time
that states had collectively adopted the concept as a ‘general guideline’ prima facie.
Lessafer explains the reasons behind this occurrence in the following manner:
Over the course of the 19th century, states continued to offer express
justifications to their subjects and allies when they resorted to war or force.
Certainly, states more often than before neglected to make a formal
declaration of war to the enemy, the forms in which justifications were made
became more diverse, and explanations became less extensive. The
language shifted further away from war as a means of legal self-help to that
of war as a means of self-help altogether—or war as ‘a pursuit of policy by
other means’ to use the famous phrase of Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831)
— as wars became justified in terms of the safeguarding of security,
territorial integrity, ‘vital interests’, or honour of states rather than
legitimate rights. But wars were by and large justified as reactions to prior
unwarranted action, preferably armed action, by the enemy. They were
justified for being defensive. By the late 19th and the early 20th centuries,
this focus on defensive war found its correlation in an increasingly general
rejection of aggression by the international community.371
In addition to a general disagreement of the concepts of state aggression and the general
use of force, the French and American Revolutions provided a further emphasis on the
protection of fundamental rights of citizens to which warfare applied strictly as a manner
of self-defense. In other words, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2 on the history of
self-determination, “[h]umanitarian and political interventions were justified as actions to
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safeguard or restore other people’s fundamental rights or actions for the sake of
international order and stability.”372 Moreover, the rise in strength of civil society in 19th
century Europe through such mechanisms as peace associations and civil movements,
equally contributed to the discernment of warfare by denouncing the notion of warfare in
toto.373 As part of this radical change, it became evident that the belief of warfare as
being inherent and natural to humanity (as claimed by the just war doctrine), was no
longer acceptable as a norm. In turn, this led to calls for the international codification of a
normative approach which seeks to prevent and avoid warfare between states, as well as
protects fundamental human rights. Consequently, in the late 19th and early 20th century,
the first codified attempts were made to limit and eliminate the offensive use of military
force by states in Europe.374 Nico Shrivjer explains the details behind this codification as
central to the promulgation of the notion of ‘peace’ in a continent ravaged by centuries of
bloodshed:
In fact, during the Westphalian order, only The Hague Peace Conferences
of 1899 and 1907 introduced the first serious interstate diplomatic attempts
to restrict the recourse to war. The Hague Convention (I) was aimed at the
peaceful adjustment of international differences, ‘before an appeal to arms’.
Contracting parties were ‘animated by a strong desire to concert for the
maintenance of the general peace’ and ‘resolved to second by their best
efforts the friendly settlement of international disputes.’ In Convention (III)
relative to the Opening of Hostilities, contracting parties agree not to
commence hostilities between them without previous and explicit warning,
in the form of either a declaration of war containing reasons for the
commencement of hostilities, or an ultimatum with a conditional
declaration of war.375
Through the Hague Peace Conferences, the impetus for the prohibition on the use of
force began to slowly resonate with the international community in the early 20th
century.376 Although from a practical standpoint, inter-state armed conflict continued
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well-into the 20th century (especially with the breakout of the First and Second World
Wars), the idea of engendering an international law that understood the concept of
warfare as an ultimum remedium did not. At the First World War’s conclusion, several
international documents commenced the dialogue around the codification for first the
restriction, then the overall prohibition on the use of force in international law. These
documents must be briefly summarized in order to define the scope of the ever-changing
nature of the use of force as a restrictive concept.
The League of Nations Covenant was the first international treaty document to
undertake a comprehensive effort to restrict military conflict. 377 As explained by Oliver
Dorr, Articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant
…prohibited nations resorting to war before a dispute had been submitted
to peaceful settlement and for three months after an arbitral award or a
judicial decision had been given, thus providing, in essence, merely for a
moratorium on war. It was only in very special cases that the League
members were definitely deprived of their freedom to go to war, namely
against another member that complied with an arbitral award or a decision
of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (Art. 13 (4) League
Covenant) (Art. 15 (6) League Covenant). In case the Council failed to
adopt a report by unanimous vote, the League members reserved to
themselves ‘the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for
the maintenance of right and justice’ (Art. 15 (7) League Covenant). Those
provisions were remarkable in their time as the first efforts of something
like the international community to outlaw war, but they did not have much
practical effect in the end.378
Further to the League Covenant, another international treaty signed in 1924, the Geneva
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, made a similar attempt to
avoid inter-state armed conflict by imposing compulsory dispute settlement on warring
states.379 Although this idea generated interest, it ultimately failed with opposition from
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colonial states who saw the treaty as an affront on their sovereign rights to control and
defend their colonial territories.380
Finally, the Kellogg-Briand Pact381 (also known as the 1928 General Treaty for
the Renunciation of War) was signed on August 27, 1928. This treaty significantly
changed the purview of the prohibition on the use of force from an idea that once seemed
impossible, into a realistic concept. In fact, this treaty represents the first instance where a
collective group of states attempted to delineate into an agreement over a general
prohibition on the use of force. As further explained by Anderson, this agreement meant,
among other things, a certain withdrawal of sovereignty when it came to the unilateral
use of force by a state:
Article 1 of the Pact provide[d] that parties "condemn recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument
of national policy in their relationship with one another." This provision
effectively eliminated the eighteenth and nineteenth century notions of
ultimate positivistic sovereignty, whereby no state had any restrictions upon
its "right" to wage war as an instrument of policy. Although the Pact made
no specific mention of the right to self-defence, the travaux preparatoires,
or preparatory works, indicate that such an exception was overwhelmingly
accepted. The Kellogg-Briand Pact thus enunciated two key propositions:
first, that war was not to be pursued as a matter of policy and second, that
states had an inherent right to resist any warfare undertaken by other states
against them.382
Unfortunately, several issues on the use of force by states became apparent shortly after
the Pact was signed. An absence of sanctions for breaches of the Pact, as well as its
insistence on outlawing war and not specifically the use of force by states, allowed for an
effortless circumvention of this new norm. Incidents such as the Japanese invasion of
Chinese Manchuria in 1931, as well as the military invasions by the Axis powers at the
outbreak of the Second World War in the mid-late 1930s ultimately condemned the idea
of an overall prohibition on the use of force.383 Thus, it was only at the conclusion of the

Shrivjer, supra note 342 at 468.
Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as an
Instrument of National Policy, 27 August 1928, 94 LNTS 57 (entered into force 24 July 1929) [KellogBriand Pact].
382 Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 205-6.
383 Shrivjer, supra note 342 at 469.
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Second World War that a congregation of states decided to include the prohibition on the
use of force as a corollary norm of international law in the United Nations Charter (UN
Charter). The next sub-section will list the many factors that outline an overall
prohibition on the use of force in contemporary international law, as well as establish its
applicability vis-a-vis the UN Charter and state practice since the Second World War.
Ultimately, this will lead to a consideration of the use of force in colonial and noncolonial contexts, setting the stage for a discussion on the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention and its status under international law.
3.1.2. Jus ad bellum and the ‘Exceptions’ to the prohibition on the use of force
The UN Charter is the international treaty which contains the primary codified
international law on the use of force. Even through the previous treaties attempted to
delimitate the use of force and aggression by states, they ultimately failed due to a
number of factors, including the absence of a strict codified prohibition on the use of
force, as well as the absence of sanctionary and enforcement mechanisms which failed to
prevent the outbreak of two World Wars.384
A good place to start when analyzing the international law on the use of force
through the UN Charter is Article 1 (1) which states that the purposes of the United
Nations are:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace.385
Equally, Article 2(4), which as previously mentioned is arguably the most relevant article
with regards to the prohibition on the use of force, states that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from any threat or
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use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.386
Finally, an enforcement mechanism through Chapter VII provides an extra layer of
protection for Member States through the right to the use of force as a measure of selfdefence (Article 51) or via military action only through the direct authorization of the
UNSC (Articles 42 and 43).387
In short, the aforementioned Articles decry the extent of the use of force in
international law as can be interpreted in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, as with any legal
interpretation, the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, and its subsequent
enforcement and sanctionary mechanisms via the UNSC, have not resulted in an
aggregate cessation of armed conflict between states. In fact, rather than attempt to
develop the prohibition on the use of force, states have alluded to ‘exceptions’ as existing
through its a contrario reading.388 Therefore, prior to establishing how the law on the use
of force applies to the creation of states via UNC secessions, it is necessary to produce a
brief summary which explains these ‘exceptions’, and establishes the present state of the
law on the use of force since its codification in the UN Charter.
The prohibition on the use of force in international law, as was demonstrated
through the history of the iustum bellum concept, has become a pillar of the international
legal system. Outside of its mention in the UN Charter, it has been alluded to in

Ibid, arts 2 (4), 42,43,51.
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter dictates the actions available to UN members in
response to the use of force. The collective response mechanism was developed in response to the
failures of the previous League of Nations Covenant that did not include such enforceable actions. For
more on this see ibid arts 39-51. See also Dorr, supra note 374 at para 8.
387 It has been argued that the role of the UNSC was not necessarily to cease all inter-state conflict,
but simply to limit them (as well as avoid another outbreak of a Third World War.) For more on this
see Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver, eds., The Security Council and the Use of Force (Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at 17-26.
388 Ibid. It has been argued that the role of the UNSC was not necessarily to cease all inter-state
conflict, but simply to limit them (as well as avoid another outbreak of a Third World War).
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numerous UN Declarations,389 as well as several ICJ cases,390 thereby solidifying its
status as both a conventional norm and a rule of customary law. However, this view is not
universally accepted. The argument for humanitarian intervention evidently opposes this
view, as does the argument for pre-emptive self-defence.391 For example, with regards to
the former, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention clearly identifies an exception to the
prohibition on the use of force in situations of humanitarian crises.392 On the other hand,
the latter refers to an established doctrine of pre-emptive self defense which allows for
the pre-emptive use of force by states provided certain criteria of necessity and
proportionality are met.393 In any case, both ‘exceptions’ will be discussed at large later
on this chapter; however, prior to doing so, it is necessary to point out the crux of the
debate which surrounds the extent of the prohibition on the use of force. This must be
done in order to identify the obscure areas of the UN Charter with regards to the
prohibition, out of which the ‘exceptions’ to the concept have evolved.
Largely, the debate around the extent of the prohibition on the use of force
interpretation of Article 2(4) rests on the second part of the article: “should the words
‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’ be construed as a strict
prohibition on all use of force against another state, or did they allow the use of force
provided that the aim was not to overthrow the government or seize the territory of the
state and provided that the action was consistent with the purposes of the UN?”394 As can

Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res 2131 (XX), UNGAOR, 20th Sess, Supp No 14, UN Doc
A/RES/20/2131 (1965) [Protection of Independence and Sovereignty Declaration]; Friendly
Relations Declaration, supra note 144; Declaration on the Threat or Use of Force, supra note 324;
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, supra note 322.
390 Nicaragua ICJ Judgment, supra note 68 at para 73. See also Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 145
at paras 187-90.
391 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001) at 269-70.
392 See Marjorie Cohn, “The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo” in Aleksander Jokie,
Lessons of Kosovo: The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003)
at 160-5.
393 Gray, supra note 337 at 149-50.
394 Ibid at 31.
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be inferred from this question, the prohibition on the use of force was not clearly defined
in the UN Charter, leaving the door open for its interpretation by member states. For
example, it was a well-known fact that throughout the Cold War, a conglomerate of
American scholars argued that the legal interpretation of Article 2(4) should depend on
the effectiveness of the UNSC as a whole and the collective security system it purports to
represent through the UN Charter.395 Although this argument may seem partisan due to
the United States’ role in the Cold War, the veritable reality of a situation where the
UNSC can become ‘paralyzed’ and unable to act through one of its permanent members
imposing a veto has proven to be a major obstacle of the debate on the prohibition of the
use of force. In fact, this situation has played a major role in the inaction of the UNSC in
response to some of the world’s most egregious atrocities. 396 In addition to this barrier,
the effectiveness of the UNSC was also questioned during the Cold War in response to a
string of bi-proxy armed conflicts397 supported by the two world superpowers during the
Cold War (the United States and the Soviet Union). Moreover, as a result of the Cold
War, the UNSC had its political influence split ideologically between the West and the
East, paralyzing it further when the prohibition on the use of force was violated by one
side or the other. Nevertheless, the most difficult challenge to the prohibition occurred
towards the end of the Cold War, when the ideological split narrowed and the ‘West’
began to emerge as the winning side.398
While the dissolution of the Soviet Union preoccupied most of the world, it
emerged that the prohibition on the use of force was challenged once again outside of

Ibid.
The conflicts that this statement refers to include but are not limited to: Syria (2012-present) and
Kosovo (1998-1999) (where the UNSC has been paralyzed to act due to Russian vetoes), Israel (since
1990) (where the UNSC has been paralyzed to act due to vetoes from the United States). For more on
the challenges of the UNSC veto rule and UNSC paralysis, see Sir Michael Wood, ed, “United Nations
Security Council” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law by (Oxford University
Press) at paras 41-43, online: <http://opil.ouplaw.com>.
397 Examples of such bi-proxy conflicts include the United States support in the conflict in Vietnam
and the Soviet Union support of the conflict in Afghanistan.
398 It has long been considered that the West won the Cold War due to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. See e.g. Curtis Bauer, “The East Lost the Cold War, but did the West Win?” (1999) 8 Past
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UNSC approval. However, this time it was no longer as part of an armed conflict, but as
part of a mission to halt a systemic and egregious armed attack against civilians. Indeed,
the first Gulf War proved to be much more than an armed conflict between states. The
US, UK and France’s military intervention in Iraq opened a new era of post-Cold War
armed conflicts which questioned the strength and the scope of the prohibition on the use
of force in its entirety.399
As the world moved towards globalization and away from an ideological east and
west split, the question of how does the international law on the use of force apply in
humanitarian crises, cases of self-determination denial and territorial conflicts, took
center-stage now that the possibility of nuclear armed conflict and Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) had curtailed.400 For the purposes of this thesis, the focus of the
proceeding sub-sections in this Chapter will be to sketch out the applicability of the
international law on the use of force in cases of self-determination and territorial
conflicts, specifically as the end of the Cold War brought with it multiple cases of such
conflicts. These conflicts reverberated in the debate on the legality of sponsorship and
support of oppressed peoples’ within the context of self-determination, but outside of the
general decolonization context.401 Thus, before moving forward, it is necessary to
evaluate the law on the use of force as it pertains to such conflicts, using the history of
the jus ad bellum as a background to analyze the legitimacy of the emerging ‘exceptions’
to the prohibition on the use of force due to the rise in such conflicts in the contemporary
world.

For more on the UK and US positions on the First Gulf War in Iraq see “UK Materials on
International Law” (1992) 63 Brit YB Intl L 824 at 824-40.
400 The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1992 left many former Soviet states possessing nuclear
weapons. Russia and the United States combined efforts and took a number of steps to prevent the
use of nuclear weapons by smaller states as leverage in an armed conflict. See Associated Press,
“Guarding nukes: How Moscow and Washington avoided the threat of nuclear doomsday after Soviet
breakup” (8 January 2012), Daily Mail Online online: <www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2083885/How-Moscow-Washington-avoided-nuclear-doomsday-Sovietbreakup.html#ixzz4mArEJO6L>.
401 Examples include Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the former Yugoslavia. See e.g.
Marco Martins, “An Alternative Approach to the International Law of State Succession: Lex Naturae
and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia” (1993) 44 Syracuse L Rev 1019 at 1020.
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The UN Charter includes three codified exceptions to the general prohibition on
the use of force. The first exception can be found in Articles 53(1) and 107.402 Needless
to say, these Articles, which were created to allow for military action against former
enemy states from the Second World War, have no contemporary legal relevance. 403 The
second exception, as mentioned above, exists through the powers vested in the UNSC
under Article 24 which allows it to recommend and execute military action under its
discretion through Articles 39 and 42.404 The last exception, as evinced by the UN
Charter, can be found in Article 51 which allows for a state to use force only in selfdefence.405 Outside of the ambit of these three exceptions, no other codified legal rules
permit the use of force by states in international law. Yet, it is no secret that states have
systematically violated, at least prima facie, the prohibition on the use of force since its
inception in 1945.406 Therefore, the question can be asked, under what legal precedent do
such states operate?
The absence of any further exceptions (apart from those mentioned above) has led
to the emergence of two schools of thought that interpret the scope of the prohibition on
the use of force. The permissive and restrictive schools of thought emerged as a result of

Article 53 (1) and 107 both allow for either unilateral or the collective use of force outside of
UNSC approval against ‘enemy states’ of signatory Member States of the UN (enemy states generally
referred to axis powers states during and briefly after the Second World War.) Both articles are now
considered defunct and no longer legally relevant. See UN Charter, supra note 21, arts 53 (1), 77, 107.
403 There have even been attempts to remove these provisions from the Charter, most recently in the
2005 World Summit Outcome. See Shrivjer, supra note 342 at 473.
404 See UN Charter, supra note 21, arts 39, 42.
405 Ibid, art 51.
406 This statement can be controversial in the sense that there is generally no overall agreement by
international legal scholars on what constitutes recent breaches or violations of the prohibition on
the use of force. For example, certain scholars consider the United States’ invasion of Iraq as justified
under the principle of pre-emptive defense. Many scholars disagree with this point of view, in large
part due to the selective nature of American justifications for the use of pre-emptive self-defense in
certain situations, and Article 51 in others (such as was used in the justification for the use of force in
Syria and Iraq in the ‘war on terror.’ For an in-depth consideration of this debate, see generally: Chris
Bolderon, “The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Preemptive Self-Defense Under International Law”
(2005) 9:1 Chap L Rev 111; Michael J Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism
after Kosovo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of
Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order” (2005) 16:4 EJIL 369;
William Taft & Todd Buchwald, “Pre-emption, Iraq and International Law” (2003) 97 AJIL 557;
Thomas Franck, “What happens now? The UN after Iraq” (2003) 97:1 AJIL 607.
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a growing dichotomy between the interpretations of the true meaning of Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter.407 Anderson defines each school’s viewpoints in the following manner:
According to the [permissive school], Article 2(4) only prohibits the use of
force "against the territorial integrity or political independence" of any state
or "in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes" of the UN. A priori,
the use of force in contexts that do not specifically threaten "the territorial
integrity or political independence" of any state, or are commensurate with
the purposes of the UN, are not proscribed by Article 2(4)."… The
restrictive school, by way of contrast, asserts that Article 2(4) prohibits in
toto a state's right to use force, unless some explicit exception is grounded
within the Charter itself. According to this view, force may only be used
when compliant with Article 51, or the now defunct Article 107, which
allows action against former enemy states.408
In other words, the permissive school looks to define certain exceptions in international
law for the use of force, while the restrictive school commits to holding states
accountable for any use of force outside of the legal parameters outlined in the UN
Charter. 409 Overwhelmingly, the restrictive school’s approach has been supported by
scholarly opinion and state practice.410 This has been evidenced by numerous states using
an interpretation of Article 51 as a justification for the use of force (which permits
defensive military action), rather than a restrictive reading of Article 2 (4).411 The
controversy surrounding such interpretations can be analyzed through a close reading of
Article 51 of the UN Charter which permits the use of force in cases of self-defence:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to

Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspect” (1999) 10:1 Eur J Intl L 1 at 1-2
[Simma, “NATO, UN and Use of Force”].
408 Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 207-8.
409 Ibid (“[this literal interpretation of Article 2(4) has been advocated by Britain before the ICJ in the
Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) and by Israel in relation to its commando raid of Uganda's Entebbe
Airport in 1976. The viewpoint has also attracted some support from scholarly quarters” at 208).
410 For a lengthy list of scholars who support the restrictive school, see Ibid at 208-9, n 43.
411 Dixon, supra note 235 at 384-95. See also Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 208 (“[f]or
example, the US invasion of the Dominican Republic (1965), the US invasion of Grenada (1983), the
Israeli bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor (1981), the Indian invasion of East Pakistan (1971), the
Tanzanian invasion of Uganda (1979) and the NATO actions against Serbia (1998-1999), were all
justified by alleged exceptions to Article 2(4), rather than a permissive reading” at 208, n 44).
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the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.412
As can be deduced from the wording of Article 51, the exception to the prohibition on the
use of force exhibits that “self-defence is permissible in response to an "instant [and]
overwhelming" threat that leaves ‘no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation’.”413 This interpretation of self-defence is reiterated in several ICJ cases,
such as Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,414Oil
Platforms415 and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,416 which also support
the notion that “…necessity and proportionality are limits on all self-defence, individual
and collective.” 417 Therefore, it can be confirmed that a necessary and proportionate
military response by a state acting in self-defence can be conceived as a lawful use of
force under contemporary international law and customary international law. 418 Yet,

See UN Charter, supra note 21, art 51.
Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 210.
414 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 68 at para 141.
415 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), [2003] ICJ Rep
161 at para 43 [Oil Platforms].
416 Territory of Congo Case, supra note 338 at para 147.
417 Gray, supra note 337 at 149-50.
418 The extent of the principle of self-defence through Article 51 is not universally accepted as
applying only to the definition outlined in the famous 1837 Caroline incident. For example, the United
States, Australia, Israel and the United Kingdom are examples of states that justify their attacks on
non-state and state-armed groups as stemming from a right to self-defence under Article 51. For
more on the academic debate on the extent of the principle of self-defence see ibid at 117-19 (“[a]s
part of the basic core of self-defence all states agree that self-defence must be necessary and
proportionate. The requirements of necessity and proportionality are often traced back to the
1837 Caroline incident, involving a pre-emptive attack by the British forces in Canada on a ship
manned by Canadian rebels, planning an attack from the USA. This episode has attained a mythical
authority. States and writers still refer to it, generally to support their own wide claims to selfdefence, but also to support the necessity and proportionality limitation. They invoke the famous
formula that there must be a ‘necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means and no moment of deliberation’. Others challenge the authority of this episode for the modern
doctrine of self-defence, seeing it rather as an episode of self-help pre-dating the modern law on the
use of force and as a one-off episode of pre-emptive action not of relevance to the conduct of widerscale conflict. But, irrespective of the status of the Caroline incident as a precedent, necessity and
proportionality have played a crucial role in state justification of the use of force in self-defence and
in international response…” at 117-8). See also, Brownlie, “IL and Use of Force by States”, supra note
371; Stanimir Alexandrov, Self-Defense Against the Use of Force in International Law (Hague: Brill &
Nijhoff, 1996).
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outside of the protection of Article 51, another perceived exception to the prohibition on
the use of force has recently taken center stage. Although this purported ‘exception’ will
be examined in detail later in this Chapter, it is important to reiterate that, outside of the
‘exceptions’ listed above, no others have been generally accepted as forming a
crystallized and well-accepted legal rule in international law.
Although, in theory, the general prohibition on the use of force should have
restricted and discouraged blatant violations of inter-state use of force; nearly 73 years
after the codification of the UN Charter, multiple instances of states using force both
individually and collectively,419 has reignited the debate on whether their use of force is
indeed justifiable under any of the acknowledged ‘exceptions’ to the prohibition on the
use of force. One of the most controversial exceptions to the prohibition, which is
relevant to this thesis, is the notion of an obligation to undertake a military intervention in
order to halt a humanitarian crisis, better known contemporarily as the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.420 However, prior to delving into a legal analysis of the
doctrine, it is necessary to define one final issue that is relevant to the main objective of
this thesis: the applicability of the international law on the use of force in the creation of
states. As unilateral secessions can also be seen as forms of state creation, it is imperative
to define the ambit of the use of force in such instances, especially within both the
colonial and non-colonial contexts. The legal parameters identified in the next subsection will then be used to defend the objective of this thesis in providing an exception
to the prohibition on the use of force in special cases related to UNC secessions, while
denying the legitimacy of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.421

A very recent example of a breach or an alleged breach of the prohibition is the attack by the
United States against a Syrian military air base on April 6, 2017. See Michael R Gordon, Helene
Cooper & Michael D Shear, “Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria” (6 April 2017), online <
wwww.nytimes.com>. Other examples include the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the
United States invasion of Iraq in 2003.
420 Ian Brownlie, “Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen” in Richard B Lillich, ed,
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Print, 1973)
at 139–48.
421 It is important to reiterate that for the purposes of this thesis, the terms ‘military intervention’
and ‘humanitarian intervention’ will be used intermittently. The breadth, legality and threshold of
this statement will be examined in detail throughout the next two chapters. See supra note 11.
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3.1.3. State Creation and the Use of Force
It is well established that, under international law, state creation can occur as a
result of unilateral colonial (UC) secession pursuant to the law of self-determination.
More precisely, a breadth of evidence affirms the right of colonized peoples to a
unilateral colonial (UC) secession under both codified and customary international law.
This evidence includes a long history of acceptance of unilateral colonial secessions and
their subsequent claims to statehood, as well as numerous reaffirmations of this right
through well-accepted opinio juris. One such example enlists the support of Resolution
1541 which stipulates that “territories defined as colonial by Resolution 1541 are entitled
to pursue their sovereign independence from metropolitan powers.”422 More
contemporarily, the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Case has equally upheld the right of UC
secessions by ruling quod hoc, that:
During the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of
self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to
independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples
subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation (cf. Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 31-32, paras. 5253; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p.
102, para. 29; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I),
pp. 171-172, para. 88). A great many new States have come into existence
as a result of the exercise of this right.423
As can be deduced from the ICJ’s advisory opinion, the right to a UC secession, although
largely a product of the 20th century, can be confirmed as existent in international law.
Nevertheless, the question can be asked, what is its applicability of the use of force with
regards to UC secessions? More precisely, it is necessary to inquire into whether any
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force exist outside of the current legal
parameters with respect to colonized peoples.
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UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions 2105424 and 2787425 are considered
to be two of the primary non-binding international documents calling for the acceptance
of a right for the use of force by colonized peoples seeking to secure their
independence.426 Although these resolutions are non-binding in nature, declaratory
resolutions equally reaffirm the right of colonized peoples to the use of force mutatis
mutandis. For example, the Friendly Relations Declaration,427as well as the Definition of
Aggression and Inadmissibility Declaration,428 build on the wording found in Resolutions
2105 and 2787 to reiterate that “[n]othing…shall prejudice in any manner the right to
self-determination, freedom and independence of peoples under colonial domination,
foreign occupation or racist regimes, and the right to seek and receive support in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”429 This view has similarly
been supported by a number of legal scholars430 who have concluded correspondingly,
that the “…right of colonial peoples to forcibly resist an oppressive metropolitan power is
firmly grounded within customary international law.”431 However, the debate around the
threshold for third-state support becomes less clear once the aspect of direct and indirect
support is considered. After-all, what constitutes material support by a third-state?
Anderson equally observes in assessing this question that the meaning of direct and
indirect support by third-states has remained largely unclear:
Unlike the non-declaratory resolutions, however, the Friendly Relations
Declaration, Definition of Aggression and Inadmissibility Declaration
explicitly provide that colonial peoples forcibly resisting an oppressive
metropolitan power may only seek and receive third state "support in

Declaration of the Granting of Independence, supra note 5.
Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and of the
Speedy Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for the Effective Guarantee and
Observance of Human Rights, GA Res 2787 (XXVI), UNGAOR, 26th Sess, Supp 49, UN Doc A/RES/2787
(1971) [Resolution on Universal Right to Self-Determination].
426 John Norton Moore, “The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict” (1969) 9 VA J Intl L
209 at 267.
427 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 144, Principle 5 (5).
428 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, supra note 322.
429 Ibid, art 4.
430 See Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 139; Cassese, “Self-Determination of
Peoples”, supra note 6 at 153-55. For an extensive list of scholars who support this view, see
Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 220, n 91.
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accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter." This raises the
controversial question: what exactly does the word "support" and the phrase
"in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter" actually
mean? Do they together denote indirect third state assistance, or instead,
direct third state intervention? 432
The answer to the question of what is meant by direct or indirect support is complex. In
large part, this is due to the fact that the threshold for third-state support can induce some
of the more negative consequences of secession, such as regional destabilization, anarchy
and civil conflict.433 Undoubtedly, strong support exists within international legal
scholarship with regards to the right of a colonized population to seek and receive
indirect third state assistance.434 For example, both Resolutions 2105 and 2787 support
the use of force by a colonized peoples against a metropolitan power, while equally
advocating and inviting third states to “…to render aid by way of ‘political, moral and
material assistance.’”435 Additionally, most scholars point to Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of
Resolution 3070436 as evidencing that right:
Recognizing the imperative need to put an early end to colonial rule,
foreign domination and alien subjugation,
1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of all people under colonial and foreign
domination and alien subjugation to self-determination, freedom and
independence in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 1514
(XV) of 14 December 1960, 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970 and 2787
(XXVI) of 6 December 1971;
2. Also reaffirms the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for liberation from
colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available
means, including armed struggle;
3. Calls upon all States, in conformity with the Charter of the United

Ibid at 221.
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Nations and with relevant resolutions of the United Nations, to recognize
the right of all peoples to self-determination and independence and to offer
moral, material and any other assistance to all peoples struggling for the
full exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination and
independence.437
Moreover, multiple scholars have argued that the combination of General Assembly
Resolutions and Declarations that consistently encourage states to provide indirect
support and assistance to colonial peoples, coupled with the evidence of state practice
that provides it, confirms the legality of such practice intra legem.438 Most importantly,
evidence points towards the fact that “…in situations where indirect assistance has been
rendered by third states to colonial insurgent groups, the latter have not been prohibited
from attaining independence.”439 Therefore, it can be confirmed that international law
permits the indirect support of colonial insurgent groups fighting for independence on the
basis of their right to external self-determination.440
In contrast, support for direct third state assistance has remained largely an illegal
act. Simply put, direct third state assistance can be considered a form of military
intervention, violating not only the prohibition on the use of force, but the peremptory
norms of territorial inviolability and non-interference into the internal affairs of a
sovereign state (otherwise known as the principle of non-intervention). As summarized
by Anderson, the international legal parameters on such assistance is fairly evident:
An examination of the UN Charter…particularly Articles 2(1), 2(4) and
2(7), implicitly suggests that such direct third state intervention to colonial
insurgent groups is categorically illegal. Assuming that the word "state"
encompasses a metropolitan power's entire territory, this finding is
supported by the contents of the Friendly Relations Declaration [Principle
1, paragraphs 4, 8 and 9, Principle 3, paragraphs 1 and 2], Definition of
Aggression and Inadmissibility Declaration [Articles 3,6].441
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Additionally, the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case pronounced on the importance of the
effectiveness of the principle of non-intervention, underlining the impracticability of
raising or lowering the legal threshold on direct third-state support under any
circumstance:
The principle of non-intervention derives from customary international lawIt would certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention
were to be justified by a mere request for assistance made by an opposition
group in another State - supposing such a request to have actually been made
by an opposition to the regime in Nicaragua in this instance. Indeed, it is
difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in
international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request
of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the
opposition. This would permit any State to intervene at any moment in the
internal affairs of another State, whether at the request of the government
or at the request of its opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court's
view correspond to the present state of international law. 442
As can be deduced from the ICJ’s reasoning, the inevitable anarchy that will follow
should the principle of non-intervention lose its effectiveness, dissipates any opportunity
to legalize the right of third states to directly support a colonized peoples in their struggle
for independence.443 Hence, the overarching international law on third state intervention
in the context of colonialism can be confirmed as illegal. In large part, a strong legal
precedent for (currently, less than 1% of the world’s population can be considered as
living in colonial territories) international law that advocates for overall decolonization
can and has been used to ensure that former colonies earn independence from their
metropolitan powers.444 Yet, how does international law interpret third state assistance in
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the non-colonial context? After-all, could an absence or lack of jurisprudential support
for unilateral non-colonial secessions eliminate the opportunity for direct or indirect
third-state support? Prior to delving into the intricacies of third-state military
intervention, it is necessary to briefly examine this point.
As previously mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 1, the existence of a
right to UNC secession exists in extreme situations of gross human rights abuses pursuant
to the right of self-determination under customary international law. If one is to defend
the right of a UNC secession as defined through an a contrario reading of Principle 5 (7)
of the Friendly Relations Declaration, the question can be asked: does a right to a UNC
secession encompass direct or indirect third state assistance? Anderson recommends
turning to Principle 5(5) of the same Declaration to find the response:
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their
right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions
against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of
their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to
receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter.445
Similar to the case of UC secessions, the Declaration reveals a right of indirect support
by a third state provided the assistance is pursuant to Articles 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) of the
UN Charter. Although the Declaration is non-binding in nature, multiple scholars have
concluded that the right of peoples to indirect third state assistance should exist in both
the colonial and the non-colonial context.446 The primary reason for this conclusion is
that a systematic denial of a peoples’ right to self-determination can be said to equate to
the denial of a right of a colonized peoples to independence. Indeed, both concepts
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Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 234-6.
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demonstrate a struggle against an oppressor state, with little difference between the more
refined definition of a colonized state, and a peoples within a state being systematically
denied their right of self-determination. Cassese, writing before the advent of the
Friendly Relations Declaration in 1995, stated:
Turning to internal self-determination, one cannot speak of an oppressed
racial group's right to use arms against the central authorities. Nor, however,
can the group's resort to violence be better thought of as a mere fact of life,
a reality. Here again [as with the UC context], the contention can be made
that the group has been granted a legal licence to resort to armed force,
subject to the strict conditions set out above [short of sending military troops
as assistance].447
Indeed, the endemic character of self-determination appears to apply to cases outside of
the decolonization context as well, in which case, similar to UC secessions, a right of
indirect third-state support will be permitted in cases of UNC secessions as well.448 In
other words, on the basis of the evidence presented in support of an indirect right to thirdstate support, it can hardly be disregarded that a peoples’ inside a particular state “…do
not breach international law if they engage in armed action against a State that forcibly
denies their right to self-determination."449 Hence, it can be suggested that indirect third
state assistance in the context of a UNC secession is permissible under international law.
Coincidentally, direct third state assistance outside of the colonial context is the
most controversial concept not only in the context of UNC secessions, but also in the
context of its direct contention with the general prohibition on the use of force. Indeed,
the precision of when direct third state assistance is permissible under international law,
if permissible at all, is the primary question that this thesis intends to answer.
Accordingly, a detailed study of the notion of third-state military interventions (not just
‘humanitarian interventions’) is required in order to firmly establish that the only legal
exception to the prohibition of the use of force outside of the current international law, is
found within the context of a UNC secession claim and under very particular
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circumstances.

3.2. Third-State Military Intervention, Humanitarian Intervention &
R2P
The legality of humanitarian intervention is a controversial subject in international
law.450 In large part, this is due to the fact that finding the balance between the “evolving
conceptions of human rights and ethical state behavior,” 451 is a daunting task considering
that international law limits the use of force by states to self-defence or through
authorization by the UNSC.452 The first use of the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ can
be attributed to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,453 in a book titled SelfDetermination in the New World Order,454 which invented the term as part of an
explanation for the rise of “collective military intervention to accomplish strictly
humanitarian objectives.”455 Nevertheless, the origins of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, that is, a foreign power’s military intervention on behalf of a population
experiencing mass oppression - can be traced as far back as the 19th Century. During this
time, a perceived necessity of military action to rescue Christians undergoing persecution
in the Ottoman Empire is said to have given birth to the concept.456 This necessity of
military action, purported to be executed on grounds of morality and justice, strongly
resembles the iustum bellum concept, which in turn, relates to the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. This section will define this relationship in detail, putting
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forward an analysis of the doctrine that will connect it with the notion of just war, while
providing evidence that the moral obligation for the use of force by states in international
law is nonexistent.
In contemporary terms, humanitarian intervention can be defined as an “…armed
intervention [that] is permissible to enforce standards of civilized conduct when rulers
violate those standards, and finds expression today in the widely held opinion that states,
acting unilaterally or collectively, are justified in enforcing respect for human rights.” 457
While many believe that the post-UN Charter concept of military intervention for the
purposes of halting mass abuses of human rights began with the Balkan wars of the
1990s,458 its genesis can actually be traced as early as the 1970s “in connection with
several armed attacks at that time (i.e. especially in Eastern Pakistan/Bangladesh).”459 At
that time, India’s militarily intervened to halt mass atrocities and human rights abuses
being suffered by the Bengal peoples in East Pakistan.460 In the opinion of Jerzy Zajadlo,
the concept has evolved in the following manner ever-since:
In the 1960s and 1970s cases of intervention in internal conflicts took place
and they can be recognised as humanitarian interventions from today's
perspective and standpoint, even if interveners referred to self-defence
aspect rather than to humanitarian reasons (i.e. India's intervention in East
Pakistan, or to some extent Tanzania's intervention in Uganda and
Vietnam's in Cambodia).461
According to another prominent scholar, in looking at the codified international law on
the use of force, an interesting observation can be made in that, perhaps, the unilateral
and indiscriminate use of force by states after the Second World War was simply
unimaginable, yet became a reality once peace was restored. Nigel Rodley explains this
line of thinking by stating that
Contextually, it must surely have been unthinkable that the drafters of the
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UN Charter could have expected that, after the Nazi-perpetrated genocides,
the world would again have to stand by if widespread atrocities were being
committed behind the veil of national sovereignty. The world could not
have unlearned the lesson so soon. In any event, if it was not the case at
first, since it has come to be accepted that there is now not only a right, but
a responsibility to protect against the major atrocities that scarred the
conscience of the world, it is unconscionable to leave the fate of populations
to the will of the Security Council, especially when that will is determined
by a veto that may be cast for reasons having nothing to do with the clarity
of the call and the need for rescue of those in danger.462
In that respect, it is important to briefly summarize the arguments for and against the
existence of an obligation for a humanitarian intervention, starting with its theoretical
conception and ending with its contemporary applicability through the Responsibility to
Protect principle.
3.2.1. Iustum Bellum & Ius Naturale
As mentioned in section 3.1.1., one of the major arguments which favours
humanitarian intervention traces its roots back to the concept of just war. Be that as it
may, it should be noted that the concept of iustum bellum must not be conflated with the
international legal principle on the prohibition on the use of force. Although the former
can be said to have contributed to the idea of a just reason to wage war, its inherent
nature, which was built on ideals of warfare often developed through a natural law theory
lens, prevents its use as part of a legal analysis in this thesis. Hence, it can be firmly
stated that “neither the UN Charter system nor the classic just war theory provides an
adequate analysis of jus ad bellum for the twenty first century.”463 Additionally, a
primary reason that a just war doctrinal analysis will not be completed in this thesis, is
that unfortunately, its theoretical underpinnings cannot be effectively incorporated into a
contemporary international legal examination of the subject at hand. More precisely, it is
suggested that the classical just war theory fails to conceptualize the legal, moral and
political factors that are seen to govern the international law on the use of force
(specifically in relation to military intervention). This view has found support in the legal
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scholarly community. For example, Delahunty and Yoo echo this position, specifying
that there are multiple challenges related to using the classical just war theory as an
assessment mechanism of military interventions:
While it [classical just war theory] permits humanitarian interventions, it
forbids preventive war: war is only "just" when, like the criminal law, it
serves punitive justice. The injuries that war can properly redress, on the
classic just war theory, are past ones; the threat of future injury, no matter
how grave, cannot justify war except when the injury is actually impending.
In an age when rogue states can credibly threaten millions of innocent
civilians with instantaneous destruction, that consequence is simply not
acceptable.464
Indeed, solely from a legal perspective, the religious tenets of morality, which find their
basis in the theory, prevent it from being used as part of the legal analysis. As colorfully
defined by Nussbaum while writing during the Second World War:
It appears that the traditional doctrine of just war is essentially religious
where its religious spirit evaporates, only a shallow and stale residue
remains. Certainly, the issue of just war deserves discussion in any course
or textbook on international law, but only as a matter of analysis and
historical information. This view will eliminate a prolific source of doubts
and obscurities. The just-war-on-both-sides problem is illustrative. It is
there that insoluble troubles befell the writers who tried to elaborate the justwar concept in a legal or semi-legal way.465
Nonetheless, it must be reiterated that the importance of iustum bellum in influencing the
contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention cannot be ignored. Although aspects
of the classical just war theory border on the theoretical, and at-times canonical teachings
that are no longer fully applicable to modern warfare or international law, certain ideals
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of the theory have surpassed its criticism and have influenced important aspects of the
contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Such ideals include “the common
idea that war must be waged as a last resort…or Vitoria’s idea that a balance should
always exist between war and the utility which is sought by using such force.”466
Therefore, one way to see classical just war theory is to acknowledge its influence in
resurrecting similar moral principles when applied to the notion of warfare through an
advocacy for the existence of an overall obligation for humanitarian intervention.467 In
other words, the basis of the theory has been found to make up the crux of the argument
for the existence of a morality-derived legal parameter for humanitarian intervention,
which finds that an international responsibility exists amongst states, as a matter of last
resort, to use military force in an effort to halt mass and systematic humanitarian
atrocities. Hence, although the theory itself will not be used as part of this thesis’ legal
analysis of the issue at-hand, the connection between the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, iustum bellum and natural law must be made abundantly clear. The next
sub-section will briefly do so in order to introduce the theoretical foundation of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, whose status under international law can then be
established accordingly.
The philosophical relationship between natural law theory and military
intervention (specifically humanitarian intervention) traces its roots as far back as ancient
Greece and Rome.468 A suggested definition of humanitarian intervention holds that
“…armed intervention is permissible to enforce standards of civilized conduct when
rulers violate those standards, and finds expression today in the widely held opinion that
states, acting unilaterally or collectively, are justified in enforcing respect for human
rights.”469 Fundamentally, the moral aspect of adhering to a ‘civilized conduct” in
respecting human rights, points to the use of classical natural law principles in the
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aforementioned definition. This dictates a return to the roots of morality within the
contemporary international legal system, a task that revives the abandoned philosophical
approach to morality using natural law.470
The early philosophical stages of natural law can be better defined as ‘classical
natural law’ emphasizing the natural law maxim of “…what naturally is, ought to be.”471
The commencement of classical natural law theory can be principally attributed to the
literary works of Plato and Aristotle.472 Notwithstanding these contributions, the
contemporary approach of analyzing pre-modern legal theory typically falls silent on
natural law; preferring to refer to legal positivism as a more tangible alternative to natural
law’s ‘outdated’ philosophy.473 In spite of these statements, natural lawyers believe that
international law “entails some elementary normative propositions and consequently, as
per Aquinas – is supposed to [serve] the common good.”474 In light of this view, it can be
suggested that classical natural law perceives certain processes to be predetermined, and
thus inherent to humanity. If this statement is applied to the primacy of human rights in
the international law on the use of force, it becomes evident that they can be considered
as inherent to humanity and hence, should be considered as forming the basis of the that
law, while providing legitimacy for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.475 Yet, this
argument begs an important question with regards to the legal status of the doctrine: how
can such a primacy be enforceable in international law? Herein lies the most challenging
issue with regards to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. More precisely, the same
criticism leveled against the use of classical just war theory to defend the development of
the international law on the use of force, can also be applied, ipso facto, to the doctrine of
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humanitarian intervention. Moreover, their general absence in international treaties or
opinio juris supports this argument.476 Therefore, although the iustum bellum concept
may have contributed to the development of the jus ad bellum through its implication of
the right of self-defence for example,477 the current status of international law prevents
the existence of a law solely on the basis of ‘morality’ or ‘justice’, especially without
evidence of adherence to such a law in treaties or customs through state practice.
Similarly, the absence of a ‘tribunal’ or any type of assessment or enforcement
mechanism to evaluate the notion of justice or morality as it pertains to the act of
humanitarian intervention seemingly prevents its invocation as a legal right under
international law. This is applicable to both customary and treaty sources of international
law as they pertain to the international law on the use of force.
In conclusion, it can be suggested that the connection between classical just war
theory and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention weakens the overall argument of the
latter. This leads this thesis to recommend that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
should be put through a legal evaluation under the positivist understanding of
international law. In other words, the doctrine should be put through an examination
using the understanding of international law as deriving from treaty or custom, and not
simply on the basis of its morality and justice towards humanity. The next subsection will
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accomplish this in order to firmly establish that an overall right or obligation for
humanitarian intervention does not exist in contemporary international law.
3.2.2. Contemporary Arguments for Humanitarian Intervention in the 20th & 21st
Centuries
Throughout post-UN Charter history, atrocities committed by states and their
respective governments have kept alive the debate surrounding the existence of an overall
right of collective or unilateral military intervention. Specifically, whether that right
encompasses an absolute right to the use of force or not centered precisely on the attempt
to halt them and consequently, prevent them from reoccurring in the future. 478 Indeed, it
is difficult to argue against the fact that the principle of state sovereignty, which remains
corollary to the international legal system, can be left unfettered in the face of mass
atrocities committed in Rwanda (1994) or Srebrenica (1995), for example.479
Additionally, the fact that such atrocities have not been limited to certain states or regions
of the world begs the question of: at what point does a state lose its sovereignty in the
face of such atrocities being committed on its territory? Conversely, it can be asked,
should a state lose its sovereignty at all? Would that not open up a ‘Pandora’s Box’ in an
international legal system without an effective enforcement mechanism? Such valid
questions remain a part of an ongoing debate promulgated through extensive scholarship
that has attempted to argue their respective interpretations of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention. As the past chapters have demonstrated, with the international legal system
being reluctant to support laws solely by reason of morality or justice, it is necessary to
assess the strength of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by appraising its legal
status and foundation. Once completed, it will be easier to understand the strongest
argument of this thesis, which denies the legality of humanitarian intervention, rather
arguing that an exception to the prohibition on the use of force exists solely under
customary international law and under the condition of a systematic denial of a right to

Olivier Corten, The Law against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Contemporary
International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) at 495-6.
479 Mindia Vashakmadze, “Responsibility to Protect” in Bruno Simma et al, 3rd ed, The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary, vol I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 1204.
478

109

self-determination, coupled with human rights abuses deemed as in extremis.
The advocacy for the existence of a right to humanitarian intervention as a norm
evolved principally throughout the Cold War period.480 In large part, two central
arguments promulgated the concept: either as a justification for the use of force outside of
the ambit of the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, or as a responsibility to
uphold a moral standard for an intervention in an oppressed state undergoing massive and
systematic abuses of human rights.481 In response to the latter, the UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office stated in 1984 that “the best case that can be made in support of
humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be said to be unambiguously illegal.”482 With
regards to the former, as previously mentioned, an ongoing debate persists over the extent
of the prohibition on the use of force in international law. In any case, it should be
mentioned that attempts were made to develop the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
into an enforceable legal norm through the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect
principle, otherwise known as R2P.483 Before moving on, it is necessary to briefly
summarize R2P’s development and contemporary status under international law, as the
current doctrine on humanitarian intervention has embraced the concept as part of its
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attempts to be codified into international law.484
In response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the claims of inaction by UN
peacekeeping forces ‘paralyzed’ by bureaucratic and nebulous guidelines on the
prohibition on the use of force,485 a discussion began to be had around the question of
“…whether there is now a ‘responsibility to protect’, that is a duty on states to intervene
in certain cases of humanitarian crisis.”486 In 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change set up by the UN Secretary-General released a report titled: A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.487 Its contents reiterated the
responsibility of states to collectively protect and work towards eliminating mass
humanitarian atrocities. As further summarized by Gray, the Report advocated for a
collective security mechanism against mass atrocities:
[The Report] endorsed the emerging norm that there is such a collective
responsibility to protect in cases of genocide and other large scale killing,
ethnic cleansing or serious violation of international humanitarian law. The
primary duty to protect lies with the state, but when a state fails to act to
protect its own citizens the international community has a responsibility to
act, by force if necessary, though only as a last resort. The responsibility to
protect was exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military
intervention.488
One year later, the contents of the report were transferred into the World Summit
Outcome Document during the World Summit in 2005. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the
document distinctively pointed out the responsibilities of states from the perspective of
both international law and the international community. With regards to the R2P
principle in particular, Paragraph 139 clearly demonstrated the intent of establishing a
collective security mechanism for the purposes of a military intervention:
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The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to
help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities
are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need
for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the
Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and
conflicts break out.489
Although this paragraph, and its wording, was hailed as a monumental achievement by
the UN Secretary General at the time,490 the debate over the implication of creating a
legal obligation for states to act began to slowly fragment the R2P principle and
consequently, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in general. In large part, a group
of states calling themselves the ‘non-aligned movement’ saw R2P as simply a pretext for
powerful states to invade smaller states under the auspices of that doctrine, while also
imposing their political and economic will in the intervened state ex post facto.491
Generally, proponents of R2P point to numerous examples where the ‘principle’ was
invoked and used successfully. However, although such proponents point to Resolutions
1674 (2006)492 and 1973 (2011)493 as acknowledging the use of the ‘responsibility to
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protect’ doctrine with regards to the humanitarian crises in Sudan and Libya for example,
the underlying debate over the meaning of R2P has interrupted any idea of the concept
emerging into a customary norm in international law.494 In other words, even those who
still claim that R2P has the potential to crystallize into a customary international law
norm in the future, have acknowledged the challenge of invoking the doctrine outside of
UNSC approval, reaffirming the original challenge with the prohibition on the use of
force in the first place.495 Generally speaking, it can be suggested that R2P’s legal status
can be measured as being at best an instrument of soft law, encouraging states to limit
and avoid committing atrocities.496 In order to reaffirm this statement, it is necessary to
assess first, which states, if any, have openly supported the doctrine, and second, has
state practice adequately supported it, as well?
As previously mentioned, until very recently, states were reluctant to recognize a
legal right or obligation for a humanitarian intervention in their domestic or foreign
policies. This has contributed to probably the largest criticism of humanitarian
intervention: the absence of any direct legal justification for its existence, as well as a
reluctance of lawyers and legal scholars to adamantly confirm its existence, instead
opting to state that it could or should exist.497 Still, consider this extract from a speech
delivered on January 11, 2017 by the Right Honourable Jeremy Wright, the United
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Kingdom’s Attorney General on the modern law of self-defence whereby the right to
humanitarian intervention is clearly mentioned:
To be clear, today I address only the law relevant to the resort to the use of
armed force (jus ad bellum), and not the law which applies to the conduct
of military operations (jus in bello). As you know, the starting point is that
the use of force is prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. That is
such a fundamental tenet of the post 1945 world order that it is considered
by many to be a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permissible.
Even so, there are clear exceptions to that prohibition, both in the UN
Charter itself and, in the United Kingdom’s view, in customary international
law. Under the UN Charter, armed force may be used both pursuant to a
Chapter VII authorisation by the UN Security Council and in individual or
collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The UK also
recognises humanitarian intervention as a potential legal basis for the use
of force in certain exceptional circumstances.498
As can be deduced from the Attorney-General’s speech, the United Kingdom recognizes
the right for a humanitarian intervention in ‘certain exceptional circumstances’. This
declaration is significant in that it denotes one the first times in the last decade that a
government’s policy has openly supported a legal justification for humanitarian
intervention outside of the current prohibition on the use of force. Unfortunately, it also
one of the only times a government has openly acknowledged its existence. Nonetheless,
it is important to note that proponents of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention have
not ignored the criticism of unenforceability with regards to its evaluation. Generally, it is
argued that a threshold or a test must be developed to assess the gravity of the situation
and the necessity of the intervention.499 Rodley, for example, summarizes the generic test
for humanitarian intervention requiring an assessment through six separate criteria:
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1. Gravity of the situation (i.e are human rights abuses in moderato vs. in
extremis?)
2. Political neutrality (i.e is there national self-interest on behalf of the
intervening state or states?)
3. UNSC paralysis (i.e has the UNSC been paralyzed in its ability to
invoke the use of force through its Chapter VII mandate?)
4. Necessity (i.e is the necessity of the intervention similar to the threshold
invoked for self-defence: ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation’)
5. Proportionality (i.e what is a proportional military response to the
situation? This consideration would avoid the occurrence of senseless
destruction of civilian infrastructure and collateral damage such as the
ones in perpetrated in NATO’s bombing campaign of Kosovo in
1999)500
6. Accountability (i.e what is the threshold for the accountability of the
intervening party? What governmental body would have the authority
to hold the intervening state or states accountable on the basis of the
validity of the intervention?).501
Such tests, although important if one is to consider the legitimacy of an intervention, pose
a number of different issues. For example, who will administer these tests on the
international level? Can an independent arbiter truly assess the nature, necessity, or
political neutrality of an intervention? Further, what type of sanctions, if any, can be
imposed on those that violate their responsibilities under this test? In many ways, these
types of questions cannot be answered in the face of the contemporary status of the
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doctrine from a legal perspective. Overall, Nodley equates the rendition of humanitarian
intervention as a legal doctrine to the introduction of assisted suicide into a domestic
legal system. In other words, Nodley sees a troubling trend emerging should a
humanitarian intervention doctrine be officially introduced into international law. In
particular, he sees states abusing the exception to the prohibition on the use of force,
seeing as no sanctionary mechanism can prevent them from acting unilaterally on that
basis, similar to the legal ramifications of implementing an overall right to deregulated
assisted suicide in a domestic legal system.502 Nodley’s arguments are salient in that they
identify a seemingly insurmountable argument against the concept of humanitarian
intervention: the building of legal threshold for an obligation of humanitarian
intervention, that can be independently assessed and enforced if a blatant violation were
to occur. From a legal perspective, as noted by Mindia Vashakmadze, the R2P principle
has not attained the necessary strength of a rule in international law:
The enthusiasm for a possible legal nature of R2P may increase in the years
to come and it is to be expected that the debate on the normative significance
of R2P will continue. However, it must not be overlooked that the success
of the concept as such cannot be measured by its suitability to be translated
into a binding legal principle. At this stage, the R2P may be a more powerful
and effective mechanism if it is used as a tool for a slow normative change
and not as an established (or emerging) principle of international law. 503
Simply put, it is impossible at this juncture to argue for the existence of an overall right to
humanitarian intervention as evinced by the R2P principle. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that the main argument of this thesis does not defend an overall obligation for
humanitarian intervention. Additionally, it must be reiterated that this thesis defends the
right, and not a responsibility or obligation, for a third state military intervention in the
case of human rights abuses deemed as in extremis, and only if a claim of selfdetermination has been invoked and has been systematically denied to the peoples in
question. Hence, a thorough analysis of three case studies will be presented in the next
Chapter in order to better understand the implications of a situation whereby an attempted
UNC secession is followed by the commission of human rights abuses deemable as in
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extremis. The case studies will focus on three relatively recent examples of military
interventions with the objective of demonstrating the legal requirements necessary to
justify a third-state military intervention. Namely, the three examples will consist of
interventions by India in Bangladesh in 1971, NATO in Kosovo in 1999 and Russia in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. Once a thorough analysis of each case is completed,
a concluding sub-section will present a legal framework through which an exception to
the prohibition on the use of force under customary international law can be established.
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Chapter 4
Chapter 4: Case Studies – Bangladesh, Kosovo & South Ossetia and
Abkhazia
The history of third-state military interventions in the pre-UN Charter period is
controversial in relation to the nature, the reason and the end result of the interventions on
the state in question. As mentioned in Chapter 3 with respect to the history of the iustum
bellum concept, until the mid-19th century, states had been reluctant to call interventions
‘humanitarian’, rather opting for other justifications as part of their recourse to the use of
force. Overall, “history casts a heavy shadow over any intervention claimed to be
‘humanitarian,’”504 in large part due to the conflation of humanitarian intervention with
neo-imperialism.505 For example, the military intervention in Cuba by the United States
in 1898 was claimed by the United States as justified on the basis of protecting United
States citizens and interests, while also freeing the Cuban citizens from Spanish colonial
rule. Ultimately, this led Cuba to become a US protectorate until the Cuban Revolution in
1959, which, on many accounts, occurred either on moral and hence justifiable grounds,
or due to the willingness of the United States to impose its hegemony in Cuba, which
ultimately led to the exploitation of Cuban resources by American companies.506 As can
be seen through this example, finding instances of state practice with regards to a true
‘humanitarian intervention’ is extremely challenging.507 As explained by Rodley, the
criteria for what constitutes a justifiable military intervention are generally vexing to
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identify:
Again it will only be the more evident that candidacies for the title of
example of humanitarian intervention are hard to come by. It is not intended
to consider rescues of the intervening state’s national (or other foreign
nationals) abroad. To the (questionable) extent that such interventions may
be lawful, they are rarely if ever justified as being undertaken pursuant to a
general right of humanitarian intervention, that would protect all those in
the territory of the state in question, but only for the more limited right to
protect foreign nationals; sometimes self-defence is advanced as an
underlying justification. Certainly, such a defence is the only one consistent
with the original notion that the only exceptions to the prohibition on the
use of force were self-defence and Security Council-authorized action under
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter…Any inhibition on the use of force, short
of resort to outright war, must inevitably have had more than a trace of
flimsiness about it, thus creating space for the possibility of armed action
for many politically convenient purposes. It is after the advent of the
universal prohibition on the use of force that state practice becomes
especially important. 508
Without going further into the ‘flimsiness’ of military interventions executed on
‘humanitarian’ grounds, it should be noted that the intent of this thesis is to identify state
practice with regards to third-state interventions only in cases related to external selfdetermination combined with human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. Therefore, the
case studies which will be explored in this chapter will be analyzed with the
understanding that strategic and ulterior motives can exist within the ambit of third-state
military interventions (whether or not they are perceived or conceived to be of a
humanitarian nature). In turn, the threshold of whether such strategic or ulterior motives
constitute a violation of non-derogable peremptory norms of international law will also
be considered. Conclusively, the factors that will be established as legitimizing the
military intervention under international law, will provide the necessary burden of proof
that the intent, proportionality and final execution of the intervention outweigh any
notion of the interventions’ ulterior or strategic motives.
The case studies analyzed in this Chapter have been selected on the basis of the
following three variables as generally applying to three separate conflicts: a) the
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territorial conflict in question includes a peoples that have been systematically denied
their right to internal self-determination and thus have invoked their right to external selfdetermination, b) the systematic denial of self-determination has been followed-up with
human rights abuses deemed as in extremis and c) a third-state or a collective of thirdstates has(ve) militarily intervened in the conflict. Additionally, the three case studies will
be considered separately to demonstrate the scope of legal and illegal third-state military
interventions. More precisely, the military interventions in Bangladesh and Kosovo will
demonstrate how systematic denials of a peoples’ self-determination, combined with
human rights abuses deemed as in extremis, have validated or justified the interventions
in those conflicts. Alternatively, the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will
demonstrate how, even as both entities can claim to meet the international legal
requirements for statehood, the absence of systematic denials of internal and external
self-determination do not justify or validate the Russian military intervention and
subsequent occupation of the Georgian territories. Overall, the case comparison will
establish the legal requirements necessary for a third-state intervention in violation of the
prohibition on the use of force, but justified as part of customary international law.

4.1. Bangladesh
As one of the few successful secessionist movements in the 20th century,
Bangladesh is the first case whereby a serious systematic violation of self-determination
rights was met with direct military intervention perpetrated by a third state (India).509
Additionally, the case has been considered as one of the first instances of ‘legitimate’
interventions, leading to the subsequent creation of a sovereign state post-1945.510 The
rapidity of its acceptance into the international community, coupled with over 28 de jure
state recognitions in 1972, and earning full de jure recognition once conceded by
Pakistan in 1974, speaks to the importance of the factors which led to and subsequently
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completed its path to independence.511 Prior to delving into the developments of the
Bengali independence movement, it is necessary to briefly summarize the history of the
region. This will establish a firm understanding of the ethno-religious plight of its
multinational history, made more complex by multiple waves of invasions and colonial
rule over the last two millennia.
4.1.1. Bangladesh – a brief chronological history
The history of the contemporary state of Bangladesh is complex as it “is
intertwined with that of India, Pakistan and other countries in the area.”512 Moreover, the
impact of religion as introduced by the numerous colonial conquests of the territory,
provide an added opportunity to understand the complexity of its ethno-diverse
population. From the onset, Buddhism dominated the region during the Mauryan Empire
from around the 3rd Century BCE, followed by a re-establishment of Hinduism between
4-6 BCE by the Gupta kings.513 The two religions were able to coexist fairly peacefully
until an overthrow of the Senas by Muslim invaders in 1200 AD. After the invasion, the
religion of the majority of the population changed to Islam. Nevertheless, as explained by
this extract from Britannica Encyclopedia, the multiconfessional makeup of Bangladesh
after 1200 AD was not an immediate cause for the ethnic conflict that would follow in the
centuries to come:
Muslim rule in Bengal promoted a society that was not only pluralistic but
also syncretic to some degree. The rulers largely remained uninterested in
preaching religion; rather, they concentrated on incorporating local
communities into the state system. In their administration, high office
holders, influential traders, eminent literati, and musicians came from
diverse religious traditions. Nevertheless, practitioners of Sufism (mystical
Islam) and Muslim saints did indeed preach Islam, and Muslim settlers
received patronage. Although high-caste Hindus received land grants under
early Muslim rule, under the Mughals most grants were awarded to Muslim
settlers. These settlers developed an agrarian economy in Bengal that
ultimately helped the spread of Islam. Meanwhile, the extensive interaction
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between Islam and Hinduism was reflected in social behaviour and the
flourishing of various cults, notably that of the Hindu saint Caitanya (1486–
1533). In contrast to more orthodox forms of Hinduism, the Caitanya sect—
like Islam—was open to all members of society, regardless of caste or social
rank. Under the Mughals the political boundaries of Bengal expanded to
become Suba Bangalah (the Province of Bengal), and economic activity
increased.514
Once the English East India Company was granted the right to establish its headquarters
in Calcutta (known as Kolkata) in the early 18th century, the British were able to exploit
the weaknesses of the Mughal empire through their military dominance and monopoly in
operating international trade routes.515 In 1757, the East India Company with the backing
of British troops fought a war against the weakened Mughal empire, ultimately defeating
them and establishing the ‘Bengal Presidency’, a permanent settlement which
implemented a feudal-type colonial system through a policy known as the bhandralok.
The policy created a new middle-class, which unbeknownst to the British, would
advocate for eventual independence and Indian self-government.516
The difficulties of governing such a large territory were demonstrated early in the
20th century when the British decided, for geopolitical and geostrategic reasons, to
separate the Bengal Presidency into Western and Eastern Bengal. Western Bengal at that
time had a Hindu majority, while Eastern Bengal was primarily inhabited by a Muslim
population.517 As expected, the partition did not go well with the local minority
populations in each territory. This led to the eventual annulment of the partition in 1912
(due to opposition from the Indian and Hindu-dominated National Congress); however,
the seeds of religious and ethno-based separatism had already been planted.518 Over the
next twenty years, the Hindu-dominated National Congress party and the Muslim-
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dominated Muslim League party fought over control of a reunited Bengal (albeit
amicably). Yet, despite British efforts to dissipate ethno-religious tensions, “…in August
of [1946] an intense Muslim-Hindu communal conflict erupted in Calcutta, and it
eventually spread well beyond the borders of Bengal.”519 As Britain began to lose control
over India, its partition followed by civil conflict became inevitable. 520 Finally, in August
1947, India and Pakistan emerged as independent countries, with their territorial
boundaries sketched and separated by the British, with West Bengal going to India and
East Bengal going to Pakistan.521 Evidently, the partition of East and West Bengal was
not well received by the local populations. The reasons for this disenchantment are
described by Li-ann Thio as revolving around several factors:
The geographically non-contiguous eastern wing of Pakistan, where 56 per
cent of the total population lived, was separated from the western wing by
1200 miles of Indian territory. Islam was the sole unifying factor, given the
cultural and linguistic differences of West and East Pakistanis. Rather than
implementing a proposed federal system, military rule was imposed;
further, Pakistani nationalism shaped the central policies that were designed
to keep East Pakistan under-developed, negating the Bengali cultural
identity. This unjust socio-economic and political order bred Bengali armed
resistance and the desire to establish a Bengalese nation-State as a curative
to the repressive West Pakistani rule.522
As can be deduced from Thio’s explanation, the boundaries that were drawn up by the
British to separate East and West Bengal did not entirely represent the religious and
linguistic demographic of the regions.523 Additionally, “…since the Partition of British
India in 1947, India and Pakistan had been fierce enemies, strategic and ideological rivals
with clashing claims on Kashmir. The newly independent states fought a war in 1947-48,
and then again in 1965 over Kashmir.”524 Indeed, by the early 1960s, civil armed conflict
became inevitable, as the developments that followed the partition, would lead to the rise
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of a secessionist movement that would eventually bring independence to Bangladesh. The
next sub-section will provide greater detail on the legitimacy of the Bangladesh
independence movement, as well as the historical developments which led to India’s
support and subsequent military intervention in 1971.
4.1.2. Legality of India’s intervention in Bangladesh
The conflict in Bangladesh arose in the region known formerly as East Bengal,
which was partitioned from West Bengal and given to the newly-independent state of
Pakistan in 1947. As the emergence of the Pakistani state was largely a product of Islamic
nationalism,525 the ethno-religious tensions flared in the region once nationalist
movements in Pakistan began to infringe on the rights of the more Hindu-dominated
ethnic populations of East Bengal. Consequently, by 1948, “Bengalis had begun to resent
the nonacceptance of Bengali as an official language, the domination of the bureaucracy
by non-Bengalis, and the appropriation of provincial functions and revenue by the central
government.”526 Further, in 1955, East Bengal was renamed East Pakistan to represent its
status as an eastern province of the Pakistani Union (a more federative-modeled state).
Nevertheless, after the Awami league, a leading Bengali political party, backed a 1956proposed constitution that purported to provide equal representation and rights to each
ethno-religious group in East Pakistan; a proposition was made for Eastern Pakistan
autonomous rule as early as 1962.527 The Awami league argued that this is “the only way
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of resolving the disparity between Pakistan’s two parts [East and West Bengal and the
Pakistani Union].”528 Subsequently, the Awami League won the national elections in
1970-1 with an overwhelming majority in East Bengal, “…which would have given it a
majority in the National Parliament and most probably would have led to the
federalisation of Pakistan.”529 Naturally, this news was not met with enthusiasm by the
Pakistani Union, with the military pronouncing an ultimate rejection of the democratic
election results while equally proclaiming that the results were marred with ‘civil
disobedience’.530 Pakistan then launched a large-scale military operation on March 25,
1971, sending thousands of troops into the region. Consequently, the leaders of the
Awami league, as well as several other Bengali and pro-Bengali politicians were jailed
for their opposition to Pakistan’s response.531 As a result, on March 26, East Pakistan
proclaimed its unilateral independence from the Pakistani Union; however, the atrocities
committed against civilians had started the day before. It is well documented that, during
the Pakistani military operations, multiple atrocities were committed, with “over one
million Bengalis…killed[,] some 10 million driven into exile in India [as refugees],
nearly 40 million displaced from their homes and tens of thousands of Bengali women
raped.”532 Many states and state representatives decried the Pakistani military operation
as ‘genocidal’.533 In response to such actions, India attacked Pakistan ‘pre-emptively’ on
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December 3, 1971534 and on December 6 officially recognized Bangladesh as an
independent state. Nearly fourteen days later, “Pakistani troops were routed in the
east…with Indian forces deep inside Bangladesh, Pakistan offered its surrender in Dhaka
on December 16, 1971.”535 By May 1972, Bangladesh’s independence was recognized by
nearly 70 states, with nearly 100 states recognizing its de jure status by September
1973.536 At first, Pakistan, attempted to break off diplomatic relations with every state
which recognized Bangladesh, but ultimately, they were forced to rescind this action
when “the major powers such as the the Soviet Union and the United States, and the
European Council countries granted recognition”537 as well. Accordingly, after several
delays caused by China’s use of the veto in the UNSC due to its close relationship with
Pakistan,538 on September 17, 1974, Bangladesh was officially admitted into the United
Nations.539
Pakistan’s argument for respecting its territorial sovereignty largely included
pointing to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as the reason for denouncing India’s actions as
illegal under international law.540 Additionally, Pakistani diplomats pointed to Article
2(7) as another reason for which India and outside states had no business in meddling
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into the internal affairs of their country.541 Interestingly, this view was supported by a
number of democratic states including the United States, Britain, France, West Germany
and Japan.542 It was alleged at the time that regardless of the atrocities being committed
by Pakistan in East Bengal, the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in
international law must be respected to the highest degree and without derogation.543 This
leads to the question: on what grounds did India justify its military intervention?
India’s argument for military intervention has been questioned on the grounds of
its military training and support for the Bengali nationalist movements prior to the
intervention, as well as “seizing [on the] opportunity to dismember Pakistan.”544 In
addition to this argument, India’s internal cabinet saw military intervention as the only
feasible policy left, especially in an era where other democratic governments were
equally, if not more involved in executing similar actions around the world:
This kind of abnegation of international law was prominently suggested by
the strategist Subrahmanyam in an influential secret report sent to the senior
ranks of the government, including Haksar, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh,
Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, the army chief of staff, and others.
Subrahmanyam noted that India had gotten away with its 1961 seizure of
Goa from Portuguese colonial rule, despite international condemnation.
"Over a period of time in international community all actions tend to be
overlooked," he argued candidly. “U.S. intervention in Guatemala, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Hungary
and French intervention in Chad are all now vague memories.” None of
these nations had as much justification to intervene as India now has in
Bangla-Desh.545

Ibid.
Ibid at 237.
543 Nicolas J Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003) at 58.
544 Bass, supra note 524 at 236. Generally, the grounds of military intervention under the pretense of
‘humanitarianism’ are questioned first under their purview of their actual intent. For example, there
is a strong argument that ‘humanitarian’ military intervention is another form of neo-imperialism.
See e.g. Martha Minow, “Instituting Universal Human Rights Law: The Invention of Tradition in the
Twentieth Century” in Austin Sarat et al, eds., Looking Back at Law’s Century (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2002) at 58-60; Thomas Lee, “The Augustinian Just War Tradition and the Problem
of Pretext in Humanitarian Intervention” (2005) 28:1 Fordham Intl L J 756; Ryan Goodman,
“Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War” (2006) 100 AJIL 107 at 109-11.
545 Bass, supra note 524 at 242.
541
542

127

In other words, India looked to comply with international law, yet draw a fine line with
regards to the nature of its military operation in East Bengal. It is important to consider
that India’s violation of the prohibition on the use of force should not detract from its
commitment and support of international law. In fact, India prided itself on its record of
supporting and complying with international law since the ratification of the UN
Charter.546 At the end, “Indian officials and legal authorities advanced four interlocked
claims for intervention in East Pakistan: arguments from human rights, genocide, selfdetermination, and India's own sovereignty.”547 In order to confirm the legitimacy of
these arguments, it is necessary to look at several interpretations of the intervention by
legal scholars.
Inevitably, the most challenging factor in India’s intervention was the violation of
the principle of territorial inviolability. With respect to the importance of the principle,
even in contemporary times, consider this opinion by Roth:
To be sure, the traditional insistence on territorial inviolability of existing
states has an element of arbitrariness at its core. On occasion, this
arbitrariness places intolerable stress on the putative rule, justifying the
emergence of a narrow exception in keeping with the traditional
framework's basic logic; a normative order that cannot bend will likely
break. But an overall approach more favorable to external encouragement
of secession would ultimately serve neither the moral principle of selfdetermination nor the practical project of inter-state peace.548
Simply put, the principle of territorial inviolability clashes with the right of selfdetermination, specifically when that right is exercised externally through an attempted
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separation of territory, which as explained earlier, could lead to a withdrawal of
sovereignty as well. Furthermore, the separation of territory is typically either completed
through military support of the entity wishing to separate by a third-state, or through a
third-state military intervention in cases where the entity’s resistance is met with
systematic human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. Therefore, in looking at the
legality of India’s actions, it is important to consider its record of compliance with
international law (as mentioned above), as well as its considerations of the status of the
Bengali people as a peoples under international law.
The ramifications of the military intervention on India’s part, and the recognition
of Bangladesh on the other, make for a very interesting case with regards to its evaluation
under international law. Consider this opinion of the ‘remedial right to secede’ for
Bangladesh by John Dugard and David Raic:
Supporters of the qualified right of secession agree that Bangladesh met all
the suggested criteria for the exercise of a unilateral right to secede. There
is no doubt that the Bengalis constituted a people, in an ethnic sense, which
formed a majority within East Pakistan. It is also clear that the people of
East Pakistan were exposed to serious harm in the form of a denial of
internal self-determination and widespread violations of fundamental
human rights. Moreover, all realistic options for the realisation of internal
self-determination were exhausted.549
Equally, consider this opinion on the same matter by Crawford:
Genocide is the clearest case of abuse of sovereignty, and this factor,
together with the territorial and political coherence of East Bengal in 1971,
qualified East Bengal as a self-determination unit within the third,
exceptional, category discussed above, even if it was not treated as a nonself-governing territory. The view that East Bengal had, in March 1971, a
right to self-determination has received juristic support.167 Moreover, the
particular, indeed the extraordinary, circumstances of East Bengal in 1971
to 1972 were undoubtedly important factors in the decisions of other
governments to recognize, rather than oppose, the secession: by its conduct
the Pakistan army had disqualified itself, and the State, from any further
role in East Bengal.550
Additionally, with respect to the illegal use of force by India, Anderson suggests that,
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given the circumstances, the strength of the principle of self-determination was solidified
through India’s careful consideration of its military actions:
The principal factor which prevented Bangladesh from breaching the
peremptory norm prohibiting the illegal use of force was the scale and
severity of the human rights abuses suffered by East Pakistanis at the hands
of the Pakistani military prior to Indian intervention. In effect, these abuses
- which have been generally characterized as genocidal - functioned as an
antidote to the corresponding illegal use of force by Indian troops. Thus,
although Indian intervention was illegal, this did not result in Bangladesh's
statehood being called into question…A further factor which assisted
Bangladesh in not breaching the peremptory norm prohibiting the illegal
use of force is that India did not, in the judgment of the international
community, directly intervene in order to secure sovereignty or de facto
authority throughout East Pakistani territory. Rather, India's direct
intervention was a response to the estimated nine million East Pakistani
refugees that entered India and established makeshift camps.551
If all three opinions’ primary arguments are analyzed collectively, it can be determined
that several factors support the notion that, although India’s actions violated the
prohibition on the use of force, India’s intent for the intervention, as well as the
proportionality of its response, provide an exception to the prohibition on the use of force
which was justifiably accepted by the international legal community. In fact, this
exception can be summarized through five primary factors that form the basis for the
‘exception’ to the prohibition on the use of force in international law: a) the Bengalis
were systematically denied their right of international self-determination since the
partition of India and Pakistan, b) the Bengalis had their right of external selfdetermination supressed by the Pakistani military, c) the Bengalis had become the
subject of human rights abuses designated as in extremis (ethnic cleansing and possibly
even genocide) while the nearly 9 million refugees encroached on India’s sovereignty, 552
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d) India’s military intervention became justified in response to factor c, and finally, d)
India’s military intervention into Pakistan ended as soon as the fear of human rights
abuses had dissipated, with no subsequent imposition of Indian sovereignty, culture or
language on the Bengali peoples.
In sum, it can be concluded that, although India’s military intervention in
Bangladesh was a violation of the prohibition on the use of force, its proportionality,
along with its intent and its execution effectively legitimized it. Next, it is necessary to
analyze another case of a military intervention which occurred more recently, and hence,
can provide a more contemporary assessment of the argument which supports the right of
third-state military interventions in cases of external self-determination. Although it will
be demonstrated that certain aspects of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo were
different from those in Bangladesh, the underlying similarities between the two will
reaffirm the factors which support and justify the ‘violation of the prohibition on the use
of force in the case of Kosovo as well. In turn, this will solidify the argument that thirdstate military interventions can be justified provided they are executed within the context
of UNC secessions as supported by the principle of self-determination in international
law.

4.2. Kosovo
The NATO intervention in Kosovo tested the limits of ‘humanitarian intervention’
from the perspective of international legitimacy and state sovereignty. As expanded on by
Zajadlo, this type of collective and unilateral action, against the clearly-defined
parameters of the prohibition on the use of force, was of extreme concern for the
international community:
From this point of view, NATO's intervention in Kosovo was a turning point

Haitian military junta in 1994 (authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter) and NATO’s
arguments with regards to the influx of refugees from Kosovo and Yugoslavia into neighbouring
states are also examples of this. See also Anthea Roberts, “Legality vs. Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force
be Illegal but Justified?” in Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald, eds., Human Rights, Intervention and the
Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press) at 178-85; Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State
Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 134-40.

131

- both legality and legitimation of this action [intervening militarily without
United Nations Security Council approval] have been the subject of debates
until the present day. The conclusion to the report of the International
Commission on Kosovo is the best example for that. It reads: ‘The
Commission acknowledges that the NATO's military intervention was
illegal, though legitimate’. And further it goes on to state: ‘The lesson from
NATO's intervention in Kosovo shows that there is a need to bridge a gap
between legality and legitimation’.553
More succinctly, it became unclear whether the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
states - both considered to be non-derogable and well-accepted norms of international law
– had changed on the basis of the legitimization of the intervention arguments posited by
NATO.554 Hence, it is important to examine both sides of the legality vs. legitimization
debate with respect to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, as well as provide a
background to the conflict itself; however, prior to doing so, it is necessary to summarize
the historical development of the Kosovo region. This will, similar to the historical
summary of Bangladesh, allow for a more comprehensive study of the complex and
distinctive makeup of the future state of Kosovo.
4.2.1. Kosovo – a brief chronological history
The first use of the name ‘Kosovo’ can be attributed to the Battle of Kosovo (June
25, 1389), a major battle between the “Serbian prince Lazar and the Turkish forces of the
Ottoman Sultan Murad I (reigned 1360–89). The battle ended in a Turkish victory, the
collapse of Serbia, and the complete encirclement of the crumbling Byzantine Empire by
Turkish armies.”555 It is from this battle, named ‘Kosovo Polje’ or ‘field of blackbirds,’
that Kosovo derives its name. Prior to 1389, the region was home to a majority ethnic
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Serb Christian Orthodox population.556 However, following this battle, the majority
Serbian Christian Orthodox population fled north to Serbia proper, leaving the region to
be populated by an Albanian-speaking and predominantly Muslim population that was
part of the Ottoman Empire.557 In 1698, an attempt by the Austro-Hungarian Empire to
retake Kosovo failed, leading to an even larger exodus of 40-50,000 ethnic Serbs settling
outside of the territorial bounds of Kosovo.558 The abolishment of the Serbian
Patriarchate in 1766 further diminished the ethnic Serb population (including its
influence in the region).559 The ethno-centric challenges continued well into in the 18th
and 19th centuries; however, Kosovo remained a multiethnic and multiconfessional
region of the Balkans. As summarized by Thomas, the role of the Albanian-speaking
population in Kosovo is typically misunderstood:
It was the Ottoman Empire, though, and not the Albanian population, that
was responsible for the emigration of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo. When the
Serbian principality was founded in 1830, Kosovo was not included in the
territory. Not until the founding of the Albanian State in 1912/13 was
Kosovo, by that time predominantly populated by Albanians, incorporated,
not into Albania, but into the Serbian principality…The remaining territory,
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – to be renamed Yugoslavia in
1929 included Kosovo and its 400,000 Albanians.560
Nevertheless, when Serbia regained control over Kosovo for brief periods of time in the
early 19th and 20th centuries, thousands of Kosovar Albanians fled neighboring countries
in fear of persecution. Attempts by the Kosovar Albanians to integrate Kosovo with
Albania failed in 1921 and again after the Second World War. 561 The attempts for
rapprochement between Kosovar Albanians and Albania were further exacerbated by the
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ideological split of Yugoslavia from the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and
subsequently Enver Hoxha’s communist Albania in the 1950s, leading to an overall
alienation of Kosovo from Albania and other communist-friendly states.562
After the Second World War, Kosovo was incorporated into the Federative
structure of Yugoslavia by Josip Broz Tito. In light of the temporary halt to ethnic
conflict, the internal federative structure of Yugoslavia attempted to integrate the
multinational makeup of the state. The post-Second World War period saw Kosovo gain
autonomous provincial status; however, ethnic discriminations continued to be
perpetrated by Yugoslav authorities dominated by an ethnic-Serb majority (who did not
forget the role that Kosovar Albanians played during the Nazi occupation of the
Balkans).563 Nevertheless, Tito’s rise to power aimed to quell the ethno-influenced
tensions in the region. In the mid-1960s, Yugoslavia began adopting policies to
acknowledge and integrate the ethnic Kosovar Albanian identity into provincial and
federal administrations.564 Consequently, “[b]eginning in 1963, the status of Kosovo
within Yugoslavia improved, becoming a province and, with the 1974 Constitution, equal
to that of the other seven units of the Yugoslav federation.”565 Towards the final years of
Tito’s rule, ethnic tension between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo began to flare up,
followed by a series of events which would set the foundations for their respective
independence movements. This period of time is summarized by Krueger as
demonstrating a time of civil unrest in Kosovo:
The Kosovo Albanians continued to demand their independence more
vehemently. This led to an increase in tensions between the Albanian
majority and the Serbian minority, as well as early trouble at the beginning
of the 1980s. The migration of tens of thousands of Serbians and
Montenegrins over the following period unleashed Serbian fears, which the
future Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic used to his advantage in 1986.
This subsequently led to a restriction of Kosovo's autonomy and reprisals,
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breeding further tensions. In 1989 the autonomy of Kosovo was completely
suspended.566
In the early 1990s, the question of Kosovo’s status was regarded as a domestic
Yugoslavian matter, and consequently, little attention was devoted to it by the
international community.567 However, it should be noted that “…the Kosovo Albanians
lobbied heavily for the question to be considered as part of the Dayton peace process,568
which led to the resolution of the conflict in Bosnia.”569 In response to the reluctance of
the international community to address the ‘independence of Kosovo’ question, under the
leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UÇK) began to
execute radical forms of guerilla warfare on the Serbian-led Yugoslavian army, as well as
on the ethnic Serb population in 1996.570 Then, “[b]eginning in January 1997, the KLA
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stepped up its bombing campaign and, during the summer of 1998, it grew stronger.
Originally, the group's numbers were small, but by July 1998, the KLA enjoyed wide
popular support across Kosovo and controlled roughly one third of the territory."571 By
1998, United States-mediated peace talks were failing to put an end to the armed
conflict.572 After mass atrocities against Kosovar civilians were documented and
attributed to the Milosevic regime,573 NATO began a bombing campaign on March 24,
1999 as part of Operation Allied Force.574
All in all, the reaction to NATO’s bombing campaign requires further assessment.
What legal rule gave NATO the right to execute a military operation on the sovereign
territory of another state? The following sub-section will explore this question in greater
detail, pronouncing on the UNSC Resolutions prior to, during and after the conflict. A
fortiori, this analysis will look to draw similarities between NATO’s actions in Kosovo
and the military intervention in Bangladesh, demonstrating that their actions can be
considered as legitimate in accordance with the law of self-determination.
4.2.2. United Nations, Kosovo and UNSC Resolution 1244
While the situation of ethnic cleansing and discrimination in Kosovo deteriorated
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the international community did not formally
react to the atrocities being committed in Kosovo until 1998.575 As part of the
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Albanians from Kosovo into Albania, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and
Montenegro…” at 4).
574 Ibid at 3.
575 Kreuger, supra note 566 at 129.
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international community’s response, several important UN resolutions were presented
leading up to the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, which put an end to the conflict and
led to a transition of power.576 This subsection will explore the legal aspects of these
resolutions as part of the Kosovo conflict between 1998–1999. Additionally, a brief
literature review will present several viewpoints of the actions perpetrated by NATO and
Yugoslavia, as part of the Kosovo conflict. This will be done in order to objectively
analyze the emergence of the state of Kosovo.
In the Spring of 1998, the situation on the ground in Kosovo continued to
worsen.577 This prompted the UNSC to pass Resolution 1160,578 which condemned acts
of violence by both militarized Serb and Kosovar Albanian factions. 579 At the same time,
“…Resolution [1160] stressed that any solution to the Kosovo question would be based
on the territorial integrity of former Yugoslavia and would take into account the
[Kosovar] Albanians' position under international law. [Additionally,] [t]he preamble to
the resolution emphasized the continuing sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia in even clearer terms.”580 This is noteworthy, as the pattern of reaffirming the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia would continue in each UNSC resolution passed
afterwards until the cessation of hostilities.581 Nevertheless, after numerous
condemnations of atrocities committed against civilians, hostilities did not cease, rather,

See Security Council resolution 1160, SC Res 1160, UNSCOR, 53rd Sess, UN Doc S/Res/1160 (1998)
at 2-3 [Resolution 1160]; Security Council resolution 1199, SC Res 1199, UNSCOR, 53rd Sess, UN Doc
S/Res/1199 (1998) at 3-4 [Resolution 1199]; Security Council resolution 1203, SC Res 1203, UNSCOR,
53rd Sess, UN Doc S/Res/1203 (1998) [Resolution 1203].
577 The deterioration of the situation the ground is summarized in detail in Alexander, supra note 572
(“[t]he conflict in Kosovo erupted between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in
March 1998, following attacks by ethnic Albanian guerrillas on Serbian police forces. In response to
the attacks, Serbian forces raided dozens of villages over the next several months in an apparent
effort to drive the KLA forces from populated areas. To dissuade civilians from supporting the KLA,
Serbian forces conducted massacres, burned villages, raped innocent women, and looted towns all
over Kosovo. Thousands of ethnic Albanian civilians fled their homes into the densely wooded hills
surrounding their villages. Many crossed the border into the neighboring states of Albania and
Macedonia, and some even made it as far as Italy” at 431).
578 Security Council resolution 1160, supra note 576.
579 See Alexander, supra note 572 at 431.
580 Kreuger, supra note 566 at 130.
581 The territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was reaffirmed in the preambles of UNSC Resolutions 1160,
1199, 1203 and 1244 respectively. See supra note 576.
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reports indicated that Yugoslav-led Serb security forces “[intensified] the policy of ethnic
cleansing against Albanians.”582 These actions prompted the UNSC to adopt Resolution
1199.583 This resolution demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and an
implementation of an immediate ceasefire in Kosovo.584 Additionally, and most
importantly, the UNSC called on both sides to “take immediate steps to improve the
humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe.”585 Labeling
the conflict as an ‘impending humanitarian catastrophe’ prompted, according to some
scholars, the United States and NATO to act in a ‘moral capacity’ as part of a
humanitarian intervention mission.586 Yet, no concerted military action took place during
the time. Notwithstanding the international pressure, and believing that no military
intervention would take place, the Yugoslav-led military forces continued their campaign
of ethnic cleansing, with a mass grave discovered in September 1998,587 prompting an
intense outcry from the international community.588
Recognizing a policy that was failing the Kosovar civilians, activation orders
“were issued by NATO to allow it to carry out air strikes, if the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia continued to fail to comply with the demands of Security Council Resolution
1199.”589 NATO’s implicit threat of action prompted Milosevic to agree to a last-minute
compromise with “United States envoy, Richard Holbrooke, under which the Federal
Republic would allow NATO reconnaissance planes to overfly the region, and the
Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) to deploy a 2,000 strong
Kosovo Verification Mission' to monitor a cease-fire, agreed between the Yugoslav

Oeter, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, supra note 50 at para 74.
Security Council resolution 1199, supra note 576 at 3-4.
584 Ibid at para 1.
585 Ibid at para 2.
586 See e.g. Steven Wheatley, “The NATO Action Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
Humanitarian Intervention in The Post-Cold War Era” (2012) 50:4 N Ir Legal Q 478 at 478. See also
Alexander, supra note 572 at 440.
587 See “World: Europe UN Meets to criticise Kosovo massacre”, BBC News (1 October 1998), online:
<www.news.bbc.co.uk>.
588 Alexander, supra note 572 at 432.
589 See e.g. Wheatley, supra note 586 at 480.
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authorities and the Kosovo Liberation Army.”590 Nonetheless, the situation on the ground
continued to deteriorate,591 forcing the UNSC to adopt UNSC Resolution 1203592 “which
sought to protect unarmed monitors who were overseeing the cease-fire from the
ground.”593 As explained by Klinton Alexander, this Resolution was also interpreted by
certain NATO member states as acknowledging the right to the use of force:
Specifically, the resolution affirmed that ‘in the event of an emergency,
action may be needed to ensure [the monitor's] safety and freedom of
movement ...’[594] It also provided for "relevant equipment for the sole use
of the Verification Missions." which NATO countries interpreted to mean
weapons.595
In retrospect, NATO would later point to UNSC Resolution 1203 as a legal justification
for the military intervention; however, this did not take away from the controversy of
NATO’s action.596 The Resolution’s instructions to cease hostilities against civilians
would not be followed by Yugoslavia, and a subsequent meeting in Rambouillet,
France597 failed to secure a signature from Yugoslav officials. In response, NATO began
its aerial bombardment on March 24, 1999, prompting a lukewarm reception by the
international community.598
On one hand, NATO acted unilaterally and outside of the legal parameters of the
UN Charter. On the other, there was a clear indication that hostilities were being

ibid at 480-481. See also Agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Annex, UN Doc S/1998/978 (1998).
591 Wheatley, supra note 586 at 481.
592 Resolution 1203, supra note 576.
593 Alexander, supra note 572 at 433.
594 Resolution 1203, supra note 576 at para 9.
595 Alexander, supra note 572 at 433.
596 See John M Goshko, “UN Council Backs Kosovo Pact, Clears Way for NATO Intervention”,
Washington Post (25 October 1998), online: <www.washingtonpost.com> (stating that threats of
intervention have been made under an earlier Security Council Resolution, which the United States
interpreted as permitting airstrikes if Yugoslav forces remain in Kosovo and continue attacks on
ethnic Albanian villages).
597 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords), Annex, UN Doc
S/1999/648.
598 See Barton Gellman, “US, Allies Launch Air Attack on Yugoslav Military Targets”, Washington Post
(25 March 1999), online: <www.washingtonpost.com> (noting that all NATO nations supported the
execution of Operation Allied Force on March 24, 1999, with 13 members deploying military forces).
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perpetrated against a peoples who had invoked their right to self-determination. Needless
to say, the dilemma surrounding the legality of NATO’s military intervention was left
unsolved. After a 72-day bombing campaign, Milosevic and the Yugoslav army agreed to
a cessation of hostilities599 through a peace plan that was subsequently adopted through
the passing of UNSC Resolution 1244.600 Accordingly, it became the pivotal document in
determining the legitimacy of Kosovo’s bid for independence and statehood.601 However,
the Resolution posed several logistical and legal challenges in Kosovo’s succession as an
autonomous entity, still within the territorial sovereignty of Serbia.602 These challenges
require a brief mention, as they will underline the complexity of rebuilding an ethnicallydivided Kosovo post-conflict, and answer the question of why the idea of Kosovar
independence resonated with the majority of the international community.
The primary challenge posed by UNSC Resolution 1244 was the question of its
effects on the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, specifically whether its operative
language implied an autonomous or independent status for Kosovo. Borgen summarizes
the dichotomy of the arguments put forward in the document by pointing to drastically
different interpretations by the warring parties in the conflict:
Serbia and Russia, referring to Resolution 1244’s preambular language
‘[r]eaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia…’, have argued
that Resolution 1244 does not allow the secession of Kosovo without the
agreement of Serbia. By contrast, the EU has taken the position that
Resolution 1244 is not a bar to Kosovo’s independence as, in its view, the
resolution does not define the outcome of final status talks.603

See Steven Erlanger, “Crisis in the Balkans: The Overview; Milosevic Yields on NATO’s Key Terms;
50,000 Allied Troops to Police Kosovo”, New York Times (4 June 1999), online: <www.nytimes.com>.
(“The peace proposals were worked out between American Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott,
and Russian envoy, Victor Chernomyrdin, who was acting for Belgrade. Once Chernomyrdin and
Talbott agreed on the basics of the deal, Milosevic, who was indicted for war crimes a week earlier,
felt that he had no choice but to accept the plan or endure further destruction”).
600 Alexander, supra note 572 at 437.
601 Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”, supra note 46 at 2.
602 Ibid.
603 Ibid at 3. See also Oeter, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, supra note 50 (“[t]he UN Security Council
authorized the NATO Member States (together with Russia and a number of other non-NATO
members) to establish an international security force (‘KFOR’). It decided that the responsibilities of
such would include deterring renewed hostilities, verifying the phased withdrawal of Serb troops,
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Thus, the ‘end status of Kosovo’ question became a pressing issue for the United States,
NATO and the EU, which only increased in contention throughout the implementation of
the UNMIK plan.604 In large part, this contention existed through the challenge of finding
the balance between respecting the territorial integrity of Serbia and the granting of
independence to the Kosovar peoples, which ultimately rested on the implementation of
the eight standards [fixed by UNMIK]. The eight standards included democratic
governance, the rule of law, freedom of movement, the rights of ethnic minorities,
property rights, the economy, the field of cultural heritage, and dialogues that were to be
met by the provisional local authorities elected under the control of UNMIK. Only as far
as these standards of democratic governance would be met by the elected local authorities
of Kosovo – which was initially the guiding concept of UNMIK – would it be possible to
negotiate on the definitive political and legal status of Kosovo (i.e. autonomy in Serbia or
independence).605
In February 2007, a report submitted by Martti Ahtisaari (also known as the
Ahtisaari plan)606 summarized the frustrations of nearly “…17 rounds of direct talks and
26 expert missions to Belgrade and Prishtina that [he] had carried out.”607 The core of the
proposal insisted on independence as the only realistic solution. As summarized by Oeter:
The proposal [was] built on the finding that the standards policy pursued by
UNMIK had not yielded the expected results and that Kosovo’s unclear
political status is a cause of economic backwardness and political
instability. Ahtisaari’s conclusion was that a continued international
administration is not sustainable and that independence is the only viable
option. Such independence should be conditioned, and there should be an
international supervision of the newly formed sovereign State, exercised by

demilitarizing the UCK, establishing a secure environment for the return of refugees, the
establishment of a transitional administration, and the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as
ensuring public safety and order” at para 78). See also Resolution 1244, supra note 102 at para 33.
604 Robert Muharremi, “The European Union Rule of Law in Kosovo (EULEX) from the Perspective of
Kosovo Constitutional Law” (2010) 70 Heidelberg J Intl L 358 at 371.
605 Oeter, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, supra note 50 at para 82.
606 Henry H Perritt, The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 24.
607 See Oeter, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, supra note 50 at para 83.
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regional organizations (in particular the EU).608
Therefore, although a closer review of the Resolution concludes that it neither prohibits
nor advances Kosovo’s secession,609 it can be suggested that the operative language on
the future status of Kosovo was left deliberately vague, a potential precursor of things to
come and a reaffirmation of the gray area in international law surrounding the act of
unilateral non-colonial secession when coupled with human rights abuses perpetrated by
the metropolitan state that are deemed as in extremis.610 Moreover, this point of
contention has, to-date, not been resolved even as the alliance of states recognizing
Kosovo’s independence has grown exponentially611 since the Kosovo Advisory Opinion
ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).612 Therefore, although the question of
Kosovo’s independence continues to be challenged by multiple states, its status under
international law remains unchanged. To support this supposition, it is necessary to assess
the legality of NATO’s intervention as part of the international law on the use of force, as
well as determine whether the peoples of Kosovo, can be considered as such, leading to
the confirmation of the factors necessary to legitimize the intervention de lege lada.

See ibid at para 84. But, see Gianluca Serra, “The International Civil Administration in Kosovo: A
commentary on some major legal issues” (2008) 18 Italian Y B Intl L 63 (“UNSC Resolution 1244
(1999) is the legal basis for the establishment and deployment of UNMIK. It is supplemented by the
formal consent given by the host State, namely FRY of which Kosovo was thereby reaffirmed to be
part. At least two main theoretical issues need to be scrutinized when assessing such legal bases from
the international law point of view: i) where is Resolution 1244 drawing its force from? ii) was the
FRY's consent validly given? In connection to the first one, a third question is to be raised: iii) what is
the legal ground for the acts adopted by UNMIK?” at 67).
609 Borgen, “Is Kosovo a Precedent?”, supra note 46 (“[o]n balance, it appears that Resolution 1244
neither promotes nor prevents Kosovo’s secession. Although operative paragraph 1 of Resolution
1244 states that a political solution shall be based on the principles of the annexes, those annexes are
silent as to the governmental form of the final status of Kosovo. The annexes only state that, pending
a final settlement, an “interim political framework” shall afford substantial self-governance for
Kosovo and take into account the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Moreover, the references to the territorial integrity of Serbia are only in the preambular language
and not in the operational language. The document is therefore silent as to what form the final status
of Kosovo takes. Much of the debate thus grapples with the broader issues of self-determination and
secession under international law” at 3).
610 See Oeter, “Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, supra note 50 at para 82.
611 See Azemi v Serbia, No 11209/09 at para 22, [2013] EHCR 1314.
612 Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, supra note 145.
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4.2.3. Legality of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo
The legality of NATO’s intervention has remained a discordant issue of debate in
legal, political and academic circles.613 The debate can be summarized through the
following two questions: (1) whether NATO’s intervention was legal under international
law, and subsequently, (2) whether the ‘human catastrophe’ in Kosovo permitted the
violation of the ‘inviolable’ principle of territorial sovereignty, and consequently,
affirmed the independence of Kosovo as a sovereign state in 1999. The objective of this
section will be to answer these questions by assessing whether a) Kosovo possessed the
right to a UNC secession, and b) whether the human rights abuses experienced in Kosovo
reached the level of in extremis, which prompted NATO’s military intervention. Through
this analysis, it will be shown that, through a historico-legal analysis, a case exists for
supporting Kosovo’s right to a UNC secession and consequently, NATO’s intervention as
well.
After the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the late Cassese famously wrote
that, although the use of force by NATO was in clear violation of contemporary
international law, the missing parameters for the use of force in the case of a
humanitarian catastrophe (coupled with the invocation of the right to self-determination)
were factors that could have potentially legitimized its actions.614 In other words, had
there been an effort to legitimize the use of force outside of the auspices of the UNSC,
the NATO intervention could have been considered legitimate. Nearly twenty years later,
this effort has not yielded such a result, with Cassese’s words continuing to prove to be
correct. Nevertheless, in answering the first question of whether the NATO intervention
was legal under international law, it can be concluded that the answer is in the negative.
An explanation is provided below.
Several authors have pronounced themselves on the illegality of NATO’s

Dovile Morkyte, “International Law as a Legal Basis for Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention”
(2011) 24:7 Hague YB Intl L 121 at 131.
614 Cassese, “ex iniura ius oritur”, supra note 501 at 25.
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intervention. In some cases, scholars have accused NATO of not only violating the
international law on the use of force, but also violating international humanitarian law
given the civilian casualties and infrastructure damage caused by the disproportionate
aerial bombardments.615 Additionally, opponents of the intervention have argued that the
situation in Kosovo was a domestic matter as affirmed and reaffirmed in subsequent
UNSC Resolutions, which the NATO military intervention seemingly ignored.616
Furthermore, it has been claimed that NATO violated its own founding treaty617 in
bypassing the UNSC and by authorizing the aerial bombardments.618 The last claim has
cause for merit given that, admittedly, certain NATO states have acknowledged the
illegality of their actions under international law.619 Moreover, NATO’s actions could
have violated several other international treaties, including the 1976 Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques,620 the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 621 the 1985

See Cohn, supra note 392 (“NATO’s humanitarian bombs killed between 500 and 1800 civilians
and wounded thousands more. They hit not only military forces and facilities, but also destroyed
Yugoslavia’s entire public infrastructure, inflicting an estimated $ 4 Billion of damage on bridges,
highways, railroads, civilian airports, oil refineries, factories, construction equipment, media centers,
hospitals, schools, apartment buildings, houses, buses, electrical plants, and hundreds of acres of
forest” at 137). See also Wheatley, supra note 586 at 478-81; Rosaline Higgins, “International Law in
a Changing International System” (1999) 58 Cambridge L J 78 at 95.
616 See Security Council resolution 1160, supra note 576 at preamble; Security Council resolution 1199,
supra note 576 at preamble.
617 The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, 34 UNTS 241 [NATO Treaty].
618 See ibid (“[t]he Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations” at art 1). See also ibid (“This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting
in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the
United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security” at art 7). As the use of force was inconsistent with the UN Charter
given the violation of arts 2(4)-(7), 33, 37, 39, 51, 103, there is little justification for the legitimacy of
NATO’s actions.
619 Julie Hyland, “British parliamentary committee admits NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was illegal”,
World Socialist Web Site (14 June 2000), online: <www.wsws.org>.
620 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques, 18 May 1977, 1108 UNTS 152 (entered into force 5 October 1978).
621 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December
1978).
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Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 622 the 1987 Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 623 and the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change 624.625 As can be deduced from some of these accusations,
the illegality of NATO’s intervention is clear due to the violation of several treaties,
including the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. This brings this sub-section to
consider the other side of the debate: whether the intervention, albeit illegal, was
legitimate under the guise of a UNC secession experiencing human rights abuses deemed
as in extremis.
A large number of scholars have pronounced their support for NATO’s
intervention, prompting a consideration of whether the debate on the existence, vel non,
on the use of force outside of the current parameters. In general, several categories of
justifications for NATO’s intervention can be identified. This is explained by Tesón as
relating to the large spectrum of scholars who believed in the growing need to establish a
right to humanitarian intervention in international law:
Reactions from legal scholars [on NATO’s intervention] varied. Of those
who believed the intervention had been unlawful, many also expressed the
belief that the intervention was morally or politically wrong. Others thought
the intervention was unlawful, but that institutional structures should be
reformed to be more responsive to humanitarian crises. Another group
believed that the intervention had been illegal in a technical sense, but so
morally appropriate as to be otherwise justified. Yet others saw Kosovo as
an instance of legitimate humanitarian intervention. Finally, some opined
that the Kosovo incident itself marked a move toward the formation of a
customary rule of humanitarian intervention. It was, for them, a case that
expanded, rather than breached, the law, similar to the Truman
proclamation about the continental shelf. Scholars other than legal
academics, however, by and large found the intervention justified. 626
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Tesón’s analysis demonstrates that legal, political and philosophical scholarship varies on
the legality of the intervention; however, a point can be made that NATO’s actions
derived their legality from existing international law. For example, certain scholars627
have attempted to put forward a validation with strong legal elements in an attempt to
justify the intervention through customary international law. In general, they point to
three major explanations.628 First, it is argued that humanitarian intervention is an
acceptable concept in accordance with the general purposes and principles of the United
Nations.629 Next, humanitarian intervention finds support in the following international
legal instruments: the Genocide Convention of 1948,630 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948,631 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.632 Lastly, the argument
is made that human rights transcend domestic matters, and become international issues

See generally, Leslie A Burton, “To bomb or not to bomb? The legality of the question” (2001) 7:1
Ann Surv Intl & Comp L 49; Julie Mertus, “Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention:
Lessons from Kosovo” (2000) 41:5 Wm & Mary L Rev 1743; Laura Geissler, “The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention and the Kosovo Crisis” (2000) 23 Hamline L Rev 323; Ian Brownlie,
“Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law Aspects” (2000) 49:4 ICLQ 878;
Jordan J Paust, “NATO's Use of Force in Yugoslavia” (1999) 33:9 UN L Rep 114.
628 Burton, supra note 627 at 54.
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crime of genocide was occurring in Kosovo. Because NATO intervened to prevent it, NATO's action
was legal” at 56). See also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9
December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951) [Genocide Convention].
631 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights condemns the unlawful taking of life, and the Geneva
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when they become subject to in extremis abuse.633 These arguments point to a dilemma
between the influence of human rights in public international law, a debate that tends to
use legal theory when explaining its legal status.634
Through this debate, one inevitably faces the challenge of explaining public
international law beyond the codified law and clearly-established norms and practices. As
the Kosovo example has demonstrated, certain scholars vehemently continue to defend
NATO’s intervention as an appropriate action given the fact that the international legal
system would have otherwise been unable to act due to a paralyzed UNSC and the overall
prohibition on the use of force. 635 For example, Smith claims that the only negative
aspect to the intervention was the fact that NATO member states refused to clarify their
recto intentio to the rest of the world:
NATO's justification for intervention in Kosovo was tortured and
disingenuous. Instead of dancing on the head of a pin about whether
Resolution 1199 authorized the use of force, the Alliance should have
argued from the beginning that intervention as justified because:
Yugoslavia illegally withdrew Kosovo's autonomy, it denied the Albanian
majority in Kosovo its fundamental right to self-determination; and it
continued to trample on numerous other basic human rights guaranteed
under the UN Charter. In so doing, Yugoslavia forfeited its right to Kosovo.
These egregious Yugoslav violations of international law gave NATO
sufficient legal grounds for using force to assist the KLA in its fight for an
independent Kosovo.636
Indeed, a reliance on self-determination could have justified the intervention and
consequently, created a precedent for an emerging international law norm. Such an
approach is suggested as part of this thesis’ legal analysis of the Kosovo case study.
Through the lens of self-determination, it becomes evident that NATO’s intervention,
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although illegal due to its violation of the prohibition on the use of force, was justified
through the fact that Kosovars had a right to a UNC secession, and that the human rights
abuses being perpetrated on Kosovo’s territory reached levels of in extremis. With
respect to the first point, it remains to confirm how it became established that Kosovo
possessed that right. This will be done below through a brief analysis of the
contemporary status of the Kosovar peoples, as well as of the territory of Kosovo.
4.2.4. Kosovo’s right to UNC Secession
Over the last three decades, the concept of humanitarian intervention has been
examined mostly using the principle of non-intervention637 in international law; however,
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo reopened an opportunity to analyze the concept under
the strengthening role of the principle of self-determination.638 Consequently, it is
necessary to determine whether Kosovars constituted a ‘peoples’ to invoke their right to
self-determination, and subsequently, whether the territory of Kosovo fulfills the criteria
for statehood. As a result, it will become evident whether the situation in Kosovo in 1999
should be treated as a case of self-determination denial coupled with human rights abuses
deemed as in extremis. Should the threshold for this condition be met, Kosovo’s status as
an entity possessing the right to a UNC secession will become justified.
The first question to consider is whether the Kosovars constituted a “peoples”
under international law. According to Borgen, “…the Kosovars are a people, inasmuch as
they are of the same ethnicity, perceive of themselves as a group, and have inhabited
Kosovo for centuries.”639 This claim has also been reaffirmed by a number of scholars
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including Gerd Siedel and former European Court of Justice Advocate General Julianne
Kokott.640 In other words, it can be presumed that the Kosovars constituted a peoples
under international law and possessed the right to a UNC secession long before such a
concept became part of the legal framework for self-determination. 641
With respect to whether Kosovo fulfilled the Montevideo criteria for statehood, it
had a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and a limited capacity to
enter into relations with other states. Although the population was separated politically
through ethnic alliances to Albania, Croatia and Serbia proper, regardless of the Kosovar
Albanian and Serb displacements throughout the 20th century, a permanent population
continued to reside on the territory of Kosovo consistently between 1980 and 2008, 642
satisfying the first criterion for statehood. Further, the 1974 Yugoslavian Constitution
allowed Kosovo to “have its own identity and territory and [have acknowledgment] in the
field of international relations.”643 Thus, it can be suggested that as well as having a
permanent population, Kosovo had a defined territory and even a limited capacity to enter
into relations with other states as an ‘autonomous province’ as part of the Yugoslavian
Federative model.644 Although Kosovo’s capacity to enter into relations with other states
was limited, as interpreted by Crawford, the effectiveness of this criterion depends
largely on an entity’s independence and ability to enter into relations with other states.645
Therefore, although Kosovo’ capacity to enter into relations with other states was limited
due to its status under the Yugoslav constitution, its ability to do so post-1999 allows for
it to meet the requirements of this criterion. Finally, apart from the time of NATO’s

See generally, Kokott, supra note 557 at 6-7; Seidel, supra note 639 at 205-6.
For a more detailed illustration of the multiethnic makeup of Kosovo, see Britannica, “Kosovo”,
supra note 559 (“[Kosovar] Serbs are concentrated in northern Kosovo, particularly in Mitrovicë
(Mitrovica), as well as around Shtërpcë (Štrpce), on the Macedonian border.” The ethnic composition
of Kosovo in 2011 was the following: 92.9% Albanian, 1.5%, Serb and 5.9% Other (Turkic, Croat,
Roma etc…) respectively”).
642 Seidel, supra note 639 at 205.
643 Hajredin Kuci, “The Legal and Political Grounds for, and the Influence of the Actual Situation on
the demand of the Albanians of Kosovo for independence” (2005) 80:1 Chi Kent L Rev 331 at 341;
See also, Constitution of Socialist Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia at preamble & arts 1, 5
224,225,226, online: <http://mojustav.rs/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Ustav-SFRJ-iz-1974.pdf>.
644 Ibid at 342.
645 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, supra note 22 at 62.
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military intervention, Kosovo had a functioning government.646 After the intervention,
government functions were taken over as part of UNMIK in accordance with UNSC
Resolution 1244.647 On the basis of these facts, it is necessary to briefly explain how
UNSC Resolution 1244 further granted independence to Kosovo. 648 Resolution 1244
“…codified a number of principles which were to guide the allocation of sovereignty
among the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Kosovo and the international
community.”649 As per Williams, the Resolution remains an integral piece of
jurisprudence with regards to the independent status of Kosovo:
The substance of Resolution 1244 focused on: 1) displacing FRY
sovereignty from Kosovo; 2) replacing it with interim U.N. and NATO
sovereign responsibilities; 3) establishing substantial autonomy and
democratic self governance; 4) ‘facilitating a political process designed to
determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet
accords," and 5) preparing in the final stage to oversee "the transfer of
authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established
under a political settlement.’650
In essence, the Resolution “…altered sovereign control over Kosovo...by displacing
Yugoslav sovereign control and replacing it with an interim U.N. administration
mandated to build independent Kosovar institutions capable of providing for democratic
self-government.”651 Although much contention exists with regards to the question of

Kuci, supra note 643 at 342.
See Security Council resolution 1244 [on the deployment of international civil and security presences
in Kosovo], SC Res 1244, UNSCOR, 54th Sess, UN Doc S/Res/1244 (1999) at para 10 [Resolution 1244].
648 It should be noted that alternative viewpoints exist that claim Kosovo as not having fulfilled the
criteria for statehood. In most cases, this is based on an interpretation of historical and political
events that occurred in Kosovo over the past three decades. See e.g. Milena Sterio, “Creating and
Building A “State”: International Law and Kosovo” (2010) 104 Am Socy Intl L Proc 361 (“First,
Kosovo's territory is heavily disputed by Serbia, which claims that Kosovo is part of Serbia and that
historically, Kosovo has always been Serbian land. Second, Kosovo does not have a permanent
population, because of the heavy flows of both Serbian and Albanian refugees that have moved in and
out of Kosovo. Third, Kosovo does have a government, but its stability depends on protection
ensured first by the United Nations, and now by the European Union. Finally, Kosovo can only enter
into international relations because of the international community's involvement with it. In other
words, Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations and its internal security has been
secured by international forces, which ensure that Kosovo has access to the outside world, that it can
trade, import and export goods, and that its political leaders can travel abroad” at 364).
649 Williams, supra note 216 at 406.
650 Ibid at 406. See also Resolution 1244, supra note 647 at paras 3-4, 9, 5-11, 17.
651 Williams, supra note 216 at 407.
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whether Resolution 1244 granted Kosovo territorial independence from Serbia, 652 it
should be noted that much of that contentiousness stems from different interpretations of
Kosovar history, and consequently, the political decisions that led to the breakout of the
ethnic conflict. 653 Examples include such factors as the competing territorial claims for
Kosovo as part of a ‘Greater Serbia’ or a ‘Greater Albania,654 as well as the nature of
NATO’s intentions in Kosovo as originating from wanting to impose the ‘American
world order’ in Eastern Europe.655 Nevertheless, the determining factor can be suggested
as being stated in Resolution 1244, which granted Kosovo the right to an inclusive
autonomous government, a right that was denied to them by the Serb-led Yugoslav
authorities before 1999. It should be noted here that, as mentioned in Chapter 2, an
effective government as part of a justified UNC secession must only demonstrate the
ability and not the capacity to enter into relations with other states as part of its ‘actual
independence’. Additionally, in the case of a UNC secession experiencing human rights
abuses deemed as in extremis, the formal part of independence can occur postintervention, as was the case in Kosovo. Conclusively, it can be determined that regardless of political decisions made by Kosovo, the EU, the United States and Serbia ex
post facto; Kosovo’s status as an independent state must be acknowledged as having
derived from Resolution 1244. 656

See e.g. Alexander Orakhelashvili, “Kosovo: The Post-Advisory Opinion Stage” (2015) 22 Intl J on
minority and group rights 486 [Orakhelashvili, “Kosovo”] (“the Admissibility Decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in Ali Azemi v. Serbia (2013) dealing with the claims as to the
compliance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the context of the
enforcement of decisions of courts operating under the Kosovo Albanian authority. The Court
acknowledged that 89 States had recognised Kosovo’s independence, including 22 out of 27
European Union Member-States, as well as steps taken by the Kosovo government and International
Steering Group to end Kosovo’s “supervised independence” Yet the Court frames its own reasoning in
terms of Serbia’s continuing territorial sovereignty over Kosovo that, due to various circumstances,
cannot be factually exercised on the ground” at 491). See also, Azemi v Serbia, supra note 611.
653 Sterio, supra note 647 at 364.
654 Orakhelashvili, “Kosovo”, supra note 652 at 487.
655 Cohn, supra note 392 at 138.
656 The evidence of human rights abuses committed against the Kosovars was presented in detail as
part of the previous sub-section. It should be noted that the actions of Yugoslav forces in general
towards non-Serb and non-Orthodox Christian minorities in the former Yugoslavia can be used as an
additional factor of analyzing the reasons for which a military intervention was required in Kosovo.
Although the deaths of Kosovars at the hands of Yugoslav-supported military in Kosovo may not
meet the threshold of a genocide, similar actions by Yugoslav and Serb-supported factions in Bosnia
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Now that the cases of military interventions in Bangladesh and Kosovo have been
summarized, it is necessary to look at a third military intervention which will demonstrate
the drastic difference between a justified and a non-justified violation of the prohibition
on the use of force. The next section of this Chapter will analyze Russia’s military
intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Republic of Georgia in 2008,
establishing the tenets around the illegal intervention, as well as the false claims of a
justified right to external self-determination by the two entities, which consequently
prompts a denial of their claims to independence.

4.3. South Ossetia & Abkhazia
Long-time Caucasus’ scholar Donald Rayfield recently wrote that “[t]he origins
of the Georgian peoples, their ethno-genesis, like that of most nations, precedes
documentary evidence.”657 In fact, geographically, Georgia’s diverse and rich ethnohistory allowed its historical boundaries to reach “far into today’s Turkey, Azerbaijan and
Armenia,”658 although the contemporary Republic of Georgia659 is much smaller than the
original federative state of a once flourishing Georgian Empire. Inside its contemporary
international boundaries, two de facto republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which
represent approximately 18-20% of the internationally-recognized Georgian land mass,
remain under foreign occupation since 2008.660
This sub-section will consist of a short historical summary of both entities’
histories in order to establish the ethno-historic tensions that resulted in their emergence.
Subsequently, an analysis of Russia’s military intervention to secure the entities’

(Srebrenica) for example provide additional evidence of a systematic persecution of minorities that
ended with NATO’s military intervention in 1999. For more on the intricacies of the ethno-inspired
persecutions in Yugoslavia, see Rogel, supra note 558.
657 Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2012) at 11.
658 Ibid at 7.
659 Georgians do not refer to their country as the ‘Georgia’, rather, they use the term Sakartvelo which
stands for the ‘land of the kartvelians.’ The Kartvelians ethnos’ are generally said to be made up of
Georgians, Mingrelians, Laz and Svans.
660 See Robert E Hamilton, “NATO In the South Caucasus: Present for Duty or Missing in Action? –
Analysis” The Eurasia Review (23 June 2017) online: < www.eurasiareview.com/23062017-nato-inthe-south-caucasus-present-for-duty-or-missing-in-action-analysis/>.
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independence will be completed in order to demonstrate its staunch differences with the
military interventions in Kosovo and Bangladesh. The self-determination cases of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, although representing two distinct and separate regions within the
internationally-recognized borders of the Republic of Georgia, will be analyzed
collectively as they secured their de facto independence in a similar manner and at
approximately the same time.661 However, before delving into their chronological
histories, it is necessary to indicate two important factors with respect to their relationship
with Russia. First, from a geopolitical perspective, it is necessary to note that
…Russia's recent approach to geopolitical strategy capitalizes on the
challenging ambiguity surrounding the right of self-determination and its
enforcement in international law. This ambiguity is allowing Russia to take
advantage of uncertainties and move forward with its own geopolitical
objectives in Transnistria, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia.662
Second, it is important to acknowledge the multi-ethnic and multi-religious makeup of
the Caucasus region, to which both breakaway ‘republics’663 belong. Although the
heterogenous makeup of the region has been the cause of other regional and territorial
conflicts in the past,664 the South-Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts, which were primarily
rooted in the breakup of the Soviet Union, “followed years of simmering tensions and

Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by presidential decree on
August 26, 2008. See Clifford J Levy, “Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves”, The New
York Times (26 August 2008) online:<www.nytimes.com>.
662 Adam Sorenson, “South Ossetia and Russia: The Treaty, the Takeover, the Future” (2016) 42 NCJ
Intl L 223 at 224. For a more succinct legal analysis of Russia’s interpretation of international law,
see Milena Sterio, “Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law: The New Framework”
(2015) 21 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 293.
663 For the purposes of avoiding any confusion, the term ‘republics’ may identify South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in this Chapter. This will be done in order to dispel any confusion between using the term
‘region’ to define each republic and the geographic Caucasus region to which they belong to. The use
of the term ‘republic’ does not take away from their status under international law as de facto
breakaway regions.
664 Territorial conflicts around the borders of the Russian Federation are plentiful. Some examples
include Nagorno-Karabakh, a de facto republic and a point of armed conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia. Another example is Chechnya, an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation,
whose independence movement caused a number of bloody armed conflicts in the 1990’s. For more
on the conflict in Chechnya, see Jonathan Charney, “Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East
Timor, 34 Vand J Transnat’l L 455. For more on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh see Tim Potier,
Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, A Legal Appraisal (Boston: Kluwer Law
Publications, 2001).
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sporadic hostilities in the region.”665 To summarize, outside of the legal ambit of analysis
for this case study, it is important to keep in mind that Russia’s involvement in the
Caucasus region certainly possesses historical and political influences, which cannot be
ignored when attempting to understand its actions sine 1992.
4.3.1. Abkhazia – a brief chronological history666
The history of Abkhazia is complex in that, similar to other territorial disputes, it
had been the subject of conquests, invasions and multiple waves of imperialism over the
past three millennia. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Abkhaz culture and
language had existed in Georgia since its inception as a functioning society,667 and other
Georgian ethnos’ such as the Svans, Laz and Mingrelians have lived side by side with
Abkhaz peoples since Georgia became a federative state in the 10th century AD. 668 In any
case, as was written by ecclesiastical lawyer Giorgi Merchule over one thousand years
ago, in the 10th century, “…Georgia was defined as anywhere where the Mass was said in

Philip Leach, “South Ossetia” in Elizabeth Wilmhurst ed, International Law and the Classification of
Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 317.
666 It is important to note that a large part of this sub-section will cite the following publication:
Dugard & Raic, supra note 528. This publication’s excerpt on the history of Abkhazia is a combination
of multiple original historical sources. See generally, Potier, supra note 664; A Khachikian,
“Multilateral Mediation in Intrastate Conflicts: Russia, the United Nations, and the War in Abkhazia”
in M C Greenberg, J H Barton & M E McGuinness, eds., Words Over War, Mediation and Arbitration to
Prevent Deadly Conflict (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000) at 15; S N MacFarlane,
“Conflict Resolution in Georgia” in H G Ehrhart & A Schnabel, eds., The Southeast European Challenge:
Ethnic Conflict and the International Response (Hamburg: Nomos Verlagsgeselleschaft, 1999) at 117;
Raic, supra note 13 at 379–86.
667 See Rayfield, supra note 657 (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2012) (“[w]hen Georgia emerged from
legend into history, it did so as two possible three, distinct entities. One is the core of the future
unified state, Iberia (today’s Kartli and Kakhetia). The second is Colchis, the Black Sea coast region
that at its greatest stretched from east of Trebizond to north of today’s Sukhumi [modern-day capital
of Abkhazia]…The third is Svanetia, ancient Suania, which two or three thousand years ago was more
extensive than today’s landlocked highlands…Colchis is mentioned as a kingdom long before Iberia…”
at 12).
668 See George Hewitt, “Abkhazia and Georgia: Time for a Reassessment” (2008) 15 Brown J World
Aff 183 (“Passing through the Caucasus in 1404, the cleric Johannes de Galonifontibus has left a
brilliantly succinct description of the sequence of countries he visited. His text translates: "Beyond
these [Circassians] is Abkhazia, a small hilly country...They have their own language...To the east of
them, in the direction of Georgia, lies the country called Mingrelia...They have their own language...
Georgia is to the east of this country. Georgia is not an integral whole...They have their own
language"” at 184).
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Georgian”669 – Abkhazia included.
Abkhazia’s early history as a functioning society can be traced back to the 9th
century BC, where until the 6th Century BC, its territory belonged to the ancient kingdom
of Colchis (Kolkha).670 Subsequently, an influx of Milesian Greeks established
themselves on the territory in around the 5th Century BC and in 1 AD, the region was
invaded and conquered by the Byzantine Roman Empire. In the centuries that followed,
the Kingdom would be the subject of multiple conquests; however, the strength of the
Georgian, and predominantly Christian-Orthodox population, allowed for its culture and
language to survive nonetheless. 671 In 978 AD, Abkhazeti (Abkhazia in Georgian) was
absorbed into a feudal Georgian state ruled by King Bagrat III. Upon its absorption into
the Georgian state, the Abkhaz lived in proximity and married into other Georgian
ethnos’, with many important figures of the Georgian monarchy having direct Abkhaz
lineage or ancestry.672
Through countless invasions by first the Sassanids, the Mongols, the Timurs, and
finally the Ottoman Turks, the Georgian state ultimately fragmented into smaller
principalities under the yoke of foreign conquest. Eventually, Abkhazia broke into its
own independent principality in the 17th century while under the Ottoman Empire, but
through Russia’s conquest of the North Caucasus673 became a part of the Russian Empire
via official annexation in 1864.674 Fearing revolts by the Abkhaz against further imperial

Rayfield, supra note 657 at 7.
David Braund, Georgia in Antiquity: A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian Iberia (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995) at 359.
671 Rayfield, supra note 657 at 18-47, 55.
672 It is important to note Abkhazia’s role as part of the unified Georgian federal state. See Hewitt,
supra note 668 (“[t]he first king of this unified state, Bagrat' III, in 978 inherited from his Abkhazian
mother, Gurandukht', the Kingdom of Abkhazia, which included both Abkhazia proper and most of
today's west Georgian provinces, which Abkhazian prince Leon II had added to his domains in the
late 8th century. By the time of his death in 1014, Bagrat' had inherited all remaining Georgianspeaking regions, and, as his 36 -year reign ended, the Georgian chronicler ascribed to him the title
apxazta da kartvelta mepe: "Sovereign of the Abkhazians and the Georgians. However, this unified
polity was bound to fragment after the depredations of the Mongols, who first appeared in the
Caucasus during the reign of Tamar's daughter, Rusudan, in the 1270’s” at 184).
673 It is also important to note that the Russian Empire annexed and conquered most of Georgia by
the early 1800’s.
674 Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 113.
669
670

155

rule, the Russian Empire authorities proceeded to deport Muslim Abkhazians to the
Ottoman Empire. Consider this summary of the historical developments in 18th century
Abkhazia by George Hewitt, which clearly underline the Russian Empire’s relationship
with the Caucasus region:
As Tsarist Russia pushed south in the late eighteenth century following the
1783 Treaty of Georgievsk between Catherine the Great and Erek'le II, king
of the central and eastern Georgian kingdoms of Kartli and K'akheti,
resistance grew across virtually the whole North Caucasus. During the
nineteenth century Caucasian War, the Abkhazians were the only people
resident south of the mountains to join it. Abkhazia came under Russian
"protection" in 1810 but continued to administer its own affairs until 1864.
This was the year when the Caucasian War ended with the surrender of the
North-West Caucasian alliance at Krasnaja Poljana, inland from Sochi.
Following their defeat, all the Ubykhs and most Circassians and Abkhazians
chose to abandon their ancestral lands to resettle in the Ottoman Empire. As
a result, most Abkhazians and Circassians today live in the Near East,
predominantly in Turkey. A further outflow took place after the 1877-1878
Russo-Turkish War. It was after these migrations, known as maxadzhirstvo,
"Great Exile," that non-Abkhazians first started to populate the denuded
areas… With the departure of at least 120,000 Abkhazians, mostly during
the maxadzhirstvo, and the beginning of an inflow of non-Abkhazians,
Abkhazian territory was subjected to different administrative divisions and
arrangements up to the time of the Russian Revolution (1917).675
Evidently, the Abkhaz peoples underwent a broad range of ethnic discrimination under
the rule of the Russian Empire. This prompted them to seek more autonomy and freedom,
especially as communism began to slowly dismember the power of the Russian
monarchy. After the October Revolution in 1917 and the rise of the Bolsheviks, the
Abkhaz Socialist Republic was finally given official republican status within the Soviet
Union in 1921. Nearly one decade later, under pressure from the Soviet Union central
government, the autonomy originally granted to the Abkhaz began to slowly disappear.676
Raic and Dugard explain that what happened next set the stage for the isolationism that
the Abkhaz peoples felt throughout the 20th century:
On 4 March 1921, the Abkhazian Soviet Republic was formed, which
possessed full republican status in the Soviet Union. In December 1921,
under pressure from the central government of the Soviet Union, a special
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Hewitt, supra note 668 at 185.
Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 113.
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‘contract of alliance’ was signed between Abkhazia and Georgia, by which
Abkhazia became part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic while it
retained its status as Union republic. On 1 April 1925, the Abkhazian
Constitution was adopted which enshrined its republican status with treaty
ties to Georgia. However, under Stalin, the status of Abkhazia was reduced
to an autonomous republic within Georgia. In the course of the 1930s, large
numbers of Georgians were resettled in the region… Under Stalin’s rule, a
period of ‘Georgianisation’ took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
The Abkhazian language was banned from administration and publication
and the Abkhazian alphabet was changed to a Georgian base. In 1953,
following the death of Stalin, this policy changed and the Abkhazians were
rehabilitated and compensated with over-representation in local offices. In
1978, the Abkhaz launched a campaign to separate the Autonomous
Republic of Abkhazia from the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic and to
incorporate it in the Russian Federative Socialist Republic. Although
rejected by Russia, this resulted in significant concessions to the Abkhaz,
including disproportionate representation in the Supreme Soviet of
Abkhazia.677
As can be established from this extract, the Abkhaz incurred forms of self-determination
denial and discrimination in the early 20th century by both the Russians and the
Georgians; however, this would gradually change as the Soviet Union adopted a more
balanced activism of self-determination rights on the international stage.678 Ultimately,
Abkhazia’s exhaustive requests for autonomy from Georgia were met with concessions
from the Soviet Union’s central government, which granted ethnic Abkhaz supremacy in
their autonomous parliament; a move that would create discord and significantly impact
relations with ethnic Georgians living on the territory of Abkhazia in the coming years.
In the 1980s, a rise in Georgian nationalism led to renewed fears of
‘Georgianisation’ in Abkhazia, prompting tensions to boil over on August 25, 1990 when
“…the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet, in the absence of its Georgian deputies, voted in
favour of independence, and like virtually all autonomous republics of the former Soviet
Union, declared the state sovereignty of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Republic
(ASR).”679 Although the declaration was subsequently disregarded and proclaimed as

Ibid.
See sub-section on “Leninist Self-Determination” in Chapter 2.
679 Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 114.
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invalid by Georgia, the Abkhaz authorities made legitimate efforts twice (in 1990 and
1992) to begin discussions on including Abkhazia into Georgia as part of the federal
structure of an independent Georgian federative state. Unfortunately, both times the
proposals were ignored and, following a coup d’état in 1991, “…the Georgian Military
Council reinstated Georgia’s 1921 constitution which did not recognise Abkhazia’s status
as a separate entity within Georgia.”680 In response to this, Abkhazia declared its
independence, naming itself the ‘Republic of Abkhazia’; however not ‘officially’
proclaiming its independence as a state from Georgia.681
Without a consensus in place, a civil war broke out between the Georgian
National Guard and the Abkhaz militia as early as 1991, with the primary reason for the
Georgian intervention being the growing Abkhaz secessionist movement in the country.
By the end of June 1993, Abkhaz militias had overpowered the Georgian military,
capturing Sukhumi (the capital of Abkhazia) a few months after. Once a cease-fire was
agreed upon on December 1, 1993, Georgia conceded to previous Abkhaz demands by
offering proposals for extensive autonomy, which were subsequently rejected by the
Abkhaz authorities.682 One year later, the UN attempted to hold talks between the two
sides; however, an insistence on recognising the territorial integrity of Georgia prompted
the Abkhaz authorities to reject any declarations or propositions by the Georgian side.
The primary issue for the Abkhaz was that they wanted to return to a confederal structure
of Georgia (Abkhazia as an autonomous republic with the same rights and status as
Georgia, but within the Georgian de jure territory); however, the Georgians were
prepared only to offer autonomy to Abkhazia under a Georgian federative state.683 In any
case, upon learning of the Abkhazian authorities’ refusals, negotiations ceased and

Ibid at 115.
Ibid.
682 Ibid at 116.
683 It is necessary to note that although Georgia had sought to offer this option to the Abkhaz
authorities, it was not done with much enthusiasm and was most likely a result of international
pressure to solve the civil conflict.
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Abkhazia continued its path to de facto statehood by holding elections in 1996.684
Indeed, it is the time period after the 1996 elections from which much of the
opposition to Abkhazia’s de facto independence is derived. The civil conflict in Abkhazia
had caused nearly 300,000 ethnic Georgians to flee from Abkhazia into Georgia proper.
Their return, which was fervently advocated by the international community and by
Georgia, became a point of contention between the Abkhaz and the Georgian authorities.
In large part, this was due to the fact that the return of Georgian refugees (which slowly
began in 1997), was claimed by Abkhazia to be a way of destabilizing “the delicate
politico-military balance in the area.”685 After nearly 30,000 returned refugees were
forcibly expelled from Abkhazia in 1998, calls about a potential ethnic cleansing by the
Abkhaz authorities began to shape the nature of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict.686
Ignoring the international pressure to solve the refugee situation, Abkhazia held an
independence referendum in 1999, the results of which overwhelmingly called for an
independent Republic of Abkhazia. However, by that point, it had become clear that the
majority of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia had not participated in the voting due to forced
exile and intimidation. The international community’s response reflected this fact, with
the referendum and the subsequent ‘declaration of independence’ later that month being
declared as illegal.687 As rightly summarized by Raic and Dugard:
The international (in particular the United Nations) stance towards the
conflict is characterised by (a) consistent support for the preservation of the
territorial integrity of Georgia, (b) a rejection of secession by Abkhazia, and
(c) an insistence on the grant of extensive autonomy to the Abkhazians
within the Republic of Georgia. 688

The elections results were rejected by the majority of the international community and
pronounced as illegal by the UNSC and the European Parliament. See e.g. Security Council Resolution
1096 on extension of the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), SC Res 1096,
UNSCOR, 52nd Sess, S/Res/1096, (1997) at para 3 [Security Council Resolution 1096]; Security
Council Resolution 1065, Resolution on the Situation in Abkhazia, SC Res 1065, UNSCOR, S/Res/1065
(1996) at paras 3-4. See also Dugard & Raic, supra note 528 at 116.
685 Ibid at 116-7.
686 Ibid at 116, n 69. See specifically, OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, OSCE Doc. SUM.Doc/2/99
(1999) at para 17 (“In 1996, the European Parliament labelled the treatment of the refugees and
displaced Georgians from Abkhazia as ‘ethnic cleansing”).
687 Ibid at 117.
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Indeed, the UNSC, as well as the European Union and Council of Europe, all agreed that
Abkhazia’s independence infringed on Georgia’s territorial integrity under international
law.689 Further, the Abkhaz authorities, who initially began negotiations in the early
1990’s with discussions of Abkhazia as existing under a Georgian federative structure,
rejected every proposal offered to them either by Georgia, or international mediators once
some form of governmental stability returned to Georgia in 1996.690
Between the years 2000 and 2008, the situation in Abkhazia remained tense but
stable, characterized as a ‘frozen conflict zone’ with both Russia and Georgia attempting
to scrounge support in the region. For example, after 2000, Russia began issuing Abkhaz
citizens with Russian passports as a means of travel and protection. 691 Additionally, the
election of pro-‘West’ President Mikhail Saakashvili as part of the Rose Revolution in
2004 further strained relations between the separatist republic and Georgia. Specifically,
this was due to the fact that Saakashvili “made Georgian territorial unity and control of
the country’s separatist regions—Abkhazia among them—a political priority.”692
Moreover, a ‘nationalist turn’ related to the election of Saakashvili further provoked the
severity of the secessionist crisis, rekindling Abkhaz memories of previous
‘Georginasation’ movements in the past. As explained by Hewitt, the argument that the
reality of a nationalist government in Georgia was of concern to the Abkhaz authorities
should be accepted:
The advent of a new Georgian president might have been the moment to
manifest a sense of realism vis-a-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However,

See Security Council Resolution 1287, SC Res 1287, UNSCOR, S/Res/1287 (2000) at para 5; Security
Council Resolution 896, SC Res 896, UNSCOR, S/Res/896 (1994) at para 5; Resolution on the Situation
in Abkhazia, SC Res 1065, UNSCOR, S/Res/1065 (1996) at paras 2-3; Council of Europe, PA, 1997
Ordinary Sess (10th Sitting), Resolution 1119 on the conflicts in Transcaucasia, Debates, vol 1 (1997).
690 The Georgian government was unstable in the years after declaring independence from the Soviet
Union on May 26, 1992. Mired by civil and ethnic conflicts, as well as a destabilized government
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any such opportunity was squandered yet again, as Saak'ashvili set himself
the nationalist goals of regaining the lost territories, including the MuslimGeorgian region of Ach'ara in the southwest during his first presidential
term, offering Abkhazians the same old "maximal autonomy" until early
2008, when the offer, 19 years too late, became a special federal
arrangement. After peacefully regaining Ach'ara in May 2004, Saak'ashvili
turned his attention to South Ossetia. As for Abkhazia, troops, allegedly
mere policemen that were needed to restore order entered the Upper K'odor
Valley in the spring of 2006, Abkhazia's only region that Georgia has
historical claims to still under Tbilisi's control. They were quickly joined by
the so-called "Abkhazian Government in-exile." This provocation, which
saw tourist numbers plummet in the expectation of renewed fighting,
produced no immediate Abkhazian response other than to halt the
negotiations.693
Thus, under the pretence of halted negotiations, it was only a matter of time before
tensions spilled over into an armed conflict in August of 2008. Prior to delving into the
developments that caused the Russian military intervention in 2008, it is necessary to
present a similar historical summary of South Ossetia to identify the comparable
differences between the two separatist entities, as well as the similarities which equally
affect their current status’ under international law.
4.3.2. South Ossetia – A brief chronological history
South Ossetia can be found within the territorial boundaries of the north-eastern
region of the Republic of Georgia, separated by the Caucasus mountain range with North
Ossetia-Alania, an autonomous federal republic within the territorial boundaries of
Russia.694 The Ossetian peoples are considered to be of “Iranian origin and are viewed by
Georgians as a non-native group living in its territory.”695 Unlike Abkhazia, which had its
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origins and language engrained into the etymological history of Georgia, Ossetians,
believed to have derived from a Sarmatian Iranian tribe known as the Alans, only began
to migrate into Georgia en masse sometime in the 17th century.696 Hence, the
historiography of the Ossetian peoples can begin at this juncture of Georgia’s long and
rich history.
Once South Ossetia became part of the Russian Empire through the annexation of
Georgia in 1801, “…the Ossetians retained their identity and did not join other groups in
the North Caucasus putting up fierce resistance to the expansion of the Russian
empire.”697 Furthermore, Ossetian migration continued into Georgia throughout the 19th
century, and while ‘Russification’ was more prevalent in North Ossetia, the ethnic
tensions between Georgians and Ossetians persisted due to in large part, linguistic and
cultural differences, as well as a strong support of Russia by the Ossetians. 698 Following
the Russian Revolution, a Menshevik government was elected in what came to be known
as the “First Georgian Republic” (1918-1921);699 however, as described by Noelle
Higgins and Kieran O’Rielly, the ethno-historical issues that to-date bordered on
linguistic and cultural differences, began to take a more ‘separatist’ undertone:
The First Georgian Republic's Menshevik government faced many
problems, including war (with Armenia and White Russian forces),
economic chaos and hyperinflation." The Mensheviks turned to Georgian
nationalism as they tried to bolster support for the state. This led to
minorities, including Ossetians, feeling isolated within the state, and
Georgians began to regard them as a potential fifth column which could
collaborate with forces outside of Georgia to undermine the Georgian
government. Following the defeat of the Mensheviks, the incorporation of
Georgia into the Soviet Union in 1921 was followed by the establishment
of an autonomous oblast of South Ossetia within the Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republic.' Unhappy with the division of Ossetia into two units in
separate Soviet republics, through the 1920s and 1930s North and South
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Ossetian leaders sought a united Ossetia within the Soviet Union and
petitioned the Soviet Union leadership for this. However their request was
denied.700
After the Second World War, Joseph Stalin (himself an ethnic Georgian), ceded both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic. 701 Throughout the
post-war Soviet period, ethnic tensions were low, only beginning to rise towards the end
of the 1980s in response to the multiple South Ossetian requests “…to have its status
upgraded from that of an autonomous oblast to an autonomous republic.”702 In fact, it was
only in 1989, where a final request by the South Ossetians for extensive autonomy was
met with violence, that the Georgian-Ossetian ethnic divide reached similar levels to the
ongoing conflict in Abkhazia:
In the summer of 1990 regional parties were banned from Georgian
elections, effectively prohibiting any South Ossetian party from
participating. In response, in September, South Ossetia declared full
sovereignty within the Soviet Union. Georgia in turn abolished South
Ossetia's autonomous oblast status completely.' The Soviet Union did not
accept South Ossetia's declaration of sovereignty or Georgia's abolition of
South Ossetia's autonomous status.' In 1989 “two-thirds of the population
of South Ossetia was ethnic Ossetian," and the main catalyst for conflict
was the publication of articles in the Georgian media stating that the
government was considering making Georgian the only official state
language, and the subsequent declaration to that effect following Georgia's
independence in 1991 - when at the time only 14% of South Ossetians could
function in Georgian.' Cornell states that there was a total lack of will to
compromise on both sides. Georgians regarded Ossetians as immigrants and
a tool of Russian attempts to block Georgia's moves toward independence.
Ossetians and other minorities were reacting against growing Georgian
nationalism and chauvinism and attempts at Georgianization and
Christianization of Georgia.703
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Following the first breakout of violence, and as the Georgian declaration of independence
in 1990 recused all former autonomous boundaries, the situation between South Ossetian
and Georgian authorities deteriorated completely. Inevitably, Georgia’s bid for
independence left South Ossetia as simply another region within Georgia, losing its
former status as an autonomous ‘oblast’ and crushing any hope for an autonomous
republic or an independent state.704 Armed conflict eventually broke out, and although a
peace agreement (Sochi Agreement) between Russia and Georgia was signed in 1992, by
then, South Ossetia had become a de facto state controlled by armed militias who were
supported and trained by the Russian military.705 Additionally, it should be noted that the
Sochi Agreement “and its provisions did not lead to a settlement of the situation, but
rather the region entered a 'frozen' conflict phase, similar to others in the former Soviet
Union (in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester), in that, while violence
ended, no lasting peace was achieved.”706 As summarized by Higgins and O’Rielly, after
1992,
South Ossetia began to operate as a de facto state, outside of the control of
Georgia despite being a part of Georgian territory. The coming to power of
Georgian President Saakashvili [in 2004] marked a major change in
relations between Georgia and the area of South Ossetia. Tensions had been
low in the region for many years, especially in comparison with other frozen
conflicts such as Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, there were
attempts by the Saakashvili government to regain control of the region,
including the closing of local markets that had facilitated cross-border
trading. From being the most tranquil of the frozen conflicts in the former
Soviet Union, the South Ossetian became the most volatile. This coincided
with a general deterioration of relations between Russia and Georgia. In
2005 North and South Ossetia released an agreement stating their wish for
unification.707
After the declaration for Ossetian unification in 2005, tensions began to rise again as it
became more and more likely that South Ossetian separatism would not accept anything

in Kiren Dawisha & Bruce Parrott eds., Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 173-80.
704 Cornell, supra note 695 at 164-6 cited in Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 571, n 23.
705 Sorenson, supra note 661 at 229.
706 Higgins & O’Rielly, supra note 695 at 571.
707 Ibid at 571.

164

less than full independence from the Georgian state. Additionally, as a major promise of
Saakashvili’s platform included ‘unifying’ Georgia, a Georgian-proposed referendum for
autonomy was rejected by South Ossetian and Abkhaz voters in 2006. At this point,
tensions began to point towards a potential for an all-out armed conflict, with South
Ossetian militias becoming more organized and better-trained, largely through funding
and support by the Russian authorities.708 After the 2006 referenda in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, negotiations ceased and relations deteriorated between Georgia on one
side, and South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia on the other. The next sub-section will
explore the series of events that followed the 2006 referenda in detail, defining the
illegality of Russia’s military intervention in 2008 and rejecting the claim of external
self-determination for both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
4.3.3. Legality of Russia’s military intervention
As demonstrated in the previous sub-sections, Russia’s involvement in the
Caucasus should not be surprising given its historical and geopolitical ties to the region.
Outside of these ties, Russia’s support for territorial disputes and secessionist conflicts
around its borders are certainly a cause for concern, although the intervention and
subsequent invasion of Georgia in 2008 was the first instance of a direct Russian military
invasion since the end of the Cold War.709 This sub-section will provide a brief
chronological summary of Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008, and will aim
to firmly establish how, notwithstanding all other factors, the intervention and subsequent
invasion of Georgia was executed on false legal precedents that do not conform to the
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international legal norms for the use of force in UNC secessionist conflicts.710
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were subject to multiple civil armed conflicts prior to
2008, which primarily consisted of the Georgian National Guard facing off against
Abkhaz or South Ossetian militias. Although the military skirmishes did not permanently
cease, and both republics’ territorial boundaries became labeled as ‘frozen conflict
zones’,711 the events which took place in 2008 overshadowed any attempts to find a
negotiated solution to the territorial conflicts.712 Therefore, prior to investigating the
legality of the military intervention, it is necessary to briefly summarize the events that
occurred right before and after the military intervention in 2008.
As previously mentioned, the events that led to Russia’s military intervention in
August of 2008, known as the ‘Russo-Georgian five-day war’, started much earlier in the
year. As early as April 2008, “Russia moved to formalize its relations with both South
Ossetia and Abkhazia as President Putin signed a decree instructing the government to
open political, economic and social relations with the regions.”713 A string of military
clashes between the South Ossetian and Georgian militaries followed. After a bout of
Russian military exercises in neighbouring North Ossetia in July of the same year,
clashes and Georgian shelling of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali commenced
sometime during the first week of August. Although the series of events that took place
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during the first days of August remains unclear, it is well established that the Georgian
military attacked the capital Tskhinvali on August 7th through an air and ground assault,
capturing the capital on August 8.714 This prompted Russia to respond with a
comprehensive military intervention, including 300 combat aircraft, a naval blockade of
Georgia’s ports and the deployment of nearly 9,000 troops into South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.715 The military intervention lasted nearly two weeks, with Russian troops
supporting South Ossetian and Abkhaz militias to repel the Georgian military to outside
the boundaries of their respective republic boundaries. However, instead of ceasing
hostilities once the Georgian military retreated, Russia proceeded to send its troops into
Georgia proper, coming within miles of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, while undeniably
attacking Georgian military on “undisputed Georgian territory.”716 Additionally, in
Abkhazia, Russian and Abkhaz forces attacked the Georgian military stationed in the
upper Kodori Valley, while forcibly expelling the majority of the ethnic Georgian
population from Abkhazia proper.717 These developments prove crucial to the
understanding of why the international reaction to Russia’s military intervention rejected
the notion that it was executed under the pretences of a pre-emptive ‘humanitarian’ cause
based on the Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples’ right to self-determination.
Russia’s military intervention and subsequent invasion of Georgia ended with a
brokered ceasefire by French President Nikolas Sarkozy on August 12, 2008. Although
the Russian military forces withdrew from the areas considered to be Georgia proper,
they maintained their military presence inside both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.718 In
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response to the international community’s condemnation of Russia’s intervention and
subsequent invasion of Georgia, a number of ‘legal arguments’ were put forward by the
Russian authorities to justify Russia’s actions under international law. One of those
points, made by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and reiterated by then-Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin, was that the Russian military intervention was executed
“…upon the finding that South Ossetians and Abkhazians faced an extreme amount of
peril at the hands of the Georgian state right before Russia intervened.” 719 Additionally,
Putin made an unsubstantiated claim that a ‘genocide’ had been committed by Georgia in
South Ossetia, in reference to the figure of 1,500–2,000 dead civilians as part of the
Georgian military operation.720 Lastly, a comparison was made between the situation in
Kosovo and the situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with Russia insisting that both
peoples were the targets of ethnic cleansing and discrimination, which prompted an
obligation for pre-emptive and reactive military intervention.721
In the context of this thesis, it is necessary to validate only the arguments that
pertain to whether the Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples possessed the right of selfdetermination, as well as whether the human rights abuses they suffered at the hands of
the Georgian military could be considered as in extremis. Should these factors not meet
the threshold set by the two aforementioned case studies for a direct third-state military
intervention, the actions of the state become that of an aggressor and should be analyzed
from a perspective of their violations with respect to international law.
Concerning the case of Abkhazian peoples, the answer to whether they had a right
to seek external self-determination lies in assessing two separate claims. First, the lack of
international recognition for Abkhaz peoples’ right for external self-determination, and
second, the lack of evidence that atrocities were committed by Georgians against the
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Abkhazian people. As expanded on by Anderson, both claims have serious legitimacy
issues:
[The lack of international] recognition stems from the fact that Abkhazia's
UNC secession did not conform with the customary law right of peoples to
external self-determination. In the period prior to the declaration of
independence, Abkhazian citizens were not subject to deliberate, sustained,
and systematic human rights abuses in extremis at the hands of Georgia. As
such, Abkhazia's UNC secession violated the peremptory norm of the right
of peoples to self-determination, which in turn ensured that Abkhazia's
statehood failed to crystallize.722
This claim is echoed by Raic and Dugard who state that
…There is no doubt that the Abkhazians qualify as a people for the purpose
of self-determination. This was acknowledged by the Soviet Union when it
conferred a special status on Abkhazia…This does not, however, seem to
be the main obstacle in the way of recognition of Abkhazia’s bid for
independence. Instead the answer is to be found in Abkhazia’s
intransigence at the negotiating table and the absence of serious violations
of the Abkhazian people’s human rights by Georgia. The Abkhazians have
become more and more unwilling to enter into good faith negotiations on
the future political status of Abkhazia within Georgia, whereas the Georgian
government has been willing to grant a substantial amount of political
autonomy since the end of 1993. The consistent rejection by the Abkhazians
of Georgia’s proposals for political and territorial autonomy within a federal
arrangement, and of the appeals of the international community for such a
settlement, suggests that the Abkhazians are not prepared to exhaust
effective and peaceful remedies before claiming secession. Moreover, there
is no evidence of widespread and serious violations of the fundamental
rights of the Abkhazians by Georgia. On the contrary, the Abkhazians are
themselves accused of violating the fundamental rights of Georgians
resident in, or previously resident in, Abkhazia. Therefore, the conclusion
must be that the Abkhazians do not, under the prevailing circumstances,
possess a right of unilateral secession and, consequently, that the
proclamation of independence is in violation of the law of selfdetermination.723
Although certain human rights violations were committed as part of the on-going civil
conflict between the ethnic-Georgian citizens and the ethnic-Abkhaz citizens, no
evidence points to perpetrated human rights abuses that can be designated as in extremis.
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Furthermore, the exile of ethnic-Georgian citizens from Abkhazia throughout the late
1990s, as well as after the war in 2008 (which continues to present day), provides
evidence of the fact that the Abkhazian peoples’ right to external self-determination
infringed on the rights of a Georgian ethnic minority which lived on its territory, through
abusive and discriminatory practices.724 Similarly, with regards to South Ossetia,
Anderson writes that
Whilst it is obvious that Georgians and South Ossetians experienced a
prolonged breakdown of relations and intermittent hostilities during the
period 1989-2008, it must be asked whether South Ossetia's UNC secession
conformed with the customary law right of peoples to external selfdetermination. More pointedly, it must be asked whether South Ossetians
experienced sustained and systematic human rights abuses in extremis at the
hands of Georgians, with no prospect for peaceful resolution of the conflict.
It would seem most likely that the answer is no, as prospects for a political
solution stopping short of UNC secession were possible, particularly under
Shevardnadze's more moderate influence…It would seem then that South
Ossetia's statehood has failed to crystallize, owing principally to the fact
that its UNC secession was not in conformity with the peremptory norm of
the right of peoples to self-determination.725
Therefore, if the right of self-determination is applied to the cases of South Ossetian and
Abkhazian peoples prior to Russia’s military intervention in 2008, it becomes evident
that, factually, a lack of dolus specificus with respect to the purported human rights
abuses committed against them by the Georgian state prevents the invocation of any right
of external self-determination. Additionally, the plethora of attempts by the Georgian
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state to include Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of a federative autonomous state
structure both under a less-nationalist and moderate nationalist government, further
alienates any justification of that right. Lastly, Russia’s direct military intervention which
supported the de facto independence of both republics, violated the prohibition on the use
of force through its invasion of Georgia proper, which cannot be used as a pretense for a
justification of independence, as it was determined that both peoples’ in question did not
possess the right to external self-determination.726
In sum, this sub-section can be summarized by three conclusions with respect to
the status of the two breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: i) one of
Russia’s primary and official reasons for military intervention into South Ossetia and
Abkhazia was that it responded to confirmed acts of ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’
(both of which could be considered as fulfilling the criteria of human rights abuses in
extremis if factually accurate), ii) no evidence of ethnic cleansing or genocide have
surfaced to date for either entity, iii) at most, South Ossetians and Abkhazians have the
right to invoke their right of internal self-determination (i.e. request for more autonomy),
an opportunity which they were presented with numerous times by Georgian and
international negotiators and systematically rejected. Collectively, these conclusions
allow for the confirmation that, even if a legal justification existed for Russia’s military
intervention with regards to Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia due to the death of
Russian peacekeepers in the initial Georgian military attack on Tskhinvali,727 the
subsequent military invasion which reached deep into Georgian territory blatantly
violated peremptory norms of international law and thus invalidate any invocation or
execution of the right of South Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples to external self-

Scholarly opinion and state practice extensively support the notion that compliance with
peremptory norms is a primary requirement of a UNC secession. See e.g. Anderson, “Unilateral NonColonial Secession”, supra note 7 at 87-8 n 325; Raic, supra note 13 at 156; Crawford, “The Creation
of States”, supra note 22 at 107.
727 There is evidence that Russia’s military response was lawful in response to the death of its
peacekeepers allegedly by the Georgian Armed Forces. See especially, Heidi Tagliavini, Report of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, (Volume II, 2009) online: <
http://echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf> at 23-5. Additionally, for a
breakdown of the legal justification for self-defence that can be applied by Russia in this particular
instance, see Mastroianni, supra note 709 at 641.
726

171

determination.
Now that all three case studies have been presented, it is necessary to conclude
this Chapter by combining the factors which identified the justifications behind the right
to both a UNC secession and a military intervention, into a legal framework. This
framework, which will be presented in the next section, will establish a platform through
which a third-state military intervention can be analyzed and consequently, determined to
be justifiable and legitimate.

4.4. The Analysis Framework of Third-State Military Interventions
Although evidence of state practice with regards to a qualified right to a thirdstate military intervention under international law has been presented in the preceding
Chapters, it is necessary to identify the elements which strengthen its legal justification.
This sub-section will do this by establishing a framework consisting of four requirements
through which such elements can become more easily identifiable. Once identified, such
elements can subsequently be applied to situations of military interventions in similar
circumstances, and consequently, assist in determining their legitimacy under
international law.
Prior to delving into the factors that justify the violation of the prohibition on the
use of force, it is necessary to briefly mention the critical difference between an ‘excuse’
and a ‘justification’ in international law. Vidmar presents an excellent definition of the
two terms, which can be adopted as part of this thesis’ legal analysis:
Justifications are legally-warranted exceptions to the general prohibition.
As such, they are a way out of illegality. Excuses, on the other hand, are not
a way out of illegality, but act as mitigating circumstances that preclude
responsibility for an otherwise illegal conduct.728
As can be deduced from Vidmar’s definition, the difference between the two concepts is
central to understanding the criticism leveled against international law and the use of

Jure Vidmar, “Excusing Illegal Use of Force: From Illegal but Legitimate to Legal Because it is
Legitimate?” (14 April 2017) online: < www.ejiltalk.org/excusing-illegal-use-of-force-from-illegalbut-legitimate-to-legal-because-it-is-legitimate/> [emphasis added] [“Vidmar, “Excusing Illegal Use
of Force”].
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force in general. For example, the previous sub-sections in this Chapter have
demonstrated that Russia’s military intervention into Georgia proper in 2008 and
NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, have been ‘justified’ through official
statements that purport to provide a ‘legal justification’ for the states’ actions. When
analyzing the veracity of such statements, especially in the legal sense, it is crucial to
identify and differentiate the ‘excusatory’ statement from the ‘justificatory’ one. In other
words, as international law relies heavily on states to provide justifications for their
actions in order to formulate custom729 (this assumes of course that the action is not
found in codified treaties), the threshold for identifying whether a states’ response to that
action meets the standard for a legal justification or not must be established. In the
context of the use of force, defining the asymmetry of the two concepts is challenging as
in part “[i]nternational law does recognize defenses for states that breach their
international obligations, but it does not clarify which defenses are justifications and
which are excuses.”730 Although the debate on international state responsibility is an
extensive subject and beyond the scope of this thesis,731 it is nonetheless important to
consider the juristic difference between an ‘excuse’ and a ‘justification’ in international
law. Further, Vidmar makes an excellent point of identifying that in providing a threshold
or a guideline for what constitutes a ‘justification’, a norm prohibiting the act which
requires justification can be eased or relaxed, thereby ensuring that its violators can
become easily identifiable. 732 This is an important suggestion, which if applied to the
case of third-state military interventions, reaffirms the existence of a more ‘relaxed’

Curtis A Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015) in at 139.
730 Arthur Kutoroff, “Emerging Voices: Excuse in International Law” (12 August 2015), Opinio Juris
(blog), online: < http://opiniojuris.org/2015/08/12/emerging-voices-excuse-in-international-law/>.
731 The debate over state responsibility and the difference between a justification and an excuse is
extensive. For example, international legal human rights scholars argue that states should be held
responsible for breaching any of their international legal obligations. On the other hand, another
group of scholars argues that a state has a right to determine the necessity of breaching its
international obligations in conformity with its responsibility to protect itself and its citizens. For an
excellent review of both sides of the argument, see Frederica Paddeu, Justification and Excuse in
International Law: Concept and Theory of General Defences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2017). See also Roman Boed, "State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally Wrongful
Conduct" (2000) 3:1 Yale Human Rights and Dev J 1.
732 Vidmar, “Excusing Illegal Use of Force”, supra note 728 [emphasis added].
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interpretation of the prohibition on the use of force as being restrictively qualified and not
obligatory.
Now that the difference between an excuse and a justification of a violation of
international law has been established, it is necessary to present the four requirements
which makeup the framework through which a third-state military intervention can be
properly analyzed. The first requirement which determines whether a right to third-state
military intervention exists or not, mandates two necessary criteria: i) that a ‘peoples’
within an established state are the subject of systematic abuses of human rights deemed
as in extremis, with no possibility of a negotiated solution between them and the state
authorities,733 and (ii) that such ‘peoples’ be eligible to invoke a right to a UNC secession
under international law.734 In this context, the term ‘peoples’ should be construed openly,
so as to not limit the right of self-determination to certain descriptive or ascriptive
features that can create discord in multinational states. A good example of considering an
‘open’ definition of the term ‘peoples’ is presented in the following manner by Anderson:
Although there is no definitive legal definition of “peoples,” three
propositions can be reasonably inferred from relevant UN instruments: first,
that “peoples” are not restricted to the colonial context; second, that more
than one “people” can inhabit a non-self-governing territory and sovereign
state; and third, that “peoples” should have what might be loosely termed
“national overtones,” in the sense that they should have some common
group identity. The latter point, however, should not be interpreted
narrowly: “psychological perceptions and not tangible attributes” should
form the primary basis of peoplehood. The corollary of the foregoing points

It is important to note that in order to reach the threshold of ‘no possibility of a negotiated
solution’, numerous attempts at a negotiated solution should be attempted and subsequently fail.
734 This element can be determined by putting the peoples’ in question through the ‘implied
requirements test’ as suggested by Anderson. According to him, the four implied requirements of a
right to a UNC secession are: I) The discrimination against the peoples’ in question must be
deliberate and sustained, II) The discrimination must be contemporary, meaning that the attempted
UNC secession must be based on contemporary events which do not surpass 10 years ex post facto,
III) UNC entity must agree to protect and uphold the rights of other minorities within its territorial
claim, especially any minorities of the offending state, IV) the entity must abide by all laws of
statehood in international law, meaning that it will not be granted legitimacy should its UNC
secession come about as a result of a violation of peremptory norms of international law. For a more
in-depth analysis of this test, see Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1218-20.
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is that there are no reasonable grounds to argue that the definition of
“peoples” in anyway precludes UNC secessionist self-determination.735
It is therefore suggested that, for the purposes of this framework, the term ‘peoples’ be
interpreted as such; however, it is also necessary to point out that, in considering the
applicability of the term, a consideration for the extent of the discrimination they face
must equally be applied. In other words, it must be determined that, outside of the
applicability of whether the homogenous group can be attributed the term ‘peoples’, an
equal amount of weight must be given to whether such a group has suffered a systematic
and persistent discrimination that warrants a third-state military intervention. In order to
identify this, a more precise definition must be established of what constitutes such a
level of discrimination, which in turn can be termed as human rights abuses deemed as in
extremis. With regards to determining what is meant by ‘discrimination of peoples’, it is
necessary to point to Paragraph 7 of the Friendly Relations Declaration which stipulates
that:
…States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.736
The final sentence of this citation, which mentions race, creed and color, has been the
cause of an extensive debate surrounding its meaning in the context of UNC
secessions.737 This is important as, unfortunately, “the Declaration's travaux
preparatoires and proces verbaux provide little or no guidance [to their definition,
meaning that], it has been left to eminent scholars to formulate their own definitions.”738
For example, Anderson suggests that Cassese’s interpretation of the meaning of race and
creed creates a pleonasm if interpreted through Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of

Ibid at 1203-4. For relevant evidence as part of UN instruments that defend each of these points,
see ibid at nn 78-81.
736 See Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 144, para 7 [emphasis added].
737 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1204.
738 Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 355.
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Human Rights.739 He explains this further by stating that:
Cassese strictly construes "race" as only connoting physical somatic
differences, explicitly rejecting any definition that encompasses factors
such as language or culture. He further postulates that the meaning of
"creed" is restricted to "religious beliefs, rather than the broader definition
provided by the Oxford English Dictionary: "a set of opinions on any
subject." Cassese arrives at this conclusion by arguing that if "creed"
encompassed the broader Oxford definition, "a set of opinions on any
subject," a government not representing the opinions of a people, even if
democratically elected, could be interpreted as violating that people's right
to self-determination. He therefore concludes that the right to UNC
secession contained in paragraph 7 is activated only on the grounds of racial
or religious discrimination against a people.740
First, with respect to the terms ‘race’ and ‘colour’, it is challenging to not accept
Cassese’s analysis given that “…it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation
where two or more peoples may be of a different colour, whilst at the same time not also
constituting a different race.”741 Second, as can be understood through Anderson’s
reasoning, Cassese’s narrow definition of ‘race’, “…which is confined to physical
somatic differences,”742 fails to account for cultural and linguistic ties that are important
factors when considering the notion of racial discrimination. In fact, Anderson concludes
his argument by pointing to the synonymy of the terms ‘race’ and ‘nation’ as being
crucial to the understanding of how discrimination in the context of UNC secessions must
be interpreted. By pointing to the Oxford Dictionary’s definition of ‘race’, which can be
construed as being more diverse and expansive than Cassese’s,743 Anderson clarifies what
was meant by the Declaration on the threshold of discrimination of peoples:

See UNDHR, supra note 631 ("[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction
shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under
any other limitation of sovereignty" at art 2). See also, Cassese, “Self-Determination of Peoples”, supra
note 6 at 112, cited in Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 356, n 50.
740 Ibid.
741 Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 356.
742 Ibid.
743 See Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo. "Race" Online:
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/race>. “Each of the major divisions of humankind,
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The synonymy between "races" and "peoples" evident above is important,
as the Charter's travaux also reveals that the word "peoples" captures the
concept of "nations."…Further evidence of the synonymy between "races"
and "nations" is provided by the 1966 International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 1 of which
contains the most widely accepted definition of "racial discrimination"…It
follows that the notion of racial discrimination encompasses distinction or
exclusion based upon and related to "national or ethnic origin." It may be
reasonably inferred then that the term "race" not only connotes physical
somatic differences, but also other factors associated with nationality and
ethnicity, such as language, culture and customs.744
Therefore, if one is to adopt Anderson’s interpretation of the Convention, the term
‘peoples’ can be construed as encompassing factors outside of physical somatic
differences. Indeed, it can be suggested that in a world that is becoming more multiethnic
and multicultural, it is difficult to argue that a homogenous group of ‘peoples’ can only
be determined on the basis of ascriptive features. Therefore, for the purposes of this
framework, the definition of ‘peoples’ mentioned above can be considered side-by-side
with their purported discrimination, which can be understood as being based on physical
somatic differences and such factors as language, culture, customs, religion or ethnicity.
Concerning the level of discrimination, it is important to reiterate the difference
between human rights abuses deemed as in extremis and human rights abuses deemed as
in moderato. Human rights abuses considered to be in extremis “…must be of a
deliberate, sustained, and systematic nature, with ‘the exclusion of any likelihood for a
possible peaceful solution within the existing state structure’.”745 Example of these types
of human rights abuses can include such acts as genocide and systemic ethnic cleansing,
as well as actions considered genocidal (such as the case in Bangladesh, which may have
not met the threshold of a ‘genocide’ from the perspective of international law, but was
termed as ‘genocidal’ nevertheless). 746 Alternatively, human rights abuses considered as

having distinct physical characteristics…‘people of all races, colours, and creeds’… A group of people
sharing the same culture, history, language, etc.; an ethnic group.
744 Anderson, “Declaratory GA Resolutions”, supra note 68 at 357.
745 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1218. See also Cassese, “SelfDetermination of Peoples”, supra note 6 at 119-20.
746 On the term ‘genocidal’ in relation to the Bangladesh conflict, see supra note 533.
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in moderato can be understood to mean political, cultural, or racial discrimination, which
can include acts such as supressing a peoples’ political, linguistic and cultural rights, as
well as repressing their official representation in government. The discrepancy in the
definition and the level of discrimination by the existing state’s government is expanded
on by Anderson in the following manner:
This means that a government must knowingly and intentionally inflict
discrimination against a people. Mere de minimis or unknowing instances
of discrimination will not do. Something more is required, namely,
governmental behavior which evidences dolus, or intentional malice,
towards a people. Additionally, there must be a fundamental loss of rapport
between the parties to the dispute, precluding the likelihood of a harmonious
resolution.747
In the cases of Bangladesh and Kosovo, a systematic and deliberate attempt to extinct the
Bengalis and the Kosovars by their respective state authorities through a mass campaign
of atrocities, provides a clear example of the level of discrimination as reaching in
extremis levels. Additionally, both case studies effectivelydemonstrated that, insofar as a
diplomatic solution was available, there was no opportunity for a ‘harmonious resolution’
to the territorial conflicts. On the other hand, political and linguistic repressions of the
Abkhaz peoples in Abkhazia and the Ossetian peoples in South Ossetia, although
deplorable and denounceable, fail to meet the necessary threshold of dolus and hence, can
be considered as human rights abuses in moderato.
The second requirement as part of this framework is that two valuable pieces of
evidence must be presented as justification for the military intervention. First, there must
be evidence, of the UNSC being paralyzed, and unable to act through its enforcement
mechanism as evinced under the UN Charter.748 It is crucial that evidence of such a
paralysis exists, as a violation of the prohibition on the use of force in this context can
only occur through the existence of this circumstance prima facie. More precisely, in
accordance with Article 27 of the UN Charter, should a permanent member of the UNSC

747
748

Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1241.
Supra note 396.
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invoke the use of the veto749 or imply that a veto will be used to halt any military action
in order to solve the issue at hand,750 the process of justifying a right to a military
intervention can move forward to the third requirement which, if satisfied, can proceed
unabated.751 Although, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the restrictive school would argue that
the prohibition on the use of force is absolute,752 and hence, inviolable; the cases of
Kosovo and Bangladesh provide evidence that such a violation through a military
intervention is justified and permitted under the specific circumstances outlined in the
case studies in this Chapter.
The third requirement relates to the concern outlined by the Non-Aligned
Movement regarding the true intention of a state or states when conducting a military
intervention. For example, if one is to consider the 2011 NATO operation in Libya as
being an example of a ‘humanitarian intervention’, the question can be asked, what were
the true intentions of NATO states that partook in the military intervention given the state
of Libya contemporarily (i.e post-intervention)? In order to alleviate this type of criticism
for third-state military interventions in self-determination conflicts, it is important to
consider the following course of action, which, if implemented, could alleviate some of
the discord for the military action by those states who oppose it: the key actors’ military
force must present a plan for an intervention which includes considerations of

An example of this is Russia’s use of the veto preventing the UNSC on passing a resolution for
possible military action or reprisal in the humanitarian crisis in Syria. See Euan Mckirdy, “8 times
Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution on Syria” CNN (13 April 2017),
online:<www.cnn.com>.
750 An alternative example is a permanent member of the UNSC vowing to impose a veto prior to a
vote happening. Russia did this with regards to passing a resolution on Syria as well. See Jennifer
Peltz, “UN Syria sanctions vote sought next week; Russia vows veto” CTV News (24 February 2017)
online: <www.ctvnews.ca>.
751 Although Article 27 does not explicitly mention the implied right to a veto by one of the five
permanent members of the UNSC, an implied consensus of voting on substantive matters provides a
right for any of the permanent five members to a ‘veto.’ See e.g. UN Charter, supra note 21, art 27. On
the criticism and challenges of the UNSC use of the ‘veto’ see Bardo Fassbender, ed, “Veto” in Max
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press) at paras 9-17, online:
<www.opil.ouplaw.com>.
752 See section 3.1.2.
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proportionality,753 as well as post-intervention withdrawal in order to alleviate the
suspicion of an ex post facto foreign military occupation.754 Such a plan can include
political, legal and rebuilding considerations, as the likelihood of an effective and stable
government post-intervention is very minimal (as was demonstrated in the cases of
Kosovo and Bangladesh). From an international legal perspective, such considerations
can also include a post-intervention treaty for cessation of hostilities, as well as an
establishment of a provisional government. This treaty could be signed between the
former sovereign state, the key actors who performed the intervention and the newly
formed state.755 Examples of such treaties include the 1995 Austrian State Treaty756 or the
1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty.757 Although in the instances of Kosovo and
Bangladesh, treaties were not needed in order for the key actors’ militaries to halt

‘Proportionality’ in this case refers to the ‘principle of proportionality’ which can be defined in the
substantive sense as a principle which should plan to do more good than harm in relation to a
military intervention. See Rodley, supra note 456 (“…the point is that the interventionist prescription
cures, rather than aggravates, the malady, much less kills the patient” at 791).
754 A clear example of this is Russia’s military occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For evidence
of the fact that Russia is considered as a ‘foreign military occupying force’ in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, see “OSCE conference discusses Russian occupation of Georgian territories” Agenda.Ge (29
Jun 2017) online: < http://agenda.ge/news/82452/eng>. For more on the nature and the definition
of foreign military occupation under international law, see Adam Roberts, ed, “Military Termination
of Occupation” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press)
online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com> (“The term ‘military occupation’ is broad, encompassing a wide
range of cases in which the armed forces of a State, or of several States, exercise authority, on a
temporary basis, over inhabited territory outside the accepted international frontiers of their State. It
refers to belligerent occupations, in the classic form of which a belligerent State or alliance controls
all or part of an enemy’s territory in the course of a war; and it also refers to other instances in which
territory is occupied in the absence of hostilities, or in which an occupation continues after
hostilities, and even a formal state of belligerency between States, have ended. The ‘law on
occupations’—ie the body of international law governing military occupations—is part of the law of
armed conflict, often referred to as international humanitarian law. Occupations are generally a
consequence of international armed conflicts. The main aims of the law on occupations are that
certain legitimate needs of the occupant ie occupying power and its armed forces should be met; that
disruption to the lives of inhabitants should be kept to a minimum; and that control over territory
should be treated as provisional in character until final arrangements are made” at para 3).
755 Roberts, supra note 754 at paras 21-22.
756 State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, 15 May 1955, 217
UNTS 223, BGBl Nr 152/1955, UKTS 58. This treaty ended the USSR occupation of Austria and
established a newly independent Austrian state.
757 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, Israel and Egypt, 26 March 1979, UNTS 17813. This treaty, among
other things, ensured the complete withdrawal of the Israeli military from the Sinai Peninsula. In
turn, Egypt agreed to recognize Israel as a state.
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operations and withdraw, this consideration could further solidify the intentions of the
key actors, as well as avoid accusations of a foreign military occupation.
Lastly, the fourth requirement of this framework looks at the international
community’s reaction to the intervention, which must not include a collective, systematic
or consistent condemnation. In other words, the majority of the international
community’s reaction, which could include such factors as condemnations by regional
organizations, can be measured as providing supporting evidence for the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of the intervention. A prime example of this has been the condemnation of
Russia’s military intervention by regional organizations such as the OSCE,758 NATO,759
and the EU.760 Such condemnations can, given the specific circumstances of the
intervention, point towards the illegality of the intervention, coupled with other potential
violations of international law (as in the case of Russia’s intervention in 2008.) More
precisely, as suggested by Harold Koh, the international reaction to an act by a state can
be defined as “an ex post exemption from legal wrongfulness.”761 He explains:
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility
recognize, for example, that extreme circumstances such as distress and
necessity would preclude claims of international wrongfulness against an
acting state and permit certain forms of countermeasures to stop illegal acts
by others. Whether the collective action would ultimately be judged
internationally lawful would then depend critically on what happened next,
particularly if the Security Council condoned the action after the fact... 762
For example, the response to the intervention in Bangladesh, although originally
bordering on the negative, quickly gained traction and changed to the positive vis-à-vis
its respective recognition and the justifications provided by India to the UNSC. Similarly

“OSCE Chairman condemns Russia's recognition of South Ossetia, Abkhazia independence” OSCE
(26 August 2008) online:< www.osce.org/cio/50011>.
759 Helen Womack, “Nato joins US in condemning Russia's response in South Ossetia” The Guardian
(11 August 2008) online: < www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/11/georgia.russia7>.
760 “EU Condemns Russia Over Georgia Action” VOA News (1 November 2009) online:<
www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2008-09-01-voa52/402144.html>.
761 Harold Hongju Koh, “Not Illegal: But Now The Hard Part Begins” Just Security (7 April 2017),
online: < www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins/>.
762 Harold Koh, “The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention” (2016) 53:5 Hous J Intl L 971 at
1010.
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in Kosovo, the NATO intervention, although heavily criticized, has been largely accepted
as justifiable in the years following its successful execution. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that “…what amounts to a breach of international law by a State depends on the
actual content of that State’s international obligations, and this varies from one State to
the next.”763 More succinctly, the international reaction towards a violation of
international law will not preclude or justify on its own the action of the violator.
In conclusion, when analyzing a case of a third-state military intervention in the
context of a UNC secession, these four requirements - that, (i) a ‘peoples’ eligible for a
UNC secession within an established state are the subject of systematic abuses of human
rights deemed as in extremis, with no possibility of a negotiated solution between them
and the state authorities, that ii) evidence of UNSC paralysis exists, that (iii) the true
intention of the key actors’ intervention should be made clear through factors such as
proportionality of military operations and post-intervention rebuilding and that, (iv) the
international community’s collective response to the intervention must not include a
systematic or consistent condemnation - can become useful elements when assessing its
legality under international law. Nevertheless, it must be noted that, as UNC secessions
are often executed differently due to historical, political and regional elements, a legal
analysis of a third-state military intervention in such situations requires a certain degree
of flexibility. In other words, this framework can only speak to the main elements
necessary in a UNC secession, to which the exception of the prohibition on the use of
force can be directly applied to. For example, such elements can include the
determination of whether the entity can be identified as ‘peoples’ and, if so, whether their
right to self-determination has been systematically denied and repressed. On the other
hand, elements such as the unlawful use of force against civilian minority populations by
the UNC secessionist entity, or the violation of peremptory norms of international law as
part of the statehood process, must be evaluated separately on the basis of the foregoing
situation.
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Crawford, “State”, supra note 194 at para 2.
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Conclusively, this framework can be used as a general guideline, from which
determinations of legal or illegal actions can be made on the basis of case-specific
elements which will depend entirely on how the intervention has been executed, as well
as the circumstances that precede and surround it. Now that this Chapter has come to its
conclusion, it is necessary to provide a brief reaffirmation of the primary arguments of
this thesis, as well as establish a clear argument on the exception to the prohibition on the
use of force in international law.
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Chapter 5
Chapter 5: Conclusion
The concept of humanitarian intervention, its meaning and its status under
international law, continues to be a topic of contested debate among scholars, lawyers
and politicians. As the prohibition on the use of force has crystallized into the ‘most
secure’ jus cogens norm in international law given its centrality in the UN Charter, it is
challenging to assert that its violation can be legitimized in any manner under a
‘particular exception’.764 Indeed, the most basic issue with the concept of a humanitarian
intervention as having legal standing under international law is that its challenges are not
normative, but rather operational.765 More precisely, although an extensive list of scholars
have attempted to argue for or against the existence of a right to humanitarian
intervention, it can be suggested that state practice along with opinio juris has
predominantly rejected its existence as an ‘absolutist’ concept. 766
This Chapter is separated into three sub-parts. First, a summary of the preceding
four chapters’ primary arguments will demonstrate the interconnectivity of several areas
of international law that support the final argument for this thesis. Second, further
clarification will be presented on discerning the contemporary doctrine of humanitarian
intervention (which embraces the R2P principle). This will be done in order to establish
this thesis’ principle viewpoint on the topic of military interventions, which posits that a
legal exception to the prohibition on the use of force exists only within the context of a
UNC secession, coupled with human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. Lastly, a final
sub-section will offer a number of concluding thoughts with respect to the notion of a
right to a third-state military intervention in international law.

Rodley, supra note 456 at 794.
Thomas G Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention, (Hoboken: Polity Press, 2016) at 140.
766 Sean Richmond, “Why is humanitarian intervention so divisive? Revisiting the debate over the
1999 Kosovo intervention” (2016) 3:2 J on the Use of Force and Intl L 234 at 255-9.
764
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5.1 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1 introduced the thesis by establishing the sources of international law
used as part of the legal analysis of the subject-matter. Additionally, the Chapter clearly
established the objective of the thesis, providing a distinction between the alreadyestablished doctrine of the right to a UNC secession, and the primary objective of the
thesis which intended to defend its three primary suppositions: i) that the principle of
self-determination exists as a legal right under international law, (ii) that the principle of
self-determination provides a qualified right of a UNC secession, and lastly, (iii) that in
cases where the principle of self-determination is systematically denied (combined with
human rights abuses designated as in extremis), a legal right may be invoked to a military
intervention by a third-state.
Chapter 2 summarized the history of the principle of self-determination, with the
intention of drawing a parallel between the principle and the concepts of state
recognition, statehood and sovereignty under international law. It began by presenting the
history of the principle of self-determination, which was separated between its
development prior to and after the 19th century, examining its legal development under
classical and contemporary international law. Next, it was demonstrated how the
principle became intertwined with the concepts of recognition, statehood and sovereignty
throughout the late half of the 19th and early half of the 20th centuries. As the three
concepts are often conflated in cases of external self-determination, it was necessary to
emphasize how their interrelatedness plays into considering the legitimacy of an UNC
Secession. Lastly, Chapter 2 presented an explanation for the existence of a right to a
UNC secession under international law, while equally presenting its interrelation with the
right to a UC secession. The connection between the two concepts was made in order to
demonstrate how colonial oppression can exist outside of the ‘decolonization’ context.
Overall, Chapter 2 established how the principle of self-determination is corollary to the
existence of a justification for a right to a UNC secession.
Chapter 3 focused on examining the international law on the use of force, and
subsequently, how that law has been applied to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. First, a history of the jus ad bellum was
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presented in order to demonstrate its relationship with the classical just war doctrine and
later with the notion of a ‘humanitarian intervention’. Second, the prohibition on the use
of force was introduced as part of a general introduction on how international law
perceives the use of force by states. Further, the prohibition was analyzed vis-à-vis its
applicability to the creation of states in international law. This was done in order to
evaluate what constitutes the legality of direct and indirect third-state support in cases of
state creation related to UC and UNC secessions. Lastly, a final portion of the Chapter
focused on connecting how the concepts of classical natural law, humanitarian
intervention and classical just war theory intersect with regards to their theoretical and
legal bases. As part of this comparison, a legal analysis of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention was completed, concluding that its legal status under international law
remains inchoate and hence, can be considered at most an instrument of soft law.
Finally, Chapter 4 examined three case studies that shared similar variables of
being attempted UNC secessions with subsequent military interventions by a third state.
The first two case studies, Bangladesh and Kosovo, identified the historical, political and
legal developments that led to their unilateral secessions and subsequent military
interventions by India and NATO respectively. The intention of the first two case studies
was to underline how their UNC secessions, even if supported through a unilateral and
collective third-state military intervention, did not violate peremptory norms of
international law as part of their statehood creation processes. Additionally, both cases
had evidence of systematic and widespread human rights abuses deemed as in extremis,
which justified the violation of the prohibition on the use of force as part of the third-state
military interventions. Alternatively, a third case study was presented in an effort to
highlight the difference between a legally-justified and unjustified third-state military
intervention on the basis of a UNC secessionist claim. In outlining the historical
developments which led to the ‘secession’ of the de facto republics of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, a clear line was drawn between what constitutes a legitimate and an
illegitimate claim of a right to external self-determination, as well as the threshold for a
third-state military intervention through the confirmation of human rights abuses that can
be deemed as in extremis. The threshold was established on the basis of the following
methodology: that (i) a ‘peoples’ invoke their right to internal self-determination which is
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rejected by the state, that (ii) the right of external self-determination is invoked on the
basis of a right to a qualified UNC secession, which is rejected as well, that iii) the state
responds by beginning a systematic campaign of human rights abuses, repressions and
killings considered as in extremis against the peoples in question, and that iv) a third-state
or a collective group of third states invoke their right to a military intervention to cease
the human rights abuses and allow for the invocation of the right to external selfdetermination to proceed. On the basis of this methodology, a set of four requirements
was presented which combined the elements identified in the case studies into an
analytical framework. The objective of the framework was to create a guideline through
which a third-state military intervention executed under similar circumstances can be
analyzed from. Overall, the case studies solidified the existence of an accepted state
practice with regards to the right of third state military interventions under the
circumstances outlined above. Now that the summary of the first four Chapters has been
completed, it is necessary to conclude this thesis with a short commentary on the primary
issues it addressed.

5.1. The Right to a Military Intervention - Final Comments
As the act of secession continues to be a topic of heated debate in the international
legal community, it is important to recognize that the “…the prohibition of the use of
force represents, besides the protection of human rights, the major advancement of the
international legal order in the 20th century.”767 Hence, irrespective of its violations,
whether through excuse or justification, the prohibition has become the cornerstone of the
international legal order with respect to interstate relations and an overall objection to allout inter-state or collective warfare.768 Thus, any ‘exceptions’ to the prohibition on the
use of force require very strong evidence in both state practice and opinio juris to be
considered as legitimate. 769 More precisely, the general notion of interventionism in the

Dorr, supra note 374 at para 51.
Ibid.
769 For more on the impact of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo as part of international human rights
law, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth “From the Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of the
Field of International Human Rights” (2006) 2 Annual R of L and Social Science 231 at 234-46.
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last two decades has demonstrated that, through an unregulated international
understanding of this concept, a hierarchy of necessity is created by virtue of which a
case of human rights abuses must reach in extremis levels prior to a consideration of a
military intervention. Even more so, this applies to cases of human rights abuses outside
the ambit of self-determination, which have seen states choose ‘selectively’ when or
when not to militarily intervene in a given conflict.770 This notion of human rights
‘selectivism’ is, in the author’s opinion, one of the most divisive issues facing
international legal scholars in the present moment. Nevertheless, in combination with all
of the evidence presented in the previous four chapters, it is necessary to establish a firm
statement with regards to the right of a military intervention only in the context of a UNC
secession under international law.
To begin, it is important to reiterate that, within the context of military
interventions, the qualified right to a military intervention can be interpreted as
The justifiable use of force to protect [a peoples’ right to a UNC secession]
…against so persistent and arbitrary abuse as to go beyond the limit by
which the sovereign nation is presumed to act within justice and reasons…
[additionally, it can be defined as an act] which recognizes a state's rights
to exercise through military force international control over acts of another
states regarding its internal sovereignty when its actions are deemed to
contradict the laws of humanity.771
Although it is undeniable that states should be held responsible for a systematic and
egregious abuse of human rights in armed uprisings and independence-related
conflicts,772 the basis on which an absolute right for a humanitarian intervention can be
interpreted as having its weakest legal standing is premised on three crucial

Nico Kirsch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the
International Legal Order”16 EU J Intl L 369 at 397-99.
771 Zaid Ali Zaid, “Humanitarian Intervention in International Law” (2013) 54:2 Acta Juridica
Hungarica 185 at 187.
772 International Human Rights Law is a growing discipline of international law which considers the
primacy of human rights jurisprudence in all major spheres of international law. The core of the
discipline is governed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See
generally, Thomas Buergenthal, ed, “Human Rights” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (Oxford University Press) at para 9, online: <www.opil.ouplaw.com>; UNDHR,
supra note 631; ICPR, supra note 92; ICESR, supra note 144.
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constraints.773 Respectively, these constraints are, i) the concern evinced by multiple
states of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as becoming a concept of neoimperialism for powerful states, ii) the continuous promulgation of ‘defensive armed
conflicts’, such as the ‘war on terrorism’ under which military interventions by states
(such as the US intervention in Iraq in 2003) have become ‘justified’ for ‘humanitarian
reasons’, and iii) the notion of human life as being more valuable than the sovereignty of
states has lost its popularity through the continued brutal armed conflicts in Yemen,774
Syria,775 Afghanistan776 and Iraq,777 to name a few, whereby the systematic death of
civilians has resulted in little collective humanitarian military action. 778 Therefore, it is
necessary to conclude that, on the basis of the evidence presented in Chapter 3, the
contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention which stipulates that a
‘responsibility’ exists on a state or states to militarily intervene on behalf of a
systematically oppressed population has not crystallized as a norm in international law.
At the very least, this vision of ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a norm can be construed as
being in its early stages of development, specifically with respect to unilateral or
collective military action by states regardless of circumstance (i.e. military intervention to

See Weiss, supra note 765 (“[t]he NAM – with more than 130 members, and arguably the most
representative group of countries outside the UN itself – has publicly rejected “the right of
humanitarian intervention,” even if Africans on their own are usually seeking more outside
intervention to halt humanitarian disasters and the African Union’s Constitutive Act contains a
bullish Article 4(h). Developing countries are not alone in their recalcitrance. For example, American
“sovereigntists” launched three lines of counterattack: the emerging international legal order is
vague and illegitimately intrusive on domestic affairs; the international lawmaking process is
unaccountable, and the resulting law unenforceable; and Washington can opt out of international
regimes as a matter of power, legal right, and constitutional duty” at 141).
774 Rebecca Tan, “The war in Yemen has led to the worst cholera outbreak in the world”, VOX (26 June
2017) online: <www.vox.com/world/2017/6/26/15872946/yemen-war-cholera-outbreak-saudiarabia-us-airstrikes>.
775 Julian Borger, “Civilian deaths from US-led strikes on Isis surge under Trump administration”, The
Guardian (6 June 2017) online: < www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/06/us-syria-iraq-isisislamic-state-strikes-death-toll>.
776 “Afghan Civilians” Watson Institute of Public and International Affairs online:
<watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/afghan>.
777 “Iraq” Watson Institute of Public and International Affairs online:
<watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/iraqi>.
778 See Weiss, supra note 765 at 140-2.
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stop systematic human rights abuses against anti-government protesters in Libya)779 and
outside of UNSC approval (such as the current extremely bloody civil conflict in Syria).
More concisely, the R2P principle has become engrained as the leading contemporary
interpretation of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which purports to obligate
military action by states in cases of humanitarian crises.780 This obligation has, to date,
been unable to earn the necessary normative and operative strength to become an
accepted law under the well-accepted sources of international law. In the qualified sense,
such operative and normative support exists for a third-state military intervention only
through the pretext of the principle of self-determination, and under very particular
circumstances which must include a UNC secessionist entity invoking that principle on
the basis of its systematic denial.
Nonetheless, the law on the use of force as it stands must continue to progress
towards a more relaxed understanding of its operative strength. In fact, one positive
aspect that can be noted is that its progression has been noticeable since its inception in
1945. For example, as stated by one jurist on the ever-evolving international law on
interventionism:
In 2017, we live and operate in a world order that is distinctly different from
that which operated between 1945 and 1989. This is so, even though it might
be difficult to pin down the specific moment of change. Unlike the

UNSC Resolution 1973 authorized the use of ‘all necessary means’ to protect the Libyan civilian
population from attacks by the government run by Muammar Gaddafi. Although the military
intervention by NATO and other Western allies resulted in the abdication and subsequent death of
the Muammar Gaddafi, the intervention was considered by a number of scholars as an example of
‘regime change’. Most such scholars disagree with NATO’s interpretation of the UNSC Resolution as
allowing for collective ‘humanitarian’ intervention sub silentio. See e.g. Fox, supra note 315 at paras
45-52; Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 18 at para 17.
780 The notion of an ‘obligation’ in international law holds an extremely high threshold. In essence, an
obligation would, as argued by Dr.Halil Basaran, ‘governmentalize’ the process of military action in
response to egregious atrocities and abuses of human rights around the world. See Halil Basaran,
“Identifying the Responsibility to Protect” (2014) 38 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 195
(“[u]ltimately, R2P represents a subtle mechanism. It consists of observations, suggestions, and
stimulations as epitomized by the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome, and by General Assembly and Security Council
resolutions. R2P, as a form of knowledge, aims to indirectly and subtly govern states. These subtle
procedures of governmentality run counter to positivism…R2P has still not distinguished itself from
humanitarian intervention, and these two concepts remain terminologically interwoven” at 196202). See also ibid at 204,208.
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dethroning of the post-World War I order by the U.N. system, we cannot
point to a precise moment at which the changes can be said conclusively to
have occurred, nor can we point to specific texts (or even clear-cut rules) in
defining and framing those changes. Nonetheless, that the international
system now operates under distinctly different norms-and perhaps
objectives and aspirations-are, in my view, beyond cavil.781
As expounded on in the citation above, a slow, yet steady progress with regards to the
contemporary jus ad bellum can be noticed if analyzed on the basis of its consistency
since its codification in the UN Charter. However, outside of this progress, as this thesis
has clearly demonstrated, blatant violations of the prohibition on the use of force in
recent history should be seen as exactly what they are perceived to be under international
law: blatant violations. Exceptions in international law only exist insofar as they can be
supported by a breadth of evidence necessary to confirm their existence. With regards to
military interventionism in particular, the emphasis must remain on self-determination as
the leading factor behind the strength of its justification only in the UNC context. In large
part, this is due to the fact that “…self-determination is a progressive force that has
challenged the political status quo throughout history”782 and, hence, continues to
similarly challenge it on the prohibition on the use force if coupled with its systematic
denial and human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. All things considered, it should
also be noted that even as a progressive force, each case of self-determination throughout
history requires an aggressive and detailed analysis, in order to determine the elements
necessary to confirm the legitimacy behind its claim, specifically with regards to the
emergence of new states.
Conclusively, it can be suggested that the only right to the use of force outside of
the current legal parameters, exists in the context of an UNC secession which meets the
criteria for an oppressed ‘peoples’ on the basis of an external self-determination attempt,
and whose secession is coupled with human rights abuses deemed as in extremis. It is
necessary to underline that the direct support of a third state or states in an effort to halt

Maxwell O Chibundu, “International Law and the Legitimation of External Coercive Measures in
Aid of Internal Change” (2017) 31 Temp Intl & Comp L J 123 at 131.
782 Anderson, “A Post-Millennial Inquiry”, supra note 13 at 1201.
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the human rights abuses will violate the peremptory norm of the illegal use of force783
regardless of circumstance; however, the scope of the military intervention, coupled with
the intent, the execution and the adherence to the requirements presented in the analytical
framework, can provide a justification for the violation of the peremptory norm of the
illegal use of force. Ultimately, the combined supremacy of the principle of selfdetermination, state practice and UN instruments, if considered side-by-side, provide an
exception of the prohibition on the use of force under customary international law; the
only such exception to the prohibition.
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Anderson, “The Use of Force”, supra note 9 at 239.
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